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Author’s Note
It has been a tremendously enjoyable and rewarding experience toresearch and write the history of the Government Car Service.
Sensitivity and discretion is of course at the centre of all the work
done by GCS, but the necessity to remain out of the limelight means
that its fascinating and unique story is largely unknown to the
outside world. For myself, therefore, it was a revelation to discover
the extremely close relationships that have often developed between
drivers and the Ministers and officials they carry, and also the personal
interest in its development taken by a succession of Prime Ministers.
As an organisation, GCS has inevitably experienced some ups and
downs over its sixty years, but invariably the great quality and
character of its staff have seen it through each crisis, so that today it
is probably in its strongest ever position.
I would like to thank all the former and current members of GCS
who gave so unstintingly of their time to help and advise me, and
to answer all my queries. It has been a great privilege to meet and
speak to all of them. However, special mention must be made here
of one unique source – the scrapbook compiled over her thirty-five-
year career with GCS by driver Beryl Osborne. The wealth of
material included in the scrapbook, including reminiscences,
letters, photos and press cuttings, is a treasure trove for anyone
researching the history of GCS. There is no doubt that ‘Ossie’s’
scrapbook is an important historical document in its own right, and
a tremendous credit to her conscientious effort in compiling it over
so many years. This book would certainly have been much the
poorer without it.
vii
I would also like to thank staff at the National Archives at Kew for
their advice and assistance in identifying material from the earlier
history of OCS/GCS.
Finally, I would like to thank all at the Centre for Transport and
Society at the University of the West of England for their unfailing
support. In particular, I am grateful to Professor Glenn Lyons and Dr
Graham Parkhurst for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of the
book.
With reference to the book itself, unless otherwise stated, all
material is either from GCS files or from interviews with the author.
Dr Geoffrey Dudley
Centre for Transport and Society,
University of the West of England
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CHAPTER 1
A Special Relationship
Personal Service
Before the Government Car Service was even founded, the uniquecharacter of its relationships with its principal customers was
already being moulded. This was perfectly illustrated one day
towards the end of the Second World War, when Tom Hughes was
summoned to 10 Downing Street to see Prime Minister Winston
Churchill. Hughes was in charge of the Ministry of Aircraft
Production vehicle fleet, but his responsibilities also included main-
taining the Prime Minister’s car.
Unfortunately for Hughes, he found that the great wartime leader
was not in a happy mood, and Churchill complained that rain was
getting into his car. Hughes went away and tested the vehicle, but
was puzzled when he found that it seemed to be completely water-
proof. He therefore arranged for someone to follow the car when the
Prime Minister was riding in it, and from this discovered that
Churchill always dropped the window an inch when smoking his
trademark cigar, in order to be able to flick out the ash! Hughes
reported his findings to the Prime Minister’s Private Secretary, only
to receive the abrupt message from Churchill to ‘stop the rain coming
in!’ Typically, the Prime Minister was not going to compromise, and
so Hughes had to find a solution. He achieved this by arranging for
two sets of louvres (horizontal slats sloping outwards to throw off
rain) to be fitted, to allow the rear windows to be dropped a couple
of inches without the rain leaking in.
Having led Britain to victory against Hitler, Churchill was heavily
defeated in the general election of 1945, but then returned as Prime
Minister in 1951, when the Conservative Party won the election of
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that year. By the early 1950s, Hughes himself was Superintendent of
what in 1952 became the Government Car Service, and so the two
resumed their encounters. Taking no risks, Hughes immediately
arranged for two shields to be fitted to the rear windows of the Prime
Minister’s car. A few months later, however, Hughes was concerned to
find two bad burn marks on the rear seat of the car. He rang
Churchill’s Private Secretary to inform him of the cost of re-covering
the seats, but then asked if the Prime Minister would object to seat
covers, as these could be changed economically in future. Never-
theless, Churchill remained stubborn, and replied brusquely: ‘If
Hughes put a decent ashtray in the car, the cigar would not fall off
the ashtray.’
Anxious to please, Hughes arranged for a huge fourteen-inch-long
ashtray to be made in the workshop. It seemed that this would settle
things, but he then heard from Churchill’s driver that the Prime
Minister kept his matches in his trouser pocket, and that it was quite
a performance for him to roll over to one side and retrieve them to
light his cigar. As an extra touch, Hughes therefore saw to it that a
well was fitted at the end of the ashtray to hold the matches. At last,
the Prime Minister could smoke his cigar in peace, and he sent a
message to Hughes thanking him for his good work.
Hughes had still not quite finished, however, and in a thoughtful
gesture he arranged for the pistons from Churchill’s old wartime car
to be remoulded into a castle turret shape, and used on the GCS car
to hold Churchill’s flag, as holder of the ancient ceremonial office of
Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports. Churchill was so pleased with both
the ashtray and the turret flag that, when he resigned as Prime
Minister in 1955, he obtained permission for them to be moved to his
private car.1
This story may now of course be very much of its time, in terms of
the social acceptability of smoking, but the vital point is that, for
Churchill, the cigar was an essential tool in projecting his large and
pugnacious political personality. In later times, similar functions
would be performed by Harold Wilson’s reassuring pipe (in fact,
significantly, GCS also provided a special ashtray for this Prime
Minister) and Margaret Thatcher’s swinging handbag. Hughes
therefore no doubt understood implicitly that there was a practical
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purpose to the service he was providing, above merely catering for the
Prime Minister’s smoking needs.
The encounters between Churchill and Hughes capture
particularly well both the tangible and, perhaps even more import-
antly, intangible elements in the relationships between GCS and its
customers. On one level, a GCS driver is there to provide transport
for a Minister or official, and get them to where they want to go as
quickly and efficiently as possible. However, Ministers in particular
often lead quite lonely, stressful and insecure existences. They are
frequently on the move, and so a close relationship can develop, in
which the driver becomes a friend and discreet confidante, or at times
even an adviser. The driver and Minister may initially be thrown
together, but their experiences in the political ‘trenches’ can forge a
close relationship.
The highly distinctive character of GCS, and the quality of the
relationships it engenders, is expressed particularly well by one of its
longest serving users in modern times (as Minister, Prime Minister
and former Prime Minister), the Prime Minister from 1990 to 1997,
Sir John Major:
I have been a ‘customer’ of the Government Car Service for nearly a
quarter of a century and, throughout all that time, I cannot recall a
single occasion when I required a car and it was not immediately
available. This includes not only my period as Prime Minister and
beyond, but also my early years as a Junior Minister. I do believe that
consistency of service is quite remarkable, not least because of the
extraordinarily uncivil hours that politicians are required to be on
duty.
One other characteristic of the GCS is that when you have a dedi-
cated driver (as opposed to a changing pool of drivers) he becomes
part of an extended family, and I have never once in my years of
contact with GCS found a single confidence misplaced. It is a
remarkable service, and one that can be very proud of its contribution
to government.2
One vivid memory for Sir John concerns that of the distinctive type
of music that accompanied his twice-weekly journey to the House of
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Commons for Prime Minister’s Questions: ‘One of my drivers had the
habit of playing rousing patriotic marches during the short drive
between Downing Street and the Palace of Westminster each Tuesday
and Thursday. I am not sure how much this helped, as I was usually
focused on preparation for Prime Minister’s Questions, but there was
no doubt it stirred the blood.’3
Given the nature of the deliberately unobtrusive service provided
by GCS, it is perhaps inevitable that these relationships largely
remain unknown to the public. Occasionally, however, circumstances
may at least briefly expose them to the public gaze. This has perhaps
never been better illustrated than in the case of Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher. GCS driver George Newell had driven Mrs
Thatcher since she had become Conservative Party Leader in 1975,
but in March 1981 he had died suddenly, while the Prime Minister
was visiting Northern Ireland. When she was told the news, Mrs
Thatcher burst into tears and immediately rang George Newell’s
wife, and made a car available to her. Against established practice,
the Prime Minister insisted on attending the funeral, and was
accompanied by husband Denis and son Mark. Despite her ‘iron
lady’ public image, Mrs Thatcher again showed considerable
emotion at the funeral, and paid a warm tribute to her driver: ‘A
wonderful man, a marvellous chauffeur and a good friend who could
always make me laugh.’4 There was also a wreath from former Prime
Minister Edward Heath, as George Newell had previously been his
driver.
Mrs Thatcher subsequently developed another relationship of high
mutual regard with her GCS driver Denis Oliver, who drove her for
a total of fourteen years. This included getting the Prime Minister
out of the Grand Hotel in Brighton in 1984, after the explosion of an
IRA bomb that killed five people.
Thatcher resigned as Prime Minister in 1990 in highly contro-
versial and emotional circumstances, famously leaving Downing
Street in tears. GCS wanted Denis Oliver to take over as driver for the
new Prime Minister, John Major, but he felt a great loyalty to the
now ex-Prime Minister, who in this role was still entitled to an
official car: ‘I reckoned Mrs Thatcher had been through a lot, and
needed me more than ever now.’ Margaret Thatcher showed her
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appreciation for Oliver’s help and friendship by holding a party in her
driver’s honour when he retired in 1998, and he continues to keep in
touch, and to periodically visit his former boss.
Another remarkable GCS career was that of Bill Housden, who
drove Harold Macmillan as Minister and Prime Minister from 1951
to 1963, and then followed that up by driving Harold Wilson as
Prime Minister (1964–70), Leader of the Opposition (1970–74),
Prime Minister again (1974–76), and then former Prime Minister.
In fact, Housden developed a particularly close relationship with
Wilson, whom he had first driven when the Labour politician joined
the Cabinet as President of the Board of Trade in 1947. The closeness
of this relationship was such that Mr and Mrs Wilson acted as
godparents for the Housdens’ daughter when she was baptised in
1951. Later, as we will see in Chapter Four, Housden became some-
thing of a co-opted member of Wilson’s powerful ‘Kitchen Cabinet’
during the latter’s second period as Prime Minister.
A senior ministerial colleague of Harold Wilson during the 1960s
and 1970s, although also one of his severest critics, was Tony Benn.
With characteristic frankness, Benn leaves no doubt as to how highly
he valued his GCS drivers:
I knew some of the drivers during my eleven years as a Minister, and
the ones who looked after me were all very competent and friendly.
My drivers, especially Ron Vaughan, became real friends, and we
talked for far longer every day than I ever did with my Permanent
Secretary, including deep discussions about government business and
my Department, apart from confidential matters.5
In his Diaries, Tony Benn vividly, and at times movingly, illustrates
how at times he came to rely on his sympathetic driver. For example,
the entry for 26 July 1976 reads simply: ‘I came home and talked to
my driver Ron [Vaughan]. I tell him everything. It is a day when
politics was perfectly bloody and I have a thumping headache.’6 Ron
Vaughan became a close family friend, and this included Benn and his
wife attending Vaughan’s wedding in 1977.7 On a more sombre note,
in May 1978 Benn’s daughter-in-law Rosalind was diagnosed with
lung cancer. As Tony Benn describes: ‘I did tell my driver, Ron
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Vaughan, about it and he said, “It’s turned summer into winter”,
which I thought was touching.’8
On occasions, a Minister may find an opportunity to express an
appreciation of their driver in practical terms. This was well illu-
strated in 1994, when Beryl Osborne, a GCS driver with over thirty
years service, was awarded an MBE. Sir John Cope, a former
Conservative Paymaster General whom she had driven for several
years, took the opportunity to drive her to Buckingham Palace for the
presentation, and then picked her up for the return journey.
To a high degree, there is a continuity about these Minister–driver
relationships that runs like a thread, across the political spectrum,
throughout the sixty-year history of GCS, and operates regardless of
Party and personality. This thread undoubtedly continues up to the
present time. Nick Matheson, Chief Executive of the Government
Car and Despatch Agency (GCDA) (that includes GCS) from 1997 to
2005, sums up the essence of what the relationships mean: ‘What
matters is what actually works. With GCS, you have the remarkable
relationships between Ministers and drivers. There is something of
huge intrinsic value here. Basically, there is a bit of magic about it.’
For the current Chief Executive of the GCDA, Roy Burke, there is
a similar respect for these relationships:
The last thing I would want to do is to destroy the link with the
customer sitting at the back of the car. He or she has a relationship
with the driver that is truly our golden asset. For example, the driver
may have a call in the middle of the night from a Minister who has
been abroad, saying that they are arriving back home early, and the
driver will willingly go and pick them up.
Nevertheless, Roy Burke is also aware that GCS has to be seen to be
working efficiently and effectively: ‘The people sitting at the back of
the car like the idea that they have got a personal servant in many
respects. You can understand that they like it. However, from the
general public’s perspective they will quite rightly ask if we are
delivering something efficiently. I think that we are.’
The History of the Government Car Service
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THE ULTIMATE ‘INSIDERS’
In one episode of the classic television situation comedy series Yes
Minister, the Minister, Jim Hacker, is unable to find out what is
actually going on with regard to a particularly sensitive issue from
any of his ministerial colleagues, or the Permanent Secretary, Sir
Humphrey Appleby. Desperate for information, he consults his
driver, who proceeds to put the Minister fully in the picture with the
inside story from Westminster and Whitehall. As so often was the
case with this well researched series, the reality can bear a close
resemblance to the fictional story. Lady Falkender (formerly Marcia
Williams) was Personal and then Political Secretary to Harold Wilson
from 1956 to 1995, and therefore at the centre of government
throughout Wilson’s two periods as Prime Minister in the 1960s and
1970s. In discussing GCS drivers, she describes them as the ‘Outer
Cabinet’ because they are the depositories of every possible political
confidence.9 This inside knowledge can be particularly important at
the time of ministerial reshuffles, when a driver is often in a position
to reassure (or alarm!) a Minister about his or her impending fate. At
the same time, as Sir John Major emphasises, the unique position of
GCS drivers places a huge premium on discretion, as the golden asset
of the relationship between a driver and Minister can only work
efficiently if trust and goodwill is maintained.
GCS Director Jerry Doyle, who in one capacity or another has been
associated with the Service since 1972, acknowledges that the
relationships between Ministers and drivers lie at the heart of the
business, and argues strongly that only GCS can do this effectively:
This is something that could not be reproduced by the private sector
or the security services. In fact, drivers often come to believe that
they work for a particular Minister rather than the Government Car
and Despatch Agency, and develop a huge loyalty. At the same time,
a large number of the drivers have been with us for many years, and
so can provide a great continuity. For example, when a new govern-
ment comes in, a driver knows exactly the routine that a Minister has
to follow, and this can prove invaluable.
The History of the Government Car Service
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The political significance of GCS is made clear by Labour MP, and
former Minister, Sir Gerald Kaufman, in his handbook on How to be a
Minister. As an Environment Minister from 1974 to 1975, Kaufman
himself was responsible for GCS, and was well aware of the powerful
position he held: ‘When I was at the Department of the Environment
supreme authority over the GCS rested with me, a position of greater
power than anyone except the Prime Minister himself enjoys. The
allocation of cars to Ministers arouses violent emotions (more among
the drivers than the Ministers).’10 Nevertheless, Kaufman describes
how pleas for vehicular favours came thick and fast, and that everyone
wanted a Rover, but there was a shortage of these. Consequently, he
decided arbitrarily that only Cabinet Ministers could have Rovers, an
edict that resulted in several Junior Ministers presenting a variety of
arguments as to why they too should have a Rover!11
Kaufman emphasises that a sensible Minister will do a great deal
to please his or her driver, as they are highly dependent on them.12 At
the same time, a Minister should always bear in mind that a GCS car
and driver is a prized privilege, and so should be ready to give a lift
to backbench MPs after a late night Commons’ sitting: ‘After all, the
backbenchers have been kept behind at the House to cast a vote that
sustains the government in office, and keeps you in your ministerial
job and car.’13 He also warns that, after leaving office, Ministers will
probably suffer withdrawal symptoms, and that after several years of
pampered travel in a ministerial car, the now ex-Minister will once
more have to get used to using public transport in company with
their fellow citizens.14
The political strength of the Minister–driver relationship made
itself felt particularly on former Conservative Deputy Prime Minister
Michael Heseltine, who describes how his plans to privatise GCS in
the 1990s were thwarted by his fellow Ministers’ fears about losing
their own drivers.15 In fact, it was perhaps a telling factor that at this
time Heseltine was one of the few Ministers to actually use his own
limousine and driver! Nevertheless, significantly, there remains a
strong GCS connection here, as in his earlier years as a Minister, in
the 1980s, Heseltine himself used a government driver. When he
dramatically walked out of the Cabinet as Defence Secretary in 1986,
Heseltine offered his GCS driver the option of going with him. In the
The History of the Government Car Service
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event, the driver did choose to stay with Heseltine, and has remained
with him ever since.16
For most GCS drivers, however, Ministers and governments
eventually move on, and it is ultimately the day-to-day professional-
ism of the Service that carries things forward. One GCS driver
describes well how this professionalism works in practice:
You can get quite close to a Minister and his family, and even become
good friends. The strange thing is that the Minister will then assume
that you must have the same political views as himself, and will see
you as a colleague here. He will tell you that ‘We are doing this’ and
‘We are doing that’ and take it for granted that you are supportive.
In reality, you may totally disagree, but of course you don’t tell him
that. I guess it shows that you are doing your job efficiently, that
Ministers automatically see you as ‘one of them’.
In many respects, the unsocial hours required of a driver allocated to
a Minister can demand some tough sacrifices. As GCS Director Jerry
Doyle describes, family life can be the first victim:
Being a GCS driver is not necessarily the best job for a happy
marriage. From Monday morning to Thursday evening, a wife has to
be prepared not to see her husband. For example, there may be a late
night Commons’ sitting, and the driver has to wait around for hours,
but can only come home when the Minister’s day is finished.
Ironically, marriages can also sometimes fail when the driver gives up
the job or retires. A wife has got used to a routine, and finds that her
husband is about the place too much.
Traditionally, for GCS drivers basic pay has been relatively low, with
much of the salary made by means of large amounts of overtime.
Nevertheless, the low pay has led to some harsh impacts, such as poor
pensions, even after many years of service. In recent years,
significantly more of the salary has been consolidated into basic pay,
but the nature of the job, in terms of hours worked, means that there
can still be a strong reliance on overtime. Given these sometimes
difficult conditions, there is a concern within GCS that, with a
The History of the Government Car Service
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generally ageing workforce, it may become increasingly difficult to
attract younger people to this type of work.
Just as behind the efficient professionalism of GCS drivers there
may be a more difficult personal reality, so for the organisation itself
within Whitehall, despite its ‘insider’ status, there is a paradox that,
for much of its sixty-year history, it has been systematically over-
looked and undervalued by successive governments.
THE LONG SEARCH FOR A GOOD HOME
It could be said that GCS represents a typically British pragmatic
solution to the problems of providing official transport. It was born
out of the necessity during the Second World War to find a means to
ferry around Ministers and officials, military leaders and assorted
VIPs. One solution arrived in the perhaps unlikely form of the Motor
Transport Corps. This consisted largely of well-to-do ladies, keen to
volunteer for the war effort, who also donated their vehicles, often of
the luxury variety, such as Rolls Royces and Bentleys (a good fictional
example of the MTC at work is provided by the character Samantha
Stewart, who drives around Detective Chief Superintendent Foyle in
the television series Foyle’s War).
In the post-war world, the virtue of having an organised and
professional car service for Whitehall was quickly recognised, and in
1946 the MTC was merged with the fleet of the Ministry of Aircraft
Production to form the Official Car Service. From the outset,
however, the OCS had severe problems forging an identity as an
organisation. This was chiefly because it was placed within the giant
Ministry of Supply that, apart from providing massive supplies to
the armed services, also, incredibly, had responsibility for the iron
and steel industry, and the development of nuclear power. It was
hardly surprising, therefore, that OCS became a very small cog in a
large wheel. There was also the serious difficulty that OTS became
defined as a supply organisation, rather than its true character as a
type of transport operator. A remarkable feature of the 1950s was the
degree to which the modern GCS was forged by the personal
initiatives of Prime Ministers Winston Churchill and Harold
Macmillan, yet despite this care and attention from the very top of
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government, the Service still failed to find its true identity as an
organisation.
In the event, these organisational and identity problems would dog
GCS (as it became in 1952) for the next forty-five years, and it has
had a variety of homes. These include, after the Ministry of Supply,
the Ministry of Works, the Department of the Environment (and a
spell here of over twenty years within the Property Services Agency),
the Cabinet Office, and, since 2005, the Department for Transport.
The persistent uncertainty, and lack of identity and leadership,
appeared to sap morale over the years, and for much of the 1980s
and 1990s GCS as an organisation struggled (although, fortunately
for the future existence of the Service, the quality of the driver–
Minister relationships remained as high as ever). In the 1980s, there
was a long debate within government about the possibility of
privatising GCS. This was eventually rejected, chiefly on security
grounds, but the uncertainty continued, and for a period in the late
1980s there was a distinct possibility that GCS might disappear
altogether, particularly in the form of a takeover by the Metropolitan
Police.
GCS survived by the skin of its teeth, and in 1993 it appeared that
the Service was finally entering a new and more stable era when it
joined the ranks of the Whitehall trend towards arm’s-length
Executive Agencies, and became part of the Securities and Facilities
Executive (SAFE). However, this proved to be a false dawn. As part
of SAFE, GCS was strangely defined as chiefly a security organisation,
while the Service once again found that it suffered from neglect by
the central management of the Agency.
By 1997, GCS was in a poor financial state and at a very low ebb
generally, but it was then that its fortunes took a turn for the better.
It came together with the InterDespatch Service (the government’s
internal mail service) to form the Government Car and Despatch
Agency. Within Whitehall, there were very low expectations for the
new Agency, but under a highly proactive Chief Executive, Nick
Matheson, the formation of GCDA proved to be a key turning point
in the history of GCS. For the first time, it enabled GCS to forge its
own identity, and to plan more strategically. With the stronger and
more commercially aware leadership, GCS, in many ways against the
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odds, was able to reach its sixtieth birthday in 2006, in a much
healthier state than would have seemed possible only a few years
earlier.
EFFICIENCY ALLOCATIONS
AND GREY AREAS
Some challenges to the GCS have a persistent and repetitive quality.
In particular, over decades the Service has consistently been required
to rebut charges from political critics that it provides a luxurious
service to public servants at the taxpayers’ expense. It is perhaps
almost inevitable that GCS is seen as a soft target by those keen to
score points against the government of the time, and at least since the
1970s it has had to deal with efficiency reviews by government itself.
A lack of attention here undoubtedly damaged the organisational
status of GCS in the 1970s and 1980s. As with Whitehall generally,
there has been a major culture shift within GCS over the past two
decades, which places much greater emphasis on monitoring and
measuring costs and efficiency. GCS Director Jerry Doyle describes
the contrasts since the 1970s, when he worked in the Department of
the Environment (DoE) workshops, where the responsibilities
included maintaining GCS vehicles:
I found it very difficult at first. I had previously worked in the
private sector, where I was expected to do a large number of jobs as
quickly as possible. However, with the DoE I was told to take as long
as it took to do the job, and costs did not really matter. However,
over the years that culture has totally shifted, and it is essential to
control costs and to do the job as efficiently as possible, although the
ethic of public service is still vital.
A major moment of truth for GCS arrived during the late 1980s, after
a series of efficiency scrutinies of the Service exposed serious
deficiencies. In the early 1990s, strenuous efforts were made to reduce
costs, but with mixed success, while relationships between manage-
ment and staff deteriorated markedly. In the late 1990s, the brave
decision was made to reduce charges, which in the event proved to be
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a great success, as business was boosted, and revenues actually
increased, particularly in the area of short term hire. This has meant
that GCS has been able to declare a surplus in all its years with the
GCDA. In 2005–06, GCS income totalled £11.7 million, and there
was an operating surplus of £122,000. Nevertheless, dilemmas
remain. For example, as a public sector organisation GCS profits are
returned to the Treasury, yet it requires significant funds for invest-
ments, such as in new vehicles and technology, which can improve
efficiency.
At the same time as greater emphasis has been placed on efficiency,
so it could also be said that the scope of GCS services has tended to
expand gradually but steadily over the years. In recent years this has
tended to be chiefly in the area of short term hire, where GCS provides
an ad hoc chauffeur-driven saloon car service within Whitehall. In this
area, it is clearly in intense competition with the private sector, but
this has proved to be a great success for GCS (with the help of the
reduced rates), and revenues increased from £750,000 in 1999–2000
to over £2 million in 2005–06. Nevertheless, revenues from so-called
allocated services continue to dominate GCS finances (over 80 per cent
of the total). These allocated services refer to those provided specific-
ally for Cabinet Ministers and Junior Ministers, senior Whitehall
officials such as Permanent Secretaries, and a number of public sector
Chief Executives, such as the Government’s Chief Scientific Adviser,
the Chief Medical Officer, the Chief Inspector of Schools, and the
Comptroller and Auditor General. In contrast, pool services, such as
short term hire, are provided on a first come first served basis. In
2005–6 the GCS fleet consisted of 186 vehicles, with 114 Allocated
services, and a staff of 164.
GCS also employs private contractors, although the cars and
drivers must be specified, with all the drivers of course cleared for
security. These contractors operate in the regions as well as London,
and are required to maintain exacting standards. As Jerry Doyle
comments: ‘They know that they are only as good as their last job,
and must perform, or else we will get someone else.’ The only central
government Departments not to use GCS for all Ministers are the
Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office, where some Junior
Ministers are driven in departmental vehicles, although the
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Secretaries of State for both Departments do use GCS vehicles and
drivers. GCS covers England, Scotland and Wales, but not Northern
Ireland, while the Scottish Office does also have its own transport. In
addition to its main London base, GCS has smaller sites in
Birmingham, Bradford and Cardiff.
It is the allocated services that tend to attract the most public
attention, although there can be somemisconceptions. For example, in
recent years a great deal of attention has centred on the GCS vehicles
used by former Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott (given the
nickname of ‘Two Jags’ by the media, because of his own and official
Jaguar cars). In fact, GCS officially provides vehicles on a depart-
mental basis, and not to individual Ministers. The regulations for
vehicle use, and the list of vehicles available in the various categories,
are set out in the Prime Minister’s Rules, which are periodically
reviewed. Nevertheless, it could be said that developments in
allocations often owe as much to responses to events as codified rules,
while there can be significant grey areas in vehicle use.
For example, we will see in Chapter Four how, in the 1970s, GCS
cars were made available to the Leader of the Opposition and ex-
Prime Ministers. However, great consternation was caused in
Whitehall when former Prime Minister Edward Heath used his pool
car well beyond the stipulation that it should be driven only ‘in and
around London’. The situation only changed when an IRA bomb
exploded outside Heath’s London home, and he was immediately
given an allocated car on security grounds.
The right of ministerial spouses and partners to use official cars is
another sensitive area. Prior to the mid-1970s, a spouse was only
allowed to use an official car when the Minister was actually in it.
However, a heartfelt letter from the wife of the Lord Chancellor to the
Prime Minister’s Secretary in 1974 led to a relaxation of this rule, so
that spouses could use a car on their own, provided it was on official
business. The situation with regard to spouses can still be sensitive,
and in recent years there has been controversy over the decision to
give an allocated car on security grounds to former Prime Minister’s
wife Cherie Blair.
A Minister can only use a GCS car on official business, and
probably the longest standing, and most persistent, grey area is what
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exactly constitutes ‘official business’. In general, it has become
accepted that a Minister can be transported to and from home to the
office, on the grounds that he or she is working on the departmental
red boxes. Similarly, although a GCS car cannot be used for Party
business, some relaxation has taken place over the years, so that an
official car can be used for a Party meeting if it takes place between
official engagements. For the Prime Minister and other Ministers
with high security needs, GCS cars can be used for all journeys,
including those for private or Party purposes.
We will see in Chapters Two and Three that in the 1940s and
1950s lengthy debates and arguments took place on who should be
allowed to have an official car, and on what basis they should be
allowed to use it. In contrast, the Prime Minister’s Rules in modern
times have tended to become more stable from one government to
another, and although critics periodically call for economies,
particularly in the aftermath of any ministerial embarrassments with
regard to car use, the Rules have changed little for several decades.
THE PRICE OF SECURITY
The needs of security have inevitably been an important and sensitive
area for GCS, particularly after the growth of IRA terrorism in the
1970s. Such dramatic events as the assassination of Conservative MP
Airey Neave by a car bomb in the House of Commons underground
car park in 1979, and the Brighton Grand Hotel bomb during the
1984 Conservative Party Conference, changed for ever a world where
Ministers could more or less assume that the worst thing that might
hit them would be a rotten egg or tomato, thrown by a disillusioned
voter.
For GCS, apart from the obvious needs for greater vigilance, and
practicalities such as armoured vehicles for vulnerable senior
Ministers, the threats to security in many ways symbolised a water-
shed, between a basically certain and predictable world from the
1940s to the 1960s, and a much more unstable existence in later
decades. In many respects, the culture of GCS was constructed on
the ethics and values of service to the community, built up by the
volunteer ladies of the Motor Transport Corps. Ironically, although
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this culture developed first during the cataclysmic events of the
Second World War, the danger was chiefly external, and so the
drivers could do their job largely without fear of a direct threat to
themselves and their passengers.
Many GCS drivers, particularly women, were recruited from the
armed services in the 1950s and 1960s, and so they brought these
disciplines to the Service. Nevertheless, the threat of urban terrorism
offered new challenges in terms of driver professionalism in potential
emergency situations, and in this new world the traditional service
qualities of the GCS driver, as a type of high quality chauffeur, could
suddenly appear rather out of date. As we will see in Chapter Five, in
the wake of the 1984 Brighton bomb there was considerable internal
pressure within government for GCS drivers in protected ministerial
cars to be replaced by drivers from the Metropolitan Police. These
pressures were relieved only when Environment Secretary Kenneth
Baker, the Minister responsible for GCS, stood firm in defence of the
Service. Significantly, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher also had a
particularly high regard for the GCS drivers, and this high level
political support proved decisive.
Subsequently, security training for GCS drivers was greatly
enhanced, but the Service could no longer assume that it would
automatically continue to be responsible for driving all Ministers.
This delicate situation came to a new head in the light of fresh
terrorist threats at the beginning of the twenty-first century,
illustrated particularly by the devastating 2001 9/11 attacks in the
United States. GCS took pride in the fact that it had driven every
Prime Minister since the war, but in 2003 responsibility for driving
Prime Minister Tony Blair was handed over to the Metropolitan
Police on security grounds. As we will see in Chapter Seven, GCS
has an agenda to regain this responsibility as soon as possible, but
there appear to be significant obstacles to be overcome.
‘BUY BRITISH’
REPLACED BY GREEN VEHICLE AGENDA
For decades, a type of at least unofficial ‘Buy British’ policy existed
with regard to the purchase of GCS vehicles. Perhaps nothing
The History of the Government Car Service
16
epitomised this relationship more than the classic Rover P5 series,
which carried a succession of Prime Ministers, and appeared in a
variety of models from 1958 to 1973. Sometimes known as a ‘middle-
class Rolls-Royce’ it provided the chief means of transport for Prime
Ministers Harold Wilson, Edward Heath, James Callaghan and
Margaret Thatcher. Commonly called 3 litre and 3.5 litre, because of
the engine displacement, it was highly significant that the last batch
of P5s produced by Rover, known as the P5Bs, were reserved for
government use, and were still familiar sights in Whitehall more
than a decade after production had ended. Consequently, when
Margaret Thatcher entered Downing Street in 1979 for the first time
as Prime Minister, she did so in a 1972 P5B, although it was during
her tenure, from 1979 to 1990, that the P5 was eventually phased out
as a Prime Ministerial car in favour of the Jaguar XJ.17 Nevertheless,
Margaret Thatcher did have a particular affection for the P5, as
described by her driver, Denis Oliver: ‘I think that one of the reasons
Mrs Thatcher liked the P5 was that it had a good step up into the car.
This meant that she could get in and out of it quite elegantly and
comfortably, without, as you might say, showing yesterday’s
washing!’
If the P5 represented the high point of design and reliability in the
relationship between GCS and the British car industry, then much of
the subsequent story has seen quite a steep downward slope. Rover
itself became part of the conglomeration of companies and models that
in 1968 became British Leyland, a merger encouraged by the govern-
ment in the hope that it would promote commercial development and
efficiency. Unfortunately, these hopes were never fulfilled, and in 1975
the company was taken into public ownership. As we will see in
Chapter Five, this gave the government a vested interest in promoting
the company’s models, and Margaret Thatcher and her Ministers
became unofficial salespeople for BL.
BL was privatised in 1987 and became the Rover Group, but in
1994 it was taken over by the German company BMW. The last UK
volume car manufacturer was now in overseas ownership, but its
fortunes could not be revived, and in 2005 the end of an era arrived
with the demise of Rover. In 2006, GCS continued to run sixteen
Rover 75s, and the chief role in GCS cars manufactured in the UK
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has been taken over by Jaguar, with twelve vehicles in the govern-
ment fleet (although Jaguar is owned by the US company, Ford).
In reality, the ever-growing globalisation of the vehicle industry
means that it is increasingly difficult to identify cars that are truly
UK manufactured. In any case, GCS points out that EU regulations
now prohibit it from specifically favouring UK cars, while the end of
Rover means that pressure from MPs with a constituency interest to
‘Buy British’ has significantly decreased.
Instead, as Chapters Six and Seven describe, it is the environmental
agenda that increasingly dictates the GCS vehicle purchasing policy,
although the character of this has shifted significantly over the years.
In the 1990s, the chief concerns tended to be about the direct adverse
effects of vehicle emissions on air quality, and their role in damaging
human health, such as in inhibiting learning processes in children,
and contributing to the increased incidence of asthma and certain
cancers. In recent years, the chief attention, at least in terms of the
political agenda, has tended to switch the emphasis on to how
emissions may contribute to climate change, and in particular the
role of the chief so-called greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide (CO2).
GCS policy has tended to reflect these changes. For example, in the
1990s and the early years of the twenty-first century, the emphasis
was on the purchase and development of alternatively powered
vehicles, such as gas powered cars, but these have now almost disa-
ppeared from the GCS fleet. More recently, official targets centre
specifically on the reduction of CO2 emissions. It could be said that
this shift reflects the concern of the government to set a good
example, given its own commitment to reduce CO2 emissions
through such international agreements as the 1997 Kyoto Protocol,
together with goals set domestically, and reflected in the publication
of the 2007 Climate Change Bill.
Perhaps nothing illustrates this policy more than the meteoric rise
within the GCS fleet of the Toyota Prius, a hybrid electric–petrol
vehicle with relatively low CO2 emissions. In 2006, there were thirty-
five Priuses in the GCS fleet (out of a vehicle total of 186) and this
figure is bound to increase significantly over the next few years. This
is even more likely, given that GCS now runs its own Green Car
Service, as an option for those ordering short term hire vehicles. The
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fact that the Prius is manufactured in Japan is much less important
for GCS, than its fitness for purpose in achieving the Service’s modern
objectives.
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CHAPTER 2
Fulfilling a Need
1939–51
THE MTC: FROM THE RITZ TO THE BLITZ
Although the Official Car Service was not founded until 1946, itseventual structure and culture were forged in the crucible of the
Second World War. Several vital strands contributed towards the
organisation and character of the post-war OCS, but they all fulfilled
a basic wartime need to provide essential and efficient transport for a
wide variety of Ministers and officials and military leaders. Of these
strands, none was more important than the remarkable, but highly
unorthodox, Motor Transport Corps. The MTC was composed of
socially well connected and generally well-to-do women who volun-
teered their driving services, and sometimes also their very upmarket
vehicles, including Bentleys and Rolls-Royces.
Of these MTC women, the best known is Kay Summersby, who
from 1942 to 1945 drove the United States’ General Dwight D.
Eisenhower, the man who became Supreme Allied Commander in
Europe, and was in charge of the decisive 1944 D-Day landings in
Normandy that began the invasion of Nazi-occupied Europe. Later,
Eisenhower would serve two full terms, from 1953 to 1961, as
President of the United States. The wartime relationship between
Summersby and the married Eisenhower was given new interest after
the latter’s death with claims, including those from Summersby
herself, of an affair between the pair.
In 1948, Kay Summersby published an account of her wartime
MTC experiences, entitled Eisenhower Was My Boss.1 This makes no
mention of an affair. In the 1970s, however, when she knew that she
was dying of cancer, Summersby wrote a second account, which was
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published posthumously, with the title Past Forgetting: My Love Affair
with Dwight D. Eisenhower.2 In turn, this second account had been
triggered by a statement from former US President Harry S. Truman
that, just after the war, Eisenhower had sought permission from Chief
of Staff General George Marshall to divorce his wife and marry
Summersby. This permission had been refused, and Truman, as
President at the time, had seen to it that the correspondence was
destroyed.3 Although the claims of an affair remain disputed,4 there is
no doubt that Eisenhower and Summersby formed an extremely close
relationship, and in this respect at least they provide an outstanding
early illustration of the remarkable empathy that can develop
between a driver and passenger. Summersby’s two books also have the
great virtue of providing unique, detailed insights into how an MTC
driver operated during the war, and how the women were virtually
defining a job description as they went along, for what would
eventually become OCS.
Kay Summersby grew up in Ireland, but then moved to London,
and became a model for the fashion house Worth of Paris. When war
was declared in September 1939, she immediately joined the MTC.
Summersby describes vividly the quite remarkable origins of the
outfit that would eventually form the basis of OCS and GCS:
I soon learned . . . the MTC was looked on as a sort of social function.
A newspaper writer had noted that the qualifications for admission
seemed to be: (1) an ability to drive a car, and (2) ability to drape
oneself in chic fashion at the Ritz or Dorchester bars. One joined the
MTC because it was The Thing One Must Do Y’know. . . if one had
the money. With disappointment, I discovered there was no pay
(when we received a pittance, the girls at headquarters looked down
upon us for accepting it). The smart uniform – a skirted version of
that worn by British officers, complete with Sam Browne [a type of
belt that combines a pistol belt and a shoulder strap] – consumed
almost fifty pounds of my thin savings.5
At the outset of the war, Summersby was not driving VIPs, but found
herself assigned to a post in Lambeth in the East End of London. She
describes how, initially, the MTC uniforms ‘drew only hate from the
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class-conscious cockneys’,6 but that once the German Blitz started in
earnest, her life was transformed:
Our little social set became the busiest rescue squad in all of London.
London and the dock areas rocked under the Nazis’ bombs. We had
twenty-four hours on duty, twenty-four hours off, and rarely got even
a wink of sleep on the broken cots.
Now, it’s difficult to try to re-create that life. I was an ambulance
driver. The only concession granted me as a woman was unofficial
permission to stuff cosmetics in my gas mask bag. It was sheer Hell,
living and driving and working in a bomb-made Hell. Blood and
death became as commonplace as a cigarette.
. . . Bodies, bodies, bodies, each with a tragic tag on one foot . . .
Driving ambulances loaded with bodies . . . Sick with the stench of
burnt flesh . . . Being turned away by mortuary after mortuary: ‘Sorry,
we’re full.’7
WITH EISENHOWER ON THE ROAD
TO VICTORY
Once the worst of the Blitz was over in 1941, Summersby was among
the first of the MTC women to be transferred to US Army Head-
quarters, where they needed drivers who knew London. It was there
in 1942 that she linked up with the then unknown Eisenhower when
he first arrived in Britain. Ironically, she was allocated Eisenhower
only because she arrived late to meet the newly arrived group of
American officers, and Eisenhower and General Mark Clark were the
only two without a driver.8
Once Eisenhower became Commander of the European Theatre
later in 1942, he gathered a number of aides around him who became
like a family, and Summersby found herself an integral part of this
group, to such an extent that she and Eisenhower became virtually
inseparable for the remainder of the war. In a manner that would find
echoes with many later GCS drivers, one of Summersby’s key roles
was to act as a sympathetic and discreet confidante for Eisenhower. As
she describes:
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Ike [Eisenhower’s nickname] knew that I was utterly discreet, and he
had slowly got into the habit of talking things over with me in the
car or over a drink when we arrived at Telegraph Cottage [Eisen-
hower’s country retreat] after work. My contribution to these conver-
sations was very limited. I rarely said anything more than ‘Hmm,
yes, I see. Is that so?’ Non committal, sympathetic sounds, so that he
had the feeling that there was someone responding to his thoughts.
But I never disagreed. I never made suggestions. I was just there –
like a hum in the background.9
Remarkably, despite the tough responsibilities of women such as
Summersby, the MTC remained an ad hoc civilian organisation. As
Summersby acknowledged, ‘The uniform did not mean a thing.’10
Nevertheless, she joined Eisenhower in North Africa (being rescued
from a torpedoed ship on her way there), got to know Churchill well,
and while in North Africa drove both King George VI and US
President Franklin D. Roosevelt (despite protests from the US Secret
Service, who claimed that no woman had ever driven the President!).11
When Eisenhower returned to Europe to lead the invasion of main-
land Europe, known as Operation Overlord, Summersby also became
his Appointments Secretary, and was given her own secretary and
office. After the invasion, she drove him all over Europe. Eventually,
she was awarded the British Empire Medal, and describes her surprise:
I had never imagined that I would get a medal – any kind of medal.
The thought had never crossed my mind. Medals were for people
who had done something extraordinary, not for a woman who had
spent most of the war behind a steering wheel. When I said as much
to Ike, he leaned back in his chair and said, ‘I don’t think you realise
how valuable your services have been. I do. And so does the PM
[Prime Minister Winston Churchill]. If I were you, I’d just say
“thank you” and stop arguing.’ I took his advice and immediately
wrote to the PM telling him how surprised I was and how humbly
appreciative.12
At the culmination of her wartime travels, Summersby became the
first ‘British’ woman (as the book describes her, although she was in
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fact Irish) to enter defeated Berlin, and one of only three western
women permitted to witness Nazi Germany’s formal surrender.13 At
the end of the war, Eisenhower promised her that he would appoint
her to his staff when he returned to Washington, but the call never
came. Nevertheless, Summersby became a US citizen, and settled
there. She met Eisenhower on several occasions, but their close
relationship never resumed.14
Discretion at a Moment of Destiny
Perhaps nothing better represents the discreet understanding and empathy
between a driver and passenger than Summersby’s moving description of the
eve of D-Day, when she was present at one of the great defining moments in
the history of the twentieth century.
Eisenhower had the awesome responsibility to give the go-ahead for the
Normandy invasion, and adverse weather conditions were causing endless
doubts, for an operation where the price of failure would be unimaginable.
The attack had already been postponed once, but after hours of agonising,
Eisenhower finally made the decision for the huge undertaking to take place
on 6 June. He then went to meet the paratroopers who would form the
advance force of the invasion behind enemy lines, and watched them take off.
In Summersby’s description of what happened next, it is remarkable to note
how, despite their close relationship, or perhaps because of it, she understood
instinctively the precise moment to keep her distance and say nothing:
‘It was such a gigantic moment! My heart was pounding, and I was
practically crying. I knew I had never seen anything like it before and never
would see anything like it again. We stayed on the roof for a long time
watching the planes. Ike stood there with his hands in his pockets, his face
tipped towards the sky. The planes kept circling, and then they began tailing off
and headed towards Normandy. We sighed. A lot of those men, men whom Ike
had just been walking with, shaking hands with, were going to their deaths.
‘The General turned and left the roof without saying a word to anyone.
I hurried after him, but then I stopped. He was walking very slowly, his
head bent. I could not intrude. He needed to be alone. Before he got into the
car, he turned to me and said, “Well, it’s on. No one can stop it now.”
There were tears in his eyes. We were silent as we drove back along the
moonlit road to the trailer in the woods at Southwick.’15
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THE MTC AND HEROISM OVERLOOKED
A wartime Air Ministry file fascinatingly reveals how the minds of
officials had great difficulty in accepting and classifying the sterling
work done by the volunteer women of the Motor Transport Corps,
and that consequently there was a real danger that acts of great
heroism could be overlooked. In a strange way, the difficulties in
defining the MTC seemed to portend the persistent problems GCS
would later encounter in finding a suitable administrative home.
In March 1941, a letter from the Treasury to the Air Ministry
proposed commendations for five women of the MTC, for their valour
during the German invasion of France in 1940: Section Leader Olive
Sherington, and drivers Ursula Bennet, Marjorie Juta, Penelope Otto
and Elizabeth Stockley. In the case of Otto, Juta and Bennet, this was
because they had been taken prisoner by the Germans, but had
escaped and assisted a Flying Officer and his crew to escape. The
Director of Military Intelligence at the War Office recognised that at
the time they were under the orders of the French, but that given the
invasion, it was unlikely that they would be recognised by the French
government.
It was stressed that the MTC, unlike the Red Cross, did not just
operate at bases, but with the French forces, and up to the collapse
they were working close to forward troops. The letter acknowledged
that a number of commendations had been granted for British Army
officers and men. On the other hand: ‘These women were in a similar
position, but were, of course, not part of the British Expeditionary
Force, and must, it is agreed, be treated as civilians.’
Sherington and Stockley were recommended for awards because
they had taken charge of tending the wounded on a boat from
Bordeaux to Falmouth, and had earlier carried a number of British
Flying Officers to the French coast. The War Office also noted that
they had managed to bring their ambulances back to England. On
the tenuous grounds that the women had rescued Air Force person-
nel, the War Office was insistent that the Air Ministry should handle
the commendations.
The Air Ministry was clearly unhappy about being given this
responsibility, and on 19 March a letter to the War Office was
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accompanied by a cutting from the Sunday Dispatch. The cutting
quoted Mrs Cook, the Corps Commandant of the MTC, who
described the remarkable details of how the three women drivers had
escaped from the Germans: ‘The girls were given their chance to
escape when they were ordered to turn their ambulance at a
crossroads. Instead of turning, they drove at full speed for two miles
through the length of a German Division. The Germans seemed so
surprised at their audacity, they gaped and did nothing. Eventually,
the girls reached the French Division.’
Nevertheless, the newspaper article also revealed that the women
had been awarded the Croix de Guerre with Palm by Marshal Petain’s
Vichy government. The French Vichy government had been set up
after the German invasion, but it was a largely puppet regime,
discredited for its collaboration with the Germans.
The Air Ministry letter, however, made it clear that they were now
ready to wash their hands of the matter: ‘In view of the Vichy award,
we hardly think the award of commendations as well is either
necessary or desirable.’ In addition, in the case of the other two
women recommended for awards, the letter pointed out that they had
helped soldiers as well as airmen, and so it was up to the War Office
to sponsor commendations if desired!
It was to be nearly another nine months before the War Office
replied to this classic piece of buck-passing, but on 1 December 1941
a War Office letter stressed that the MTC did not come under their
control, and so they could not sponsor commendations.
Things might have continued on this basis for ever, but perhaps
imbued with some Christmas spirit, the Air Ministry relented, and
on 26 December wrote to the Home Office stating that they were
now recommending commendations for Sherington and Stockley.
Even then, things were not straightforward, as no record of
Elizabeth Stockley could be found. She was only able to receive her
award when it was discovered that her name was in fact Stucley!16
KEEPING MINISTERS MOBILE
Just as the extreme circumstances of the war created the need for a
body such as the MTC, so for Ministers themselves, the declaration of
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war on 3 September 1939 ensured that their travel arrangements
would never be the same again. Prior to this time, the only Minister
who had use of an official car was the Home Secretary, who was
allocated a police car, although service Ministers could call on service
vehicles as necessary. For the other Ministers, it was basically a matter
of providing their own transport, whether cars or public transport.
The degree to which the declaration of war changed the whole
pace and culture of government, however, is very well illustrated by
the fact that, after only two days had elapsed, on 5 September, it
was suggested at a meeting of the new War Cabinet, and approved
by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, that all members of the
War Cabinet should be supplied with official cars and drivers. It
was now considered essential that, for senior Ministers, mobility
was at a premium, and that official cars were the only means of
ensuring this.
In fact, the War Cabinet was much smaller than its peacetime
equivalent, and in addition to the Prime Minister, consisted of the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Foreign Secretary, the Minister for
Co-ordination of Defence, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the
Secretary of State for Air, the Lord Privy Seal, and the Minister With-
out Portfolio. Nevertheless, it was decided that arrangements should
be made with the motor hire company of F. Kidner and Sons to hold
six 20-horsepower Austin chauffeur-driven cars to be permanently at
the disposal of the War Cabinet. Perhaps surprisingly, Chamberlain
himself retained his own private vehicle.
In the event, Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax was able to arrange
something a bit grander for himself than the Austins allocated to
other Ministers. On the one hand, Halifax emphasised that he
‘desired use of an official car with chauffeur to save him undue fatigue
during the emergency’. At the same time, he reported that he had
taken up the offer by a Mr Lees of a Rolls Royce, which would be
loaned at no charge.
Even in that first month of the war in September 1939, it was
highly significant that two events occurred that would have many
echoes for GCS in later decades, even up to the present time. Firstly,
in a manner that would be familiar to generations of GCS drivers, on
15 September it was reported that the driver of the Lord Privy Seal’s
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(Sir Samuel Hoare’s) car was asking for extra subsistence, in view of
the long hours, but this had been turned down, with the advice to the
driver to take it up with his employer.
Secondly, by 20 September the restriction of official cars to the
War Cabinet was already breached, when a car was offered to the
Head of the News Department at the War Office, as it was considered
that he had an essential need for quick transport. It seems that, even
in those days, the government understood the importance of news
presentation and management!
As the war progressed, so the demands on the use of official cars
would increase inexorably. In the case of the Prime Minister, when
Winston Churchill succeeded Chamberlain in 1940, he was given use
of an Austin hired from Kidners. With typical audacity, however,
Churchill decided that his 23.5 h.p. Austin was not fast enough, and
a 28 h.p. Austin was substituted. No doubt emboldened by
Churchill’s success, Minister for Labour and National Service Ernest
Bevin shortly after also requested a faster car, on the grounds that he
had a lot of travelling to do. However, like many later Ministers,
Bevin was to discover that there could be considerable political
sensitivity on these matters, and his request was turned down, on the
grounds that the public could be critical of high-powered cars being
supplied at public expense. Instead, it was advised that the general
line should be one of moderation.
Churchill himself did not retain his new Austin for long, and in
July 1941 he took over a bulletproof War Office Humber, with the
Austin returned to Kidners, although a driver from Kidners contin-
ued to drive the PM.
By 1942, it was acknowledged that, although official cars had
originally been restricted to members of the War Cabinet, it had
subsequently been extended to others on health or accessibility
grounds. Consequently, by May 1942 the number of official cars
totalled nineteen – six for the War Cabinet, three for Service Depart-
ment Ministers, and ten for other Ministers. In addition, two
Ministers used their own cars, but had chauffeurs at public expense. It
was therefore clear that the provision and use of official cars for
Ministers was becoming established, and moving beyond the ad hoc
arrangements set in place in 1939. This was reflected in the decision in
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December 1942 to centralise arrangements for dealing with War
Cabinet cars at the Treasury.
Nevertheless, in 1943 the pressure to extend official car use con-
tinued unabated, and there is a tone of impatient exasperation in a
Treasury memo of 4 February that noted the Colonial Secretary had
been making demands on the voluntary car pool run by the Women’s
Voluntary Service (presumably referring here to the MTC). Unfort-
unately, these demands had involved him in a number of unhappy
arguments with Ministers, and the memo noted that the provision of
official cars was liable to attract public criticism, and should be kept
within the narrowest possible limits, particularly as there had
recently been Parliamentary Questions on these matters.
Having taken this tough line, however, the impact of the memo
was diluted when it was conceded that Ministers needed cars,
particularly at night, when it could be impossible to get taxis. Conse-
quently, in borderline cases, it was endeavoured to arrange that
requirements were met by the car pool maintained by the Ministry of
Aircraft Production.
The government’s inability to take a hard line was evenmore evident
later in February 1943, when it was agreed that all senior Ministers
should be provided with an official car at public expense, ‘senior’ in this
contextmeaning allMinisters whowould normally have beenmembers
of a peacetime Cabinet. Although it was emphasised that Ministers
must pay for private use, it was also stipulated that, where possible, the
car should be made available to senior officials.
Lord Halifax may have requested an official car to ‘save him undue
fatigue during the emergency’, but by the end of the war it had
become evident that the official car had come to stay, and that some
sort of formal organisation was required to take things forward on an
efficient basis.17
Carrying Clementine Churchill
A delicate dilemma that arose during the war, and would recur persistently
over the years, was how to treat Minister’s spouses with regard to official
car use. Particularly in the case of a Prime Minister, it is almost inevitable
that a spouse will assume some sort of official role, yet there has generally
been a reluctance to acknowledge his or her place in the scheme of things.
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On 17 May 1942, a letter from the Prime Minister’s office to the
Treasury revealed that Clementine Churchill, the Prime Minister’s wife,
was using his official car during the day, particularly with regard to her
work for the Aid to Russia Fund. The possibility had been considered of
giving her an official car of her own, but as she used it only two or three
times a week in this way, this was not considered necessary. Instead, she
wished to make some payment for her use of her husband’s car.
Nevertheless, it is intriguing to note that an official car was considered
for Clementine Churchill. In fact, it was to be another sixty years before a
Prime Minister’s spouse was treated in this way, when Cherie Blair was
allocated her own car on security grounds.
By December 1942 a Downing Street letter confirmed that
Mrs Churchill was using the car herself for official purposes. The letter
also revealed that there were significant security advantages in giving
Clementine use of her husband’s car: ‘The car is never cancelled when the
PM is away on a secret mission, as this would be an open advertisement
he is not in London.’ The letter was also pleased to note: ‘The driver is a
picked man and can be trusted.’18
THE BIRTH OF OCS
At the conclusion of the war, Prime Minister Winston Churchill is
reputed to have asked, in a rhetorical fashion, what would be the cost
to the government in taxi fares, if the official cars were abandoned.
Regardless of the truth of this statement, we have seen that, as the war
years progressed, the practical necessity of having official cars and
drivers readily available had become widely acknowledged and
appreciated.
In the event, Churchill was denied any opportunity to establish an
official car service in peacetime, as in the general election of July
1945, he and the Conservative Party were defeated in a landslide
victory (an overall majority of 145) for the Labour Party led by
Clement Attlee. Crucially, however, the train of Whitehall thinking
on these matters was made clear in a Treasury memo that was waiting
for the new government when it took office.
Intriguingly, the memo began by comparing the current situation
with that at the end of the First World War, and noted that, at that
The History of the Government Car Service
31
time, the National Expenditure Committee had recommended that
provision of cars for the use of Ministers, officers and officials should
be discontinued. In these earlier days, when the motor car was in its
infancy, it had therefore been concluded that a Minister would only
need an official car at a time of extreme national crisis. The 1945
memo, however, reflected greatly changed times, and stressed that
the position on official cars needed review. The memo followed this
up by setting out the case for a permanent official car service!
In particular, it quoted from a House of Commons speech made in
May 1945 by the Conservative MP Sir Herbert Williams. In this
speech, Williams had argued: ‘Every decent business provides
managers or managing directors with facilities for transport. Now,
twenty or twenty-five Ministers have cars at public expense. I think
this is right, although it has never been properly sanctioned.We ought
now to regularise the position.’Williams was rightly pointing out that
the official cars had been introduced, two days after war broke out, as
an emergency measure, although by the end of the war it was clear that
they had become an integral part of the Whitehall machine.
The memo confirmed that, since 1943, what it called Ministers
‘above the line’ had been allocated an official car, i.e. those Ministers
who would in peacetime normally have a place in the Cabinet, rather
than the much smaller War Cabinet. The memo concluded by
succinctly presenting an argument that it could be said would form
the principal justification for GCS over the next sixty years: ‘It can be
said with truth that a Minister is a Minister for twenty-four hours a
day, and it is not unreasonable that they should be allowed to use it
[an official vehicle] at public expense.’19
The new government lost little time in taking the advice of the
memo, and in August 1945 Prime Minister Attlee set up a
committee under the chairmanship of the Financial Secretary to the
Treasury to ascertain what economies could be effected with regard to
official cars. The government was therefore clearly sensitive about
how the use of official cars had grown during the war, and of the
public reaction if this were to continue in peacetime. This was likely
to be particularly sensitive, given that Britain was basically bankrupt
after the huge cost of winning the war, and there were serious
shortages of food and basic materials. In this climate, when for the
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vast majority of the population a private car remained an unobtain-
able luxury item, the sight of Ministers riding around in chauffeur-
driven upmarket saloon cars was not likely to be well received.
The government committee was obviously sensitive to these
matters, and recommended a broadening of the pool system, which
would serve the purpose of providing essential transport, but at the
same time would restrict the number of cars allocated for personal
use, so that Ministers not of Cabinet rank could utilise the pool. The
intention was therefore that only Cabinet Ministers should have cars
allocated to them for use on a personal basis, while everyone else
would call on a general pool on an ad hoc basis.20
Nevertheless, the question of who should be entitled to an
allocated car was only one half of the equation. The other half
concerned on what basis this was all to be organised. The wartime
official transport had grown in an ad hoc unco-ordinated fashion,
with vehicles provided by private hire, the MTC (under the control
of the Ministry of Supply), and also a car pool operated by the
Ministry of Aircraft Production, while individual departments also
supplied their own transport.
Context is important here in terms of pointing the way forward,
and the Attlee Labour government had a radical commitment to
socialist principles that promoted the benefits of planning and public
ownership. Consequently, during its six years in office, it not only set
up the National Health Service, but also implemented a huge
nationalisation programme, including the railways, coal, electricity,
gas, iron and steel, and large sections of the road haulage and bus
industries. It was almost inevitable, therefore, that official transport
would be placed on a similar basis.
The trigger that brought about the birth of the Official Car Service
was the merger of the Ministry of Supply (MOS) and the Ministry of
Aircraft Production (MAP) in April 1946. The MOS had been set up
in 1939, and was basically responsible for the supplies essential to
support the war effort. MAP had been set up in 1940 to relieve the
Air Ministry of responsibility for the procurement of supplies, but in
1945 it was decided that MAP should be wound up, and merged with
the MOS. Consequently, in October 1945 the Prime Minister
announced the government’s decision to establish a new MOS.
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This restructured MOS was a truly massive organisation, with a
mind-bogglingly wide array of responsibilities. In addition to its own
supply function for the armed services, and taking over those of MAP,
it was given the responsibility to develop new types of civil aircraft;
to sponsor production of certain goods of wide economic importance;
to carry primary government responsibility for the development of
many sections of the engineering industry, including motor vehicles,
and domestic items such as refrigerators and washers; and to
administer controls on the iron and steel industry. Amazingly, to add
to all this, it was also charged with the massive task of undertaking
research on, and production of, atomic energy! Finally, and in an
official list placed ninth in a list of nine responsibilities, the MOS was
to operate the government’s Official Car Service in London and
certain provincial towns.21
By placing OCS within the overwhelming environment of the
MOS, the government was to pose a massive problem for the Car
Service that would bedevil it, and later the GCS, for decades to come.
Although governments might discuss endlessly who should or should
not be entitled to an official car, minimal attention was given to such
vital matters as the basis on which the Car Service should be organ-
ised and operate. On the one hand, it could be said that this neglect
allowed those working at the grassroots to get on with the job. On
the other hand, it also meant that the Car Service was given little
strategic direction, and that when crises finally arrived, as they did in
the 1980s and 1990s, GCS would find itself as an organisation in a
terribly weak and vulnerable position. It was only with the creation
of the Government Car and Despatch Agency in 1997 that this
position would finally be reversed.
Meanwhile, in 1946 it was up to those working day to day, to get
the vehicles on the road to ensure that the new OCS could be made
to work effectively.
Cripps the Big Spender!
A fascinating exchange of correspondence early in 1946 reveals deep
differences within the Labour government on the question of investment in
the official car fleet. This correspondence was triggered by a request from the
President of the Board of Trade, Sir Stafford Cripps, to purchase two new
The History of the Government Car Service
34
Daimlers for use by his department. The quite remarkable thing here is
that Cripps was legendary for his extremely frugal lifestyle, and in the
public mind came to symbolise the government’s austerity policies in the early
post-war years. Yet here he was ordering two luxury cars! The explanation
for this uncharacteristic behaviour perhaps lies in Cripps’ official position,
and that he saw purchase of the cars as a means of promoting the British
vehicle industry. If this was the case, then he was foreshadowing generations
of politicians, who would press a ‘Buy British’ policy on OCS and GCS.
Nevertheless, Chancellor of the Exchequer Hugh Dalton was clearly
alarmed at Cripps’ request, and in a letter to Minister of Supply John
Wilmot, argued that it should be fairly simple to provide him with a
vehicle from the car pool, without embarking on new purchases. A few days
later, Dalton wrote to Cripps himself, emphasising that the Prime Minister
had already approved proposals for a general pool of cars, and advising him
to pick a vehicle from this source.
Cripps, however, was clearly determined to press his case, and in a
remarkable letter to Dalton expressed his concern about the ‘undesirable
effects of Ministers being seen driving about in a dilapidated pre-war car’.
In contrast, he wanted ‘a decent British car’, and regarded a sufficient pool
of official cars as just as much part of an efficient administration as is a
good staff of messengers.
Cripps concluded by noting that, although parliamentary under-
secretaries may not require cars of their own, they must be mobile for their
many meetings. He believed that, at the end of a twelve-hour day, a half-
hour’s wait in the rain for a bus was not a very efficient way of dealing
with what should be a high-powered man, and that he was sure an
incident of this sort had been responsible for the recent illness of the Overseas
Trade Minister.
Ironically, a letter a few days later from Supply Minister Wilmot to
Hugh Dalton appeared to confirm Cripps’ arguments. Wilmot warned
Dalton that he was not optimistic about the quality of the pool cars, and
that many of them were worn out. He went on: ‘I had a parade last week of
the best cars left to us and, believe me, they were a sorry lot.’ Wilmot was
also clearly aware of the sensitive political implications here, and added:
‘The greater proportion of decent cars are likely to be American, but in my
view it would be unwise to use American cars for Ministers.’22
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MAKING OCS WORK
Given the Minister of Supply’s views on the state of the car pool
vehicles, it was clear that actually turning OCS into a workable
operation would be far from an easy task. We saw at the beginning of
this book how Tom Hughes ministered to the needs of Winston
Churchill, and it was Hughes, as the OCS Garages Superintendent,
who was presented with this formidable challenge.
Prior to his new job, Hughes had been in charge of the Ministry of
Aircraft Production vehicle fleet, and in his memoir he describes how
this consisted mainly of RAF vehicles, supported by gift cars that
were used in the Emergency Transport Pool. The ETP was based at
Horseferry Road in Westminster, but also at various aircraft factories
for visiting VIPs. The fitters and drivers were RAF personnel, and
numbered around 450.
In April 1946, the MAP ETP was merged with the Motor
Transport Corps, to form the OCS. At the time of the merger, Hughes
describes the OCS fleet strength as consisting of 720 vehicles,
comprising thirty heavy lorries, 152 light vans, 498 cars of all types,
from Rolls-Royces to Hillman 10 h.p. saloons, and forty motor cycles.
However, given Wilmot’s poor view of the state of the fleet, it was
perhaps not surprising that only two months later, in July 1946, the
number of cars had been basically halved, from 498 to 253. Part of
this reduction came about through the return of gift cars, which
many prominent people had donated for the war effort. Hughes
arranged for these to be rebuilt, and he describes the surprise of
owners, many of whom had written off their cars, only to find that
they were to receive them back in new condition. These cars included
Rolls-Royces, Daimlers, and Bentleys (one of which was an 8 litre).
The switch to OCS and a peacetime operation meant that the RAF
maintenance and driving staff were replaced by civilians, while many
of the remarkable MTC volunteer women left the Service, leaving, as
Hughes put it bluntly: ‘those who required to work for a living’23
(although we will see in the next chapter that at least some of these
upper-set women remained with the Car Service until well after the
war). By the end of 1946, Hughes was left with an OCS staff of
around 350.
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The most vital challenge for the infant OCS was to firmly establish
its profile within Whitehall. It was one thing to set up the new
organisation, but it desperately needed to assert itself within the frag-
mented official vehicle service that had built up throughout the war.
The chief prize here would clearly be the members of the Cabinet
themselves.
As we saw, at the outbreak of war the members of the War Cabinet
had been supplied with privately hired cars from F. Kidner and Sons,
and this arrangement was still operating in 1946. However, a Treasury
memo of 14 May 1946 indicated that the position was under review.
The memo noted that there had been a Parliamentary Question about
the expenditure on private hire cars for Cabinet Ministers. In the
subsequent discussion, it had been queried if the committee set up in
August 1945, to look for economies in the use of official cars, had
considered the possibility of persuading Cabinet Ministers and
Ministers of Cabinet rank to use cars from theMinistry of Supply pool,
although these cars would of course be available for their personal use
all the time. Significantly, the memo revealed that the 1945
committee had come to no definite conclusion on this matter, but that
it should be considered by the MOS as part of its general review.24
Official figures show that, in 1945–46, the total amount paid to
private hire companies for cars used by Ministers totalled £12,219.
Tom Hughes clearly spotted an opportunity here, although the
method he chose was certainly unorthodox, as he describes:
The majority of Ministers were supplied with cars from a private hire
firm for over £2000 each per annum, which was a lot of money in
1946, when drivers’ wages were around £4 per week. The service
provided by the hire firm was poor, so I arranged for twenty
limousines to be pulled off the RAF dump at Bourne in Cambridge-
shire, and after rebuilding these, we set about capturing the VIP
service. By the end of 1946 we had sixteen Ministers using the OCS,
and our service had spread to take in all Departments, but some
continued with a fleet of their own.25
Hughes’ entrepreneurial spirit had paid off, and the Labour Cabinet
were now using Hillman cars supplied by OCS, although one
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wonders what Sir Stafford Cripps made of being driven in a car
obtained from an RAF dump! Nevertheless, in winning the contract,
and pushing out the private hire company, OCS had established a
position that would continue unbroken for the next sixty years. It
could fairly be said, therefore, that it was this landmark change that
truly symbolised the birth of OCS.
THE BRIDGES’ PLAN
In fact, Hughes’ initiative did not go unnoticed in the highest
Whitehall circles, and ironically, for a time, it placed OCS in a tricky
position. In July 1946, an ominous Treasury memo revealed that the
Chancellor was concerned that expenditure on Ministers’ cars was
growing (after his argument with Cripps it appeared that Hugh
Dalton was clearly not prepared to let this matter go). In particular,
the Chancellor was perplexed to reconcile this rise with the gradual
shift over from the private hire service of Messrs Kidners to the MOS
pool service, since he would have thought that the pool, with its
centralised administration, would have been more economical, in
terms of cost per mile, than Kidners. The Chancellor did concede that
an alternative explanation might be that any economy on the part of
MOS might be offset by an increased use of official cars. Nevertheless,
he believed that the matter should be looked into.26
The matter certainly was looked into, and in August a memo
followed from Sir Edward Bridges, the Permanent Secretary at the
Treasury. Bridges was also Head of the Home Civil Service, and as a
former Cabinet Secretary during the war years was an enormously
powerful figure withinWhitehall. Peter Hennessy describes Bridges as
‘artistic, informal, intuitive. His preferred method of running the Civil
Service was a discreet chat over tea and buns.’ Nevertheless, Hennessy
emphasises that a summons to tea with Sir Edward was an awesome
thing for the eminent as well as the lowly, and that he had a great talent
for concentrating on the main issue, leaving the detail to others.27
Any view on OCS by Bridges would therefore carry great weight,
and the memo began on a low note by observing that the new
arrangements for official cars had not been free from difficulty, and
were of course controversial. Bridges believed that the government
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was likely to be attacked on this matter, and so it ought to take stock
before the attack developed.
Taking up the point raised in the earlier memo, he emphasised that
the government ought to know how costs per unit or per mile
compared between the pool cars run by the government and the
private hire cars. However, Bridges clearly saw the need for a lot more
information than this, and argued that the government should have
readily accessible information as to the number of cars operated on
official business, the approximate mileage they were run, the approxi-
mate cost, and the extent to which they were used for private
purposes, together with the arrangements for payment for such use.
He also wanted to make sure that really adequate logs were kept, and
in appropriate cases inspected, in respect of the journeys run by these
cars.28
Reflecting the ability of Bridges to get to the heart of things, there
is a curiously timeless quality about this memo. He had identified the
potential political sensitivity of any official car service, and had recog-
nised that it was necessary for as much information as possible to be
obtained, so that the government would not be at risk from any nasty
surprises were the cost of the Car Service to be publicly questioned.
In the event, the 1946 Treasury concern proved to be misplaced,
and in December an MOS memo confirmed that the pool cars were
indeed cheaper than privately hired cars. The MOS had not had time
to work out the full costs, but in fact had found a tendency for pool
car costs to decrease.29 As the year of its creation drew to a close,
therefore, the fledgling OCS could breathe a little easier.
Jetting Away!
Over the years, many VIPs have been separated from their official cars only
with great reluctance. One early example of this phenomenon was the
engineering genius Sir Frank Whittle, the father of jet propulsion. During
the war, Whittle had been supplied with a Rolls-Royce from the MAP
Emergency Transport Pool for the purposes of demonstrating his jet engine.
Tom Hughes describes how Whittle became very attached to his Rolls, so
that it became a terrific job to get it back from him! Eventually, this was
achieved only with the intervention of Air Chief Marshall Sir Alex
Coryton, who was Controller of Air Supplies.30
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OCS GROWING PAINS
The supply of allocated cars to senior Ministers may have been the
flagship element of the OCS operation, but below that there were
large grey areas, where the situation was much less clear-cut, and
presented significant difficulties. In particular, two persistent
problems confronted the growing OCS. Firstly, many Departments
had significant car pools of their own, which continued to operate
autonomously from OCS. Secondly, there was the sensitive question
of exactly who, outside Cabinet Ministers, should be entitled to
regular use of an official car. Here, as the 1940s progressed, it became
clear that things had moved significantly beyond what had been
envisaged in 1945.
The large size of the departmental fleets outside OCS was vividly
set out in a Treasury memo of April 1946 (the month OCS was set
up). Consequently, the memo described how, in October 1945, the
number of official cars controlled by Departments and operated in the
UK totalled 15,780. Of these, 9,434 were used by the three Service
Departments, 1,559 by the National Fire Service, and 4,787 by the
civil Departments. In London, however, twenty-five Departments
had cars that were used in effect as departmental taxis, although the
memo pointed out that there were wide variations, with the Air
Ministry having 206 cars, the War Office 160, but many Depart-
ments having less than thirty. The memo also noted that there was
little co-ordination on repairs, although many did use MOS. In
setting out the detailed figures for departmental transport, the infer-
ence of the memo was clearly that the system for official cars was not
efficient, and required greater co-ordination. It was highly significant
for the establishment of OCS, therefore, that the memo concluded
that, from 17 June 1946, all applications for use of official cars, and
for additional cars or replacements, would be required to be
submitted in the first instance to MOS.31 This process was
consolidated in a later memo, that revealed it had been agreed that
from February 1947 MOS should maintain and repair departmental
cars.32
It was clear, therefore, that OCS (through its parent MOS) had a
very powerful ally in Whitehall in the form of the Treasury, which
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saw it as an effective means of saving money by co-ordinating the
highly fragmented departmental services.
This support was set to continue, and is very well illustrated by a
letter sent to MOS by the Treasury in July 1947. The letter noted,
with a tone of regret, that MOS was now no longer taking steps to
absorb further departmental car pools into their organisation. The
reason for this was apparently to keep the total number of pool cars
down to 700. The letter declared, however, that there was no need for
the MOS to restrict itself in this way, and that the Treasury ‘would
not object to you going over 700, provided that there was a com-
mensurate reduction in the departmental pools’.33
The Treasury, therefore, was urging the MOS to be more aggressively
proactive in its takeover plans! In the event, however, it would only be
with the switch from the OCS to GCS in 1952 that major steps would
finally be taken to absorb the departmental pools into the Car Service
itself.
Meanwhile, OCS had to concern itself with the second major
problem, of controlling and regulating exactly who should have
access to official cars. In particular, the rather curious system of
nominated cars proved to be a generally unsatisfactory solution to a
delicate problem. The essence of the problem was the feeling within
Whitehall that, although it was necessary to restrict the number of
allocated cars to senior Ministers, there were those officials, such as
Permanent Secretaries, who should not be expected to take their
chance with the rest in ordering a pool car!
Initially, an April 1946 Treasury memo laid it down firmly that,
outside the Cabinet, only the Service Heads of the three fighting
services and the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury (as Head of the
Civil Service) should be entitled to allocated official cars and
drivers. The memo noted that a committee had been appointed in
October 1945 to consider the arrangements for official travel for
people other than those supplied with allocated cars. The com-
mittee found that there was a need here, given that there was a poor
taxi service in London. In addition, there was not enough accommo-
dation in central London for government officials, meaning that
some would have to be located away from the centre, leading to
access problems.
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The memo therefore announced that Departments which satisfied
the Treasury that they needed ten cars or more should be allowed to
run strictly limited departmental pools in London, with a number of
high grade cars supplying the needs of Junior Ministers, senior
officials, distinguished visitors, etc. It was emphasised that the
number of high grade cars should be less than the number of individ-
uals entitled to use them, but that they should be adequate to meet
all but abnormal demands. In addition, the memo noted that there
should also be a general pool (run by OCS) and that small pools
should also be set up in each of government regional headquarters
towns. It was also stipulated that there should be no private use,
although, significantly, the memo added here that there could be
discretion in the case of senior officials.34
The Treasury clearly hoped to keep the lid firmly on official car
use, particularly given the fact that this had grown in a rapid ad hoc
way during the war years. A year later, however, it was clear that all
was not working out as planned, and a letter from MOS to the
Treasury in May 1947 set out the position.
The letter began by noting with some concern that the list of
Ministers with allocated or nominated cars had increased, even over
the previous month. The peculiar principle of nominated cars
appeared to have evolved over the previous twelve months. The letter
explained that nominated cars were in principle entirely distinct from
allocated cars. Consequently, allocated cars were solely at the disposal
of Ministers, whereas nominated cars were technically on pool duty,
and should be available for the pool. The letter pointed out, however,
that the nominated car was not available for the pool unless the senior
official using it said that he did not need it. In practice, because the
senior official required it each day, this meant that nominated tended
to approximate to allocated! (Tom Hughes describes how there were
thirteen nominated cars, with Permanent Secretaries and others at that
level nominating cars that could be driven by any driver available.)35
Significantly, the MOS appeared to be accepting the reality of the
situation, and was not recommending abolition of the distinction
between allocated and nominated. Instead, it was considered that
particular attention should be given to the manner in which
nominated cars were now being used for private purposes, such as for
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travel to and from homes and to lunch. The problem was that
discretion had been given to the user, as the logs showed only the
mileage driven, but the MOS felt that there was a need to recover the
costs for private use.36
The MOS was clearly not prepared to let this matter go, and in a
June 1947 minute it noted with concern that, instead of occasional
private use, certain officials were now using their cars regularly for
such purposes, such as to and from their homes in the ordinary way,
a practice which had not been envisaged when the regulations for use
of car pools had been framed in 1945.
Once again, the letter recognised the reality of the situation, and
pointed out that in these situations it was difficult for junior officials
responsible for dealing with official cars to reprimand senior officials.
Instead, it was felt that it would be better to ask the officials to pay
for private use, rather than to stick to the official rules.37
There was clearly now a feeling that something had to be done here,
and a Treasury memo followed that warned the nominated system
could grow into a wholesale evasion of the restrictions that applied to
allocated cars. It therefore recommended that the nominated system
should cease to be recognised.38
A Treasury memo of July 1947 defined the new situation. There
was now no objection to nominated cars being used for official
lunches, and also to bring officials to early meetings or home from
late meetings. At the same time, it was acknowledged that private
use of nominated cars had hitherto not been recognised. Conse-
quently, it would be necessary to rely on the discretion of officials to
report private use, as was already the case with Ministers.39
Officials were therefore to be put on their honour to ‘play the
game’. Nominated cars had clearly been introduced as an
unofficial means of extending the allocated list, but once these
officials, perhaps understandably, had started using these cars as a
matter of course in their daily routines (even perhaps more than
Ministers!), then alarm bells had begun to ring in Whitehall. In
the highly austere world of early post-war Britain, any suggestion
of Ministers and senior officials making extravagant use of official
vehicles would inevitably be very badly received by the general
public.
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Nevertheless, the case of the nominated cars did reveal some tricky
grey areas as to what exactly constituted official business, such as the
journey from home to work, and this persistent problem would
continue to resurface over the years.
Moving with the Times
Tom Hughes’ account of the development of OCS makes it clear that the
Service was by no means restricted to ferrying around Ministers and
officials, and in fact was involved in many of the major events in the early
post-war period around Europe as a whole.
For example, MAP had a large car fleet in Germany, with a reporting
base at Horseferry Road in Westminster, from where vehicles were supplied
to the Control Commission in Germany. Eventually, the Control
Commission took over all the Humber 4x4s operating in Germany, in
exchange for new Wolseley and Vauxhall cars that would form the basis of
the OCS – no doubt much to the relief of Supply Minister John Wilmot,
after the shock of his vehicle inspection!
During 1945–46 cars were sent out from Horseferry Road for various
conferences in Geneva and the Paris Peace Conference, and were even used
at the Nuremburg War Trials in Germany. There were also car pools based
in Paris and Geneva at this time, although these had a separate
organisation and were not included in the OCS fleet. Eventually, these
European pools were run down, but their existence illustrates again the huge
and rapid growth in official transport as a result of the necessities of war.
In 1947, the biggest OCS commitment was for the World Monetary
Conference held in London, in which 142 cars were used by representatives
who all arrived at the same time at Victoria Station!
LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS
Two former drivers with vivid memories of the early OCS days in the
1940s,when it was based at Hobart House, are Ann Riley and
Dorothy Spoor. Their remarkable experiences reflect a time when
OCS, and later GCS, had a much wider variety of responsibilities than
in modern times, a fact that meant both women had to be literally
ready for anything.
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Ann Riley
Ann Riley was just 20 years old when she joined OCS in September
1946, four months after it was founded, yet she had already had three
years wartime experience in the WRENS. As she explains:
I grew up as very much a country girl in Sussex, but at seventeen
I was determined to help the war effort, and joined the WRENS.
I was stationed in the London docks during the time of the flying
bombs – one of them hit our rest room there. I then spent six
months at the Admiralty, but at the end of the war I left the
WRENS and needed a job. One of my friends from the WRENS
had already joined OCS, and recommended that I should follow her.
Because of my wartime driving experience, I immediately began
driving the official cars. I stayed with the pool because of the huge
variety of the work, whereas with allocated you could be stuck with
one person for some time.
The wide and highly unpredictable experiences were there almost
from the beginning. For example, Ann remembers suddenly
receiving an invitation to go to what is now Heathrow Airport, to
help them choose the curtains for the VIP lounge at the original
terminal building! As she comments: ‘I think the people in charge
hadn’t much idea about this sort of thing, and so were very keen to
have my advice.’
One passenger she did carry on several occasions was Lord Ismay,
the Chairman of the Festival of Britain Committee. The Festival was
officially designed by the Labour government to commemorate the
centenary of the 1851 Great Exhibition, but in reality it acted as a
symbol for the rebirth of post-war Britain. Many futuristic buildings
were constructed on the south bank of the Thames in London. Nearly
all of these were dismantled at the conclusion of the Festival, but one
that has survived is the Royal Festival Hall. In 1949 Ann Riley took
Lord Ismay to the laying of the foundation stone for the Festival Hall
by Prime Minister Clement Attlee. As she comments: ‘I have
attended many Festival Hall concerts over the years, and always think
how I was there at the very beginning.’
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A particularly memorable and moving occasion for Ann was the
lying-in-state in Westminster Hall of King George VI, who died in
February 1952: ‘One of the Ministers in the Colonial Office arranged
for me to go in through a side entrance, and I was able to stand and
watch what happened. I will never forget the rivers of people moving
quietly down the steps and into the Hall to pay their respects.’
In those years, GCS did quite a lot of work for the Royal Family,
such as carrying members of the press to various events. On one
occasion, Ann was driving a car accompanying the Queen Mother on
a visit to Hemel Hempstead, after which they were going to Hatfield
House for lunch. Ann was driving the car behind that carrying the
Queen Mother, and on the way to Hatfield House it soon became
evident that the driver in front had no idea how to get there. It was
therefore up to Ann to save the day:
As it happened, I did know the way, so I started making hand signals
to show the driver of the Queen Mother’s car the direction to follow
at each turning. He could see these in his rear view mirror, and event-
ually got back on the right track, so that we arrived safely. When we
arrived, he came over and thanked me for getting him out of a hole!
The huge variety of work included many visits to prisons, usually
carrying performers who gave concerts for the prisoners. People she
took included the opera singer Joan Hammond; the jazz singer
George Melly; the first man to run the mile in under four minutes,
Sir Roger Bannister; and the television presenter Sir David Frost. It
was a visit to Wandsworth prison, however, with the great violinist
Yehudi Menuhin, with his accompanist sister Hephzibah, which
provided Ann with one of the most memorable experiences of her life.
As she explains:
When we arrived, we were taken to see the prison Governor. It was
in the days when capital punishment was still in force, and the
Governor told us that there was about to be a hanging. Consequently,
the atmosphere in the prison was extremely tense and on a knife-
edge. The Governor asked Menuhin what he proposed to play, and he
replied, ‘Bach.’ The Governor was not at all happy about this, and
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asked if, in the circumstances, he could play something lighter, but
Menuhin was adamant that he would stick to his programme.
When we arrived in the hall, sure enough the prisoners were
stamping and shouting, and were not at all in the mood to listen to
a classical recital. It seemed hopeless, but then Menuhin began to
play. Incredibly, within a few minutes you could have heard a pin
drop. The Bach, played by a great artist, seemed to have a calming
effect in an almost miraculous way.
A much lighter occasion for Ann occurred when she took the Poet
Laureate, Sir John Betjeman, to a presentation at the Department of
the Environment. Ann found that he immediately treated her like
an old friend:
When I arrived at his home to pick him up, he asked me in to help
him choose a suitable tie. When we were ready to leave, I opened the
rear door of the car for him, but he insisted on riding in the front seat
with me. We then arrived at the DoE, and found the Minister, the
Permanent Secretary, and other senior officials, all lined up to greet
him. However, when Betjeman got out of the car, he said to them,
‘This is my friend Miss Riley’, and made sure that I was also
presented to them all. You should have seen their faces! I could see
why Betjeman had a reputation as a ladies’ man.
Probably the most dramatic incident in Ann Riley’s career as a GCS
driver came in 1969, when she was sent to the Heathrow Airport to
pick up Gerald Brooke, who had spent four years in a Soviet Union
jail for smuggling anti-Soviet leaflets. The British government had
controversially agreed to release Soviet agents Peter and Helen
Kroger in exchange for Brooke. When Ann arrived at the airport, she
found a huge number of reporters and photographers waiting to meet
him:
I picked up Brooke and his minders, and then found myself being
furiously pursued by the paparazzi. They tried to overtake us on the
A4 to get pictures, so I kept weaving across the road to keep them
behind me. It was like a motor race all the way into central London.
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When we arrived at our destination, I told Brooke and his minders
to jump out and make a run for it. Once they were inside, I expected
the paparazzi to really come at me for frustrating them. Amazingly,
instead they all came over and congratulated me for successfully
keeping them at bay. I don’t think that happened very often!
Ann Riley retired in 1986, after forty years service for OCS/GCS.
Dorothy Spoor
In the early days of the war, Dorothy Spoor attempted to join the
MTC, but found that there were no vacancies at that time. As she
explains, it would probably not have suited her: ‘The pay was almost
non-existent, and I couldn’t have afforded that.’ Instead, she drove
ambulances in her native Yorkshire, before joining the WRENS in
1941, where she spent some time in Rosyth in Scotland, before
spending twelve months in Australia towards the end of the war. Like
Ann Riley, a contact from the WRENS recommended that she joined
OCS, which she did in December 1947.
She began driving the government messenger and postal vans, in
order to learn her way around London. She was then sent to work in
Cambridge. As she comments, in those days OCS had a large number of
regional offices. After a few months, however, she returned to London,
and an early memorable experience arrived with the Olympic Games in
1948. The most remarkable feature of these Games, financed on a
shoestring by modern standards, and centred on Wembley Stadium,
was that they were able to be held in a city still suffering severe austerity
and shortages only three years after the war. Nevertheless, the great
benefit was that they lifted the spirit and demonstrated that some sort
of normality was returning to the world. For its part, OCS purchased
fifty Ford car/vans, each of which could convey ten competitors. These
Fords had timber bodies, with side sliding windows and double rear
doors, and in his memoir Tom Hughes was happy to report that the
whole operation was extremely successful.40
Dorothy Spoor remembers the period of the Olympics as extremely
hectic. The OCS office was situated opposite Wembley Stadium, and
she could work from 6 am until midnight. This was chiefly because
the events and accommodation for competitors were very dispersed,
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including a campsite in Richmond Park. As Dorothy comments, it’s
hard to imagine this happening for the 2012 London Olympics!
Competitors were also accommodated in many schools, which could
be extremely difficult to find. One occasion she remembers
particularly was when she took a group of Korean cyclists to train in
Windsor Great Park: ‘The Ford vans had seats lengthwise, so that
they could carry their cycles. They also took food stored in large cans.
However, at lunchtime they offered me one of their sandwiches. I
found it was a mixture of jam, cheese and beef! Apparently, they felt
it was the right diet to get them fit for the cycling.’
Another incident involving food concerned members of the
Australian delegation, who asked Dorothy to transport them to an
event to see some of their people compete. She was very tired, but
they offered her a tin of pineapple if she agreed. In those austere
1940s days, this was a great luxury, and so she took them to the event.
She was very disillusioned, however, when the tin of pineapple never
appeared!
Dorothy did not have any close family, and so made herself avail-
able for trips abroad that were then common for the Service. These
usually concerned conferences, and could involve being away from
home for long periods of time. The first of these trips for Dorothy was
to Paris for a United Nations conference, where she thoroughly
enjoyed her stay of six months. After that, she went for a trade confer-
ence to Annecy in France, near the Swiss border. She found this a
beautiful place, although a dark reminder of the recent past was the
fact that the Australian delegation were housed in the place that had
been the Gestapo headquarters during the war. Odette and Peter
Churchill, the famous Allied agents, were captured near there.
One traumatic incident at Annecy involved an arsonist setting fire
to the garage where the OCS cars were housed. While the drivers
were dealing with this, the arsonist went to their unoccupied hotel
rooms and stole a large number of items. Remarkably, the culprit
turned out to be the son of the local gendarme!
Dorothy also made several lengthy trips to Geneva. Probably the
most memorable of these was for the ‘Big Four’ conference of 1955
(involving the leaders of the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain
and France). For this, Dorothy led a large convoy of cars from London.
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As she remembers: ‘Most of the other drivers did not know the way,
so Miss Bridger, the OCS Deputy Superintendent, stood up in her car
with the roof open, making sure that no one got left behind. On these
trips, we would stop for picnics in France as a break.’
A great occasion in the early 1950s was the Coronation of Queen
Elizabeth II in June 1953. A few weeks prior to the event, Dorothy
took Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s daughter Mary on a tour of
the museums in the East End of London, in order to pick out large
vases that could be used for holding flowers for the ceremony in
Westminster Abbey. Another moving occasion in which Dorothy
participated was the funeral of Winston Churchill in 1965. As she
recalls: ‘We carried the pallbearers to the service in St Paul’s Cathedral.
I will never forget the huge crowds, often twenty deep, yet standing in
almost complete silence. One of the pallbearers was Churchill’s great
friend, the former Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden. He was not in
good health, and we had to carry an oxygen mask for him.’
After her many trips abroad, Dorothy joined the group led by the
Head of Government Hospitality, Sir Geoffrey McNab. He acquired
a set of Daimlers to deal with all the visiting dignitaries from
overseas.
Dorothy Spoor retired in 1982, after thirty-five years of service to
OCS/GCS.
TOWARDS A REBORN CAR SERVICE
As the 1947 Treasury memo had demonstrated, towards the end of
the 1940s OCS was being officially encouraged to expand its empire,
by absorbing fleets run by other Departments. OCS had established
its identity since 1946, yet in many ways it remained in a relatively
weak and vulnerable position. As a small part of the giant MOS, it
was only one of the transport providers within Whitehall, with other
departmental fleets still operating autonomously.
This vulnerability was well illustrated in a document produced by
MOS in January 1949, which listed the various functions of the
Ministry. The listing for OCS made it clear that it was still con-
sidered subservient to the Departments in providing official trans-
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port: ‘It [OCS] provides an official passenger car service in London
and certain large provincial towns for other government Depart-
ments whose needs are too small to make it economical for them to
operate cars of their own.’41
The MOS therefore appeared to see OCS as a body that was
basically there to fill in the gaps that other departments could not
meet themselves, and this interpretation suggested quite severe
limits to its development. However, Tom Hughes himself states that
a suggestion was put forward in 1949 to absorb all the Ministers’
allocated and hired cars within OCS, together with the various pools
operated by government departments, and that this suggestion went
to a very high level. These remarks by Hughes appear to indicate that
the earlier Treasury arguments were being carried forward, with
much brighter prospects for OCS.42
The other major question of this period concerned the place of OCS
within MOS. As an MOS memo of February 1951 makes clear, by the
early 1950s the realisation had dawned that the giant Ministry was
hopelessly overloaded with responsibilities. The memo considered the
future of MOS, and acknowledged that the current Ministry was open
to the criticism that it covered too wide a field, and that the load at
the top was too great in peacetime, and would be impossible in war.
The memo therefore went on to say that the services may well be
justified in thinking that MOS should give its undivided attention to
defence supplies (significantly here, British forces were by now
involved in the Korean War).43
Change was in the air, but the Labour government was now
running out of steam. An election in 1950 had severely reduced its
overall Commons’ majority to only five, and another election was
called for 25 October 1951. Whitehall officials clearly saw the
possible change of government as an opportunity to push through
changes that had been pending for some time, as is well illustrated by
a letter sent on the day before the election to the Head of the Civil
Service, Sir Edward Bridges, by the Permanent Secretary at the MOS,
Sir Archibald Rowlands.
Rowlands enclosed papers which he said he had prepared against
the eventuality of a change of government. In particular, they
examined the question of whether the MOS was overloaded, and if so,
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which parts of it might be hived off. Rowlands recommended trans-
ferring the responsibilities for atomic energy and iron and steel, but
then made a quite remarkable statement: ‘I have also included, as you
will see, my King Charles’ Head – the Official Car Service.’44 By
‘King Charles’ Head’, Rowlands meant that the OCS had become his
obsession! Sadly, in the letter he did not elaborate on exactly why this
was so (possibly the controversial system of nominated cars had
something to do with it), but once again we see the peculiar situation
of the ability of the Car Service to consistently hold the attention of
senior Ministers and officials, yet be persistently neglected as an
organisation.
Nevertheless, OCS had been slated for a move away from the MOS.
The following day saw the return of a Conservative government, and
Winston Churchill as Prime Minister, with an overall Commons’
majority of seventeen, and so a new era was about to begin for the Car
Service.
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CHAPTER 3
A Modern Service
1952–69
TAKING IT FROM THE TOP
On 1 April 1952, the Official Car Service became the Govern-ment Car Service. The fact that the word ‘Government’ was
adopted, in itself provides an insight into the events that were to
come in the 1950s. The return of a Conservative government in
October 1951, with Winston Churchill as Prime Minister, did not
signal any major ideological shift in policy. In general, despite talk in
the election campaign of freeing the nation from the shackles of
socialism, the Conservatives retained the vast bulk of the huge public
ownership programme undertaken by the Attlee Labour government.
GCS was no exception here, and although a private company had
provided cars for the Cabinet during the war, there was no suggestion
of a return to these policies. Instead, the aim was to improve the
organisational structure and efficiency of GCS. In the event, as we
will see in Chapter Five, it would be the 1980s Conservative govern-
ment, led by Margaret Thatcher, which would seriously consider
privatising GCS.
Nevertheless, the 1950s was to prove a period of great upheaval
and change for GCS, in which undoubtedly the modern Service, still
recognisable today, was constructed from the foundations laid by
OCS. The most remarkable feature of this period was that all the
initiatives and decisions came from the very top of government. This
was to the extent that Prime Ministers Winston Churchill (1951–55)
and Harold Macmillan (1957–63) could be described as the twin
fathers of the modern GCS. In this process, they were closely abetted
by successive Heads of the Home Civil Service, Sir Edward Bridges
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and Sir Norman Brook. There appeared here to have been an implicit
recognition of the political sensitivity of the Car Service, and the
importance of managing change efficiently in order to avoid adverse
publicity and public reaction. In fact, there was generally an anxiety
not only to make sure policy was made well away from the public
gaze, but also to ensure that any public pronouncements put the best
possible gloss on government policy.
The story of GCS in this period therefore provides important
insights into the personalities and styles of both Churchill and
Macmillan, two of the key figures in post-war British political
history. There was a great contrast between the two Prime Ministers,
which reflected both their personalities and the great social and
political changes that were taking place in the 1950s.
Immediately on taking office, Churchill instituted a radical
programme, designed to save money and improve the efficiency of
official cars as a whole. This proved to be of huge importance and
benefit to GCS, in that a decree went out from 10 Downing Street
that all the many departmental fleets should be taken over by a
central pool, managed by GCS (now a component part of the Ministry
of Works). Despite some strong protests, this was pushed through
with ruthless determination by Churchill, so that by 1953 GCS
completely ruled the roost in supplying official cars to Whitehall. In
this respect, it could be said that Churchill proved to be the one
major political figure who instinctively understood the key
importance of GCS organisation and efficiency.
Remarkably, in setting out the rules for official car use, Churchill
was, if anything, even more ruthless with his own Ministers and
officials! Consequently, only three Ministers (the Prime Minister,
Foreign Secretary and Home Secretary) were allowed allocated cars,
with all other Ministers and officials having to take their chance
with the pool (this also meant that the controversial system of
nominated cars was quietly ditched). All this frugality enabled
Churchill to announce to Parliament significant savings in official
car use.
Over time, however, it became clear that all was not well with the
strict policy laid down by Churchill, and by the mid-1950s it had
become evident that his system was unworkable. The person who
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took the initiative in changing things, first as Chancellor of the
Exchequer and then as Prime Minister, was Harold Macmillan, who
considerably widened the scope of allocated cars, and generally
loosened the rules on the use of pool cars.
In this respect, it could be said that Churchill had lost touch with
the changing times. By the time he finally left office in 1955, he was
80 years old, and had grown up in an age before any cars were seen
on the road. As a Minister in pre-war governments, official cars were
almost non-existent, and although their use had mushroomed during
the war, it was possible that Churchill saw this as a temporary
expedient, with the need in post-war years to return to basically the
policy of earlier days.
Although Macmillan was himself a product of the Edwardian age,
he was also an extremely shrewd political operator, who recognised
that the British people were desperate to put the years of austerity
behind them, and that a new age was at hand, where what had once
been considered luxury consumer goods, including cars, would
become widely available. This great change is indicated by the fact
that, in September 1956, there were 3,887,906 cars in use in Britain,
but by September 1964 this figure had more than doubled to
8,247,000.1 Macmillan was therefore able to capture the mood of the
nation, summed up in the 1959 election-winning slogan, ‘You Never
Had It So Good.’ Ministers and officials are of course not immune
from these wider social changes, and by the late 1950s many saw an
official car as an essential tool in order to perform their work
efficiently, rather than an optional luxury.
Macmillan therefore framed the first modern Prime Minister’s
Rules for official car use, that in amended form remain in operation
today. Perhaps inevitably, after the great changes of the 1950s, the
1960s was largely a relatively stable period of consolidation for GCS,
with the chief feature being a growing awareness that the rules for
Junior Ministers were also becoming out of touch with modern times.
ECONOMIES AT ALL COSTS
On 24 October 1951, the eve of the general election, Treasury
Permanent Secretary and Head of the Home Civil Service, Sir
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Edward Bridges, prepared one of his trademark single-page
minutes, on official cars, for the incoming government. This
succinctly set out the current position and the available options.
With regard to the existing situation, Bridges described how all
Cabinet Ministers, all other Ministers in charge of Departments,
and a number of other Ministers, totalling thirty-seven in all, had
official cars. Their total cost was around £45,000 per annum, or
about £1,300 per Minister.
Bridges warned that if any change were to be made in these
arrangements, it would have to be done urgently, since Ministers
might assume that they should continue to use their predecessor’s car,
and it would be a matter of some difficulty to deprive Ministers of
cars after they had been using them. He therefore presented three
alternatives:
(a) to continue the present arrangements
(b) to restrict the use of official cars to Ministers who were
members of the Cabinet
(c) to restrict the use of cars to a very small number of Ministers
who could show that the use of a car was a necessity in
connection with their official work.
He concluded that Ministers not allocated an official car would be
able to obtain suitable transport from the Ministry of Supply pool.
He warned, however, that experience suggested that when cars were
allocated to a large number of Ministers, there was no obvious
relationship between mileage run at public expense and what might
be regarded as the burden of official travel falling on each Minister.
He acknowledged that it was not easy to draw a clear line between
public and private travel, and that it was almost impossible to enforce
rigorously any policy adopted in this matter.
As we described in the previous chapter, Bridges had a consider-
able talent for getting to the essence of a matter in his memos and
minutes, and here the underlying tone was very much one of
scepticism about the value of the allocated system that had developed
over the previous five years, and a strong sense that it required some
sharp reductions.
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Churchill and Bridges knew and understood each other well from
their war years together as Prime Minister and Cabinet Secretary, and
it soon became clear that, on his return to Downing Street, Churchill
himself was in a bullish mood to push ahead with some severe
economies. It was therefore evident that Churchill had earmarked
official cars as one area where he could quickly produce results that
would demonstrate the new government was more efficient than its
Labour predecessor, and was not going to be thwarted. Consequently,
at a Cabinet meeting on 31October, the Prime Minister stressed that
substantial reductions must be made in the use of official cars by
Ministers, and that detailed proposals to this end should be worked
out without delay.
Bridges indeed wasted no time in acting on this order, and on 12
November produced a minute that continued to push a hard line. It
began: ‘The essential thing is to avoid the impression that cars
represent a privilege conferred on Ministers at the public expense.
One of the best ways of avoiding this impression is that, Ministers,
instead of having cars allocated to them, should draw upon a pool
when they need a car for official purposes.’
Bridges conceded that there must be a limited number of except-
ions to this rule. These included the Prime Minister, the Foreign
Secretary, and the Home Secretary, who each had police protection,
and the Commissioner of Police had said it was much easier for him
to look after these Ministers if they went about by car instead of
walking and travelling in taxis. It was suggested, therefore, that these
Ministers, but no others, should have allocated cars, and that suitable
arrangements should be made for them to pay for any private use.
The idea that a Minister should only have an allocated car on
security grounds approximated much more to a pre-war approach,
and was a long way from the climate that had seen OCS set up in
1946, with a philosophy of ‘a Minister is a Minister twenty-four
hours a day’, and requiring a car in order to perform his job more
efficiently.
Bridges continued the extremely hard line when he also recom-
mended that no Ministers, apart from the three protected ones,
should be allowed to use a car for any private purposes, even if he was
prepared to pay, as he believed that this system had not worked very
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happily. On the question of whether ‘official purposes’ should cover
Ministers who lived in London travelling from their homes to the
office and back in the evening, he considered that a ruling was
required. On the other hand, he recommended that ‘official purposes’
should not cover taking a Minister from London to his home in the
country.
Finally, Bridges was equally censorious with regard to the cars
themselves: ‘Up to the present, Ministers have always been provided
with Humber limousines. These are expensive to run and look
luxurious. It is for consideration whether the use of this type of car
should in general be limited to Cabinet Ministers, smaller and less
expensive cars being generally used for other ministerial journeys.’
It was clear that Bridges had become completely disillusioned with
what he saw as the extravagant use of official cars, and that economy
and austerity were to be the new watchwords. Equally, there was no
doubt that the Bridges’ strategy was in total harmony with the Prime
Minister’s views, and Churchill kept up the pressure with a minute to
Bridges and Cabinet Secretary Sir Norman Brook that he hoped to see
the MOS fleet of 250 cars reduced by at least 100. On fixing the
strategy as a whole, he warned: ‘I want all this settled in the present
week because I suppose the cars are being used freely at the present
time. This has to stop.’
Churchill was determined to maintain the momentum for action,
and later in November a draft answer to a Parliamentary Question
indicated that he had accepted the Bridges proposals concerning
allocated cars being restricted to only three Ministers. The answer
also contained a sentence with enormous future implications for OCS:
‘A single central pool will be formed for all official cars in London
whether belonging to the Ministry of Supply pool, to the Service
Departments, or to other Departments.’ Before Churchill could make
this public announcement, however, Cabinet Secretary Sir Norman
Brook stepped in with a memo that warned: ‘there may be some
administrative difficulties with the pool proposal’, and so recom-
mended that the Prime Minister should omit this from his statement
to Parliament.
Brook was no doubt only too aware that several Departments
would not be at all happy about handing over all their official cars to
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a single pool. Nevertheless, at a Cabinet meeting on 27 November,
the Prime Minister announced that he had now formulated his
proposals regarding the use of official cars by Ministers, and these
proposals included reference to a single central pool in London. As
Brook had anticipated, several Ministers picked up on this
recommendation, and argued that there might be some loss of
efficiency in a single pool, and that there might be advantages in
allowing several departmental pools to continue. It was therefore
agreed that further consideration should be given to this point.
The alarm bells had clearly begun to ring in some Departments
about what was in store for them, as demonstrated by a letter
Churchill received from the Minister of Labour and National Service,
Walter Monckton. The Minister argued that an alteration of the
present pool arrangements would not make for efficiency and
economy. He described how there were three departmental cars kept
for use by the Minister, Permanent Secretary and other senior
officials, and explained: ‘When we want the cars they are on the spot
and great care is taken to limit waiting times.’ Monckton’s pleas fell
on deaf ears, however, as far as the Prime Minister was concerned, and
he was told that there were no special reasons for making the Ministry
of Labour an exception.
Sir Edward Bridges also received a similar letter from the Foreign
Office, arguing that it would be a great pity to eliminate their small
car pool, particularly as the accounts showed their running costs were
lower than the Ministry of Supply pool. Another letter to Bridges,
this time from the War Office, warned that there would be serious
physical difficulties in working a single pool.
A letter from the Treasury to the Prime Minister’s Office, there-
fore, warned that, on the proposal for a central pool, ‘Objections have
started to stream in’, and to prove it enclosed copies of letters.
Bridges recognised the need for action, and sent a minute to the
Prime Minister stating that the Treasury had convened a meeting to
verify the present position about official cars in the London area, and
to explore the possibility of forming a central pool under one
organisation. Bridges described how there were 159 OCS cars, while
in addition there were 273 cars run by Departments other than MOS.
As ninety-four of these were self-drive and used by inspectors and
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technical staff, they should be excluded. With regard to the
remaining 179, however, the Treasury was satisfied that it would be
practicable to extend OCS to meet the needs of all Departments,
provided that they were located in three or four garages.
Bridges acknowledged that it would be difficult to make accurate
comparisons between OCS and other Departments on accounting
grounds but, crucially, he argued that the creation of a single organ-
isation would facilitate the enforcement of uniform standards in the
use of official cars, and on these grounds he recommended its adopt-
ion. Bridges warned, however, that if the Prime Minister agreed, he
should mention his intentions in Cabinet, in view of the strong
feelings some Ministers had against the proposal.
As we saw in the previous chapter, the Treasury had been encour-
aging OCS to take over departmental fleets since the late 1940s, and
now saw the opportunity to complete the process. Ironically, however,
this was now not on the grounds of economy, but of equity.
Churchill himself was sensitive to the objections from Depart-
ments, and in his answer to the Parliamentary Question that he had
postponed for this reason, he was careful to omit the word ‘all’ when
mentioning the absorption of cars into a central pool. Nevertheless,
by 7 December Bridges was writing to the Prime Minister’s Office
announcing that, although it would take some time, they would get
on with bringing together the various cars owned by Departments
into OCS.2
SANDYS STEPS IN
Up to this point, all the running on the reform of official cars had
come from Bridges and Churchill, but they were now to be brought
up short. On 11 December, a letter had been sent out from the
Treasury to all Ministers’ Private Secretaries stating that, from now
on, Ministers would have to call on OCS for a car, and that the Private
Secretary should inform the Car Service of the journeys that a
Minister would make in the course of a day. The Private Secretaries
were warned that, as the Prime Minister had instructed, cars could
not be ordered for a day or series of days. The letter also instructed
that ‘official purposes’ had now been defined as including journeys to
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and from Ministers’ official work within seven miles of the Palace of
Westminster.
Unfortunately, the problem here was that the circular had not
actually been seen by the Minister of Supply, and at a Cabinet
meeting on 20 December the Minister in question, Duncan Sandys,
objected that the arrangements proposed in the circular seemed to be
inconvenient, if not impracticable. He would therefore arrange for it
to be recalled, and would send the Prime Minister a report covering
not only the questions raised by the circular, but also the whole issue
of a central car pool.
Before the end of the month, new instructions were issued by the
Treasury, describing how all Departments would have to work
through the OCS Superintendent (Tom Hughes) based at Kingston
House in Kensington. It was March 1952 before things began to sort
themselves out, and in a memo that month to the Prime Minister,
Bridges apologised that consultations had taken so long, but
explained that Departments had raised a great many difficulties, and
it had been hoped to present an agreed scheme. Bridges concluded
that the Post Office should be left out of any pooling arrangement,
but for the rest he recommended that Churchill should issue an
instruction that all the other civil Departments should be served by
OCS and not have separate pools.
If this was decided, he promised that it would be seen to that OCS
garages were so located as to give an efficient service. With regard to
the Service Departments, two options were presented of either the Air
Ministry and War Office retaining their own fleets with a reduced
size, or to be absorbed in OCS. Bridges stressed that decisions were
required urgently, as OCS had not got rid of cars and drivers made
redundant through the stricter rules, pending a decision on the other
Departments. He warned: ‘The extent to which drivers and cars are at
present under-employed at the OCS main garage could easily become
the subject of public criticism.’
Up to this point, despite the memo on the eve of the election
from the Ministry of Supply Permanent Secretary, Sir Archibald
Rowlands, recommending that OCS should move away from the
MOS, there had been no suggestion that this would take place.
Events were now to take a new turn, however, with an intervention
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from the Minister of Supply, Duncan Sandys, in a dialogue with the
Prime Minister. There was an extra personal dimension here in that,
at that time, Sandys was married to Churchill’s daughter Diana,
making him the Prime Minister’s son-in-law! As we saw, Sandys
was unhappy at not being consulted on the future organisation of
OCS, and by March 1952 it was clear that he continued to have
doubts about the value of the whole enterprise. In a personal minute
from Churchill to Sandys, the Prime Minister noted that Sandys
had told him no economy had been effected, for all the incon-
venience incurred on official cars, and so Churchill suggested that
they should discuss things at Chequers.
Sandys seized the opportunity to put his point of view to the Prime
Minister in a minute that pulled no punches. He reminded Churchill
that, from the start, he had expressed doubts about the efficacy of the
tighter rules, and having tried to operate them, was satisfied that they
would produce no appreciable economies. He emphasised here that
savings would only come about when a single pool was set up, and
recommended that a single Department, whether the Treasury, MOS
or Ministry of Works, should be given undivided responsibility for
administering OCS.
By now, Churchill was clearly becoming impatient and irritated
about the lack of progress, and in a personal minute to Bridges on the
matter of OCS stated plainly: ‘This has not gone at all well, and
deserved criticism must soon be expected in Parliament.’ No doubt
encouraged by his discussions with Sandys, Churchill set out the case
for the Minister of Supply taking full responsibility for OCS.
Sandys, however, was about to provide a fresh twist to the story.
Churchill had copied the Bridges’ minute to Sandys, and in his
response the Minister of Supply now argued that the Ministry of
Works should be the Department responsible for OCS. This was
chiefly on the dual grounds that the MOW provided common
services for all government Departments, and already had a transport
branch, whereas OCS was unrelated to any other MOS function.
Perhaps partly through the family connection, but probably more
because he wanted to get a long-running problem sorted out,
Churchill wasted no time in taking Sandys’ advice, and on 18 March
wrote to the Minister of Works telling him that he had reached the
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conclusion it would be more appropriate for him to take respon-
sibility for OCS. Churchill really was wasting no time, and named 1
April, barely two weeks ahead, as the takeover date! Tellingly,
Churchill sent a minute to Sandys with a copy of his minute to the
Ministry of Works. The Prime Minister told his son-in-law simply: ‘I
think that this is what you wanted.’3
Keeping Sandys Satisfied
It was ironic that, as Minister of Supply, Duncan Sandys should be
instrumental in shifting OCS to the Ministry of Works, as he was to have
an important collaboration with GCS. Sandys was seriously wounded
during the Second World War, and GCS Superintendent Tom Hughes
describes how the Minister found the rear compartment of his car
uncomfortable due to the effects of his war wounds. Consequently, Hughes
redesigned the rear interior in consultation with Sandys. These changes were
so successful that other Ministers using the car on odd occasions asked for
their cars to be modified. Eventually, the redesigned rear compartment became
a standard for Ministers’ cars, and was used by the manufacturers as a
specification for VIP cars. In addition, several overseas heads of government
who used the cars on visits to Britain, also adopted the GCS design.4
Perhaps because of his serious disabilities, however, Sandys was known
as one of their most awkward passengers by GCS drivers. On one memorable
occasion, Sandys poked his driver in the neck with his stick. The driver
immediately got out of the car, and refused to go on! The driver then
walked to GCS headquarters at Kingston House, and told them that they
would have to send another driver to Sandys’ car, in order to complete the
journey.
A LOW-KEY BIRTH FOR GCS
On 1April 1952, without any public fanfares, the Official Car Service
switched from the Ministry of Supply to the Ministry of Works, and
was immediately renamed as the Government Car Service. Strangely,
given the lengthy top level discussions on OCS matters generally, this
change in name appears to have happened instantaneously, and with
no prior discussion. The government files of the time carry no record
of why the change happened, and GCS simply appears as the name on
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Ministry of Works papers. It seems, therefore, that the MOW wished
to re-brand the Car Service in order to distinguish it from its previous
life at the Ministry of Supply and, as we have noted earlier, chose the
word ‘Government’ as it denoted more clearly who actually owned
and operated the organisation.
Significantly, in a minute to the Prime Minister on 9 May, Sir
Edward Bridges continued to refer to the ‘Official Car Service’. By
this time, draft rules had been formulated for official car use, and the
Treasury Permanent Secretary was submitting them to Churchill.
However, the draft rules themselves referred to ‘the Government Car
Service in London’. The rules basically set out the much restricted
formula approved by Churchill several months earlier – now, of
course, with a central pool operated by GCS.
In organisational terms, therefore, something quite recognisable
as the modern GCS was now in operation. In taking over nearly all
the departmental pools, its position had been hugely strengthened,
and for the first time it could emerge as the supplier of official trans-
port (in this context we can perhaps understand why, as described at
the beginning of Chapter One, Tom Hughes was so keen to keep
Churchill happy).
Crucially, Bridges had been sceptical about the savings that might
be made in setting up a central pool, and finally recommended it on
the grounds that it would produce a more consistent and fairer system.
Ironically, however, little more would be heard about this equity argu-
ment, and certainly Churchill’s attention was almost entirely focused
on how much setting up the remodelled GCS would produce in
savings to the government.
There were definitely no signs that Churchill was any less
interested in the now GCS, and on 11 May he sent a personal minute
to Minister of Works David Eccles, with a copy of the new draft rules.
He asked Eccles: ‘What do you say about all this and how are you
getting on? Let me have a page report.’ Churchill was famous for his
liking for concise one-page reports, and so Eccles duly delivered this
on 13 May.
Eccles reported that the transfer of cars to a single pool was almost
completed, although he had agreed to leave in a separate pool of
Foreign Office cars, which fetched and carried diplomatic bags. He
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was still in discussions with the Admiralty and Air Ministry, but the
War Office had agreed that all except purely military needs should be
met by GCS. On forming the pool in London, he had dispensed with
thirty-five cars and drivers, while further economies in London and
the provinces would enable him to dispense with a further fifty-five
cars and drivers. Some of the cars were to be kept at Church House in
Westminster, but these required some repairs. On the question of the
draft rules, Eccles (unlike Sandys) thought that these were about
right, although he noted that Junior Ministers and Parliamentary
Secretaries were not mentioned, and he proposed that they should be
treated in the same way as Permanent Secretaries (in the event, the
question of official transport for Junior Ministers would be a sore
point for GCS for many years to come). Eccles concluded that econo-
mies would be achieved by better management of fewer cars, and ‘by
relying on responsible people to play the game’.
That Churchill had carefully studied Eccles’ report was quite clear
in a further personal minute he sent to the Minister of Works the
following day. With perhaps a hint of Churchillian tongue-in-cheek,
he asked pointedly: ‘What is “the game” responsible people are
expected to play?’ As we saw in the previous chapter, the peculiar
system of nominated cars had depended on senior officials ‘playing
the game’, but with little proof of success. Churchill’s drastic tighten-
ing of the rules had been designed to cut out this type of individual
initiative, and the Prime Minister’s remark to Eccles suggests that he
understood this only too well! At the same time, Churchill’s own
tight rules depended for their effectiveness on senior Ministers
‘playing the game’, but as we will see later in this chapter, few of
them would be prepared to do as they were told.
Nevertheless, Churchill was happy to tell Eccles: ‘The reduction of
ninety cars in London seems to me a considerable achievement, and
presently we must make a statement to Parliament about the econo-
mies effected.’ Churchill was of course also very well aware of the
political value to be gained in an announcement of savings in the
sensitive area of official cars, and so was encouraging Eccles to get on
with the job.
For his part, Eccles must have been only too conscious of the
importance of keeping the Prime Minister happy, and on the
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following day he replied to Churchill’s minute, saying that he would
send material as soon as possible to answer an arranged Parliamentary
Question. He also referred to ‘the game’ and pointed out that he
referred here to the sections of the draft code that allowed Permanent
Secretaries discretion to authorise journeys outside the rest of the
code. Eccles supported this discretion, provided that he was able to
achieve his main objective of cutting down the number of cars and
the expense of the Service. In other words, Eccles was very well aware
of the meaning behind Churchill’s question!
From now on, Churchill was set on being in a position to publicly
announce the GCS savings at the earliest opportunity. On 12 June,
therefore, Eccles sent a minute to the Prime Minister stating that the
GCS car fleet had been reduced by a grand total of 116. In addition,
100 drivers had been discharged, while those drivers left were also
doing the work of forty-one service personnel who had gone back to
their units. Overall, there were £65,250 in estimated annual savings.
Churchill was obviously pleased at this result, and replied to Eccles:
‘You have done a fine piece of work. Please draft a friendly question
which might be asked by one of our side, and the proposed answer I
should give. I will consider both.’ In fact, no doubt encouraged by the
Prime Minister, Eccles made an announcement of the savings at a
meeting of the Cabinet on 19 June, and it seemed that all was set fair
for a public announcement.
In the event, the Prime Minister’s Private Secretary, David
Pitblado, was not quite as satisfied as his boss was with the figures,
and made some enquiries. It transpired that savings had not been
included for the Service vehicles, and when these were included the
annual savings totalled £104,500. Churchill answered a Commons’
Question using these figures in July, but Eccles was obviously keen to
keep the Prime Minister informed, and in December sent Churchill a
minute stating that he had now reduced the GCS fleet by a further
112 cars, mostly in the regions, bringing the total annual savings up
to £160,000. Significantly, given the radical reorganisation and the
departmental protests, he reported that he had not had any com-
plaints about the Service. In response to Eccles’ minute, Churchill
made a handwritten comment: ‘Very good. I must answer a question
about it when I come back.’ Once again, therefore, Churchill was very
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keen to take political credit for GCS savings! (In the event, however,
it was Eccles himself who eventually reported the good news to
Parliament.)
Meanwhile, with regard to the draft rules for official car use, the
Minister of Works’ earlier reference to Junior Ministers being treated
the same as officials had not gone unnoticed in Whitehall. This was
made clear in a letter from the Treasury to the Prime Minister’s
Private Secretary, where it was pointed out that Junior Ministers and
Parliamentary Secretaries were entitled to call on cars for any official
journeys, whereas a civil servant, including a Permanent Secretary,
would have to use public transport where it was available. It was
acknowledged, however, that there was a proviso to the effect that, if
a Permanent Secretary was under severe pressure of work, he could as
a special concession use an official car for home-to-office journeys,
whereas Junior Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries did not have
this privilege. There was no doubt that this discretion was what
Eccles and Churchill had in mind when they referred to ‘the game’,
but obviously the Treasury was sensitive about the possibility that
Permanent Secretaries might be getting a better deal than Junior
Ministers, and wanted to clarify things. In any event, the draft rules
became official without amendment.
Churchill had therefore personally overseen the creation of a
modern GCS, and had taken significant interest in its operation,
even if there were some personal political motives at work here.
Rules for official car use had also been set down for the first time,
and by the end of the 1950s would become the Prime Minister’s
Rules that continue to this day. It might well have been that
Churchill would have continued this personal interest, but in June
1953 he suffered a serious stroke. The full truth of his condition
was withheld from the public at the time, but he was incapacitated
for several months, and although he was to continue as Prime
Minister for nearly another two years, he found it increasingly
difficult to keep on top of the details of the job. It would therefore
be another four years before a review of GCS affairs, and this time
conducted by a Prime Minister with a very different personality and
outlook.5
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Kingston Home
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, GCS had a distinctive home
underground in Kingston House in Kensington. Long-serving pool driver
Irene Maykels, who joined GCS in October 1956, stresses that there was a
great camaraderie amongst the drivers: ‘Everyone was together, in contrast
to later years, when people stayed at the Department where they worked,
and so became more separated.’ Irene Maykels has particularly fond
memories of the big Christmas parties, which in fact were usually held in
January: ‘Outsiders would feel quite honoured to receive an invitation to the
Christmas party, and they were much sought after. We would create huge
tableaux, including special features such as waterfalls. People would be
given three months off to organise it all.’
Driver Beryl Osborne, who joined GCS in 1961, also enjoyed the sense
of community at Kingston House, but recalls that this did not necessarily
extend to everyone: ‘There was a strict demarcation between the limousine
drivers and the rest of us – I think they felt a cut above!’
Former driver Chris Green, however, reflects that there could also have
been a darker side to life at Kingston House: ‘Not only was it underground,
but it also had a petrol store. The atmosphere down there was generally
unhealthy, and health and safety regulations would never allow it today.
Sadly, several people who worked there died quite young with cancer, and
you can’t help thinking that the working conditions may well have had
something to do with it.’
SYSTEM FAILURE
Winston Churchill, with the considerable assistance of Sir Edward
Bridges, had moulded a modern GCS, but with an extremely strict
set of rules for official car use that would be proved unworkable in the
changing times of the 1950s. Once again, it was left to Super-
intendent Tom Hughes to try and make things work on the ground.
Hughes describes how the GCS car fleet in London was reduced
from 225 at the time of the merger with the Ministry of Works on
1 April 1952, to 136 a year or two later, while there were also drastic
cuts in the provincial pools. Hughes confirms the radical reductions
initiated by Churchill, with all the so-called nominated cars
abolished, with Permanent Secretaries and other VIPs only allowed
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cars under special circumstances. For their part, Parliamentary
Secretaries were allowed the use of GCS from office to the nearest
station only if taxis were difficult to obtain. A pool of self-drive
vehicles satisfied a lot of transport requirements to establishments
that were not served by public transport. Again as instructed by
Churchill, an officer could not use his car freely on the mileage rate,
and use of a private car on official duties was a last resort.
Nor were the strict rules the only difficulties for the new GCS.
Hughes also highlights that staff problems were caused by the
transfer to the MOW. This was because the GCS drivers and main-
tenance staff were graded as industrial, and the MOW drivers were
non-industrial. Eventually, it was decided that all drivers would be
graded as industrial. This would cause some long-standing problems,
as industrial Civil Service pay was generally lower than non-
industrial. As we will see in Chapter Four, this lack of parity would
eventually lead to industrial action by GCS staff.6
In the mid-1950s, however, attention was focused on the austere
rules for official car use that had been introduced by Prime Minister
Winston Churchill. Once Churchill had departed the scene in 1955,
together with Head of the Civil Service Sir Edward Bridges (who
retired in 1956), then it was inevitably only a matter of time before
a reaction set in to their strict regime. Churchill was replaced as
Prime Minister by his protégé and long-designated successor Sir
Anthony Eden. The Minister who took the lead in seeking a reform
of the rules, however, was the wily and politically astute Chancellor
of the Exchequer, Harold Macmillan.
In August 1956, therefore, Macmillan wrote to Eden explaining
that, on the Chancellor’s behalf, the Financial Secretary had been
looking into the rules for GCS use authorised by Churchill in 1952.
Macmillan set out plainly the unsatisfactory situation:
He [the Financial Secretary] tells me that these rules have not been
working altogether satisfactorily: Ministers do not always know
quite where they stand under them, and the Ministry of Works
which supplies the cars is sometimes placed in difficulties. I am
satisfied that there is much to be said for replacing them by a more
workable and realistic code. I have also borne in mind, as I think you
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wished me to do, the desirability of helping Ministers towards get-
ting through their heavy working days without loss of time and
without unnecessary personal expense.
Macmillan attached a copy of his proposed new rules, but also
outlined for Eden the four main changes. Firstly, and crucially,
Macmillan proposed that in future not only Ministers with police
protection, but all Cabinet Ministers, and Ministers in charge of
Departments, would be entitled to have cars personally allocated to
them for official purposes. It was very telling here that Macmillan
added: ‘This is already tacitly accepted in practice; I suggest that it
would be sensible to regularise it.’ Despite Churchill’s strictures, it
was clear that senior Ministers had not taken at all kindly to the
prospect of taking their chance with the car pool, and in reality many
had continued to use their cars and drivers on a continuous basis. It
was also significant that Macmillan himself, although a very senior
Minister, was not one of those with police protection, and so, at least
officially, was not allowed an allocated car!
Secondly, Macmillan suggested that all these senior Ministers
should be able to use their allocated cars for private purposes at a cost
of 1s 6d per mile, a privilege previously restricted to the three
Ministers with police protection.
Thirdly, Macmillan proposed that all the Ministers with allocated
cars would be entitled to treat as official travel the journeys they
made between home and office, provided that the distances did not
exceed fifty miles. The former limit was seven miles. Macmillan
concluded: ‘This will considerably help Ministers who live near but
outside London, and at present have either to travel to and fro by
train, or to use their private cars at their own expense.’
Fourthly, the Chancellor proposed that a Minister travelling on
official business would be free to use his private car and claim mileage
allowance on Civil Service terms. Macmillan pointed out to Eden that
this was the only one of the four reforms that would need to be
announced to Parliament, as Churchill had expressly forbidden it in
a Commons’ statement in 1952.
If Macmillan had been hoping for a sympathetic hearing from
Eden, however, he was soon to be disillusioned. In fact, Eden’s Private
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Secretary took the lead in sending a note to the Prime Minister that
poured cold water on the plan:
It seems to me that it may not be quite the right time to make these
changes in the rules about cars for Ministers. I don’t think the
present arrangements are causing any serious difficulty, and certainly
they won’t during the recess. It might be better to let things run on
as at present until the Autumn.
This is the sort of change – especially c. [a reference to the
proposal concerning Ministers being entitled to travel up to fifty
miles between office and home] – which could leak and lead to a silly
story in the press.
In a personal minute to Macmillan, therefore, Eden chose to follow
this line, pointing out that concession (c) could be misrepresented at a
time when the aim was further economy in government expenditure.
The line taken by Eden and his Private Secretary was thus very
much that which echoed Churchill’s hard line approach, and was not
at all sympathetic to Macmillan’s expansionary plans.
Eden had written to Churchill on 15 August, and although the
Chancellor did not respond until 5 October, his lengthy minute
demonstrated that there were now deep differences between them on
the subject. At the outset, Macmillan emphasised to Eden that,
having made further inquiries, there was rather more urgency about
the proposed changes than perhaps his earlier minute had succeeded
in making clear. He went on: ‘First, there is undoubtedly a good deal
of confusion in the minds of Ministers about the circumstances in
which they can use cars, and this of itself imposes difficulties which
we ought not to allow to persist.’
In particular, Macmillan focused on the point highlighted by Eden
of the proposal for Ministers to have home-to-office journeys up to
fifty miles. Clearly writing from personal experience, and with barely
concealed irritation, the Chancellor put the Prime Minister in the
picture:
The present rule operates so severely that it is not proving fully
enforceable. For instance, I have ascertained that in the last three
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months there have been quite a number of cases in which senior
Ministers felt themselves justified in using official cars for home-to-
office journeys although the distance substantially exceeded seven
miles. I do so. And so I suppose do you. Frankly, I could not do my
work if I had always to go home by train and stand in the corridor –
as is usual on Mondays or Fridays. It puts officials of the Ministry of
Works in an extremely difficult position when government cars are
thus used by Ministers outside the limits which the rules permit; but
I have no doubt that each of the Ministers concerned had good
practical reasons for thus using a government car, and the essence of
the matter is that the rules are out of date and unreasonable in
relation to practical needs.
Macmillan also pointed out that, because Ministers could not claim
mileage on their private cars, they used their official cars, thereby
costing the government more. With regard to public sensitivity, he
emphasised there was no reason why the other changes should be
publicly known, ‘any more than the existing rules have become
known’.
Despite Macmillan’s strong words, or perhaps because of them,
Eden was still not at all disposed to give any ground, and instead
chose to refer the whole matter to his Chief Whip, Edward Heath. In
fact, it is tempting to speculate to what extent Eden was able to con-
centrate on these matters at all, given that by this time international
events were escalating quickly to a climax that would bring an abrupt
end to his period as Prime Minister.
In July 1956, President Nasser of Egypt had nationalised the
strategically important waterway, the Suez Canal. This act had
enraged Eden, who saw it as a personal insult and blatant provo-
cation, that threatened Britain’s key trade routes between East and
West. A top secret plan was then hatched between Britain, France
and Israel, whereby the latter would attack Egypt, leading the other
two countries to themselves invade Egypt, ostensibly as a peace-
keeping force, but in reality to secure the Suez Canal. The plan was
carried out in October and November 1956, with the Anglo-French
force quickly seizing control of the Canal Zone. Eden’s strategy,
however, split the country and caused huge controversy. Even more
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crucially, US President Eisenhower flatly refused to back the invasion,
leaving Eden with no choice but to order a troop withdrawal. On top
of this humiliation, a run on the pound produced an economic crisis,
while the trade fallout from the loss of the Canal included petrol
rationing.
In this desperate position for the government, the question of
Ministers’ transport was decidedly not at the top of the political
agenda. By the time Chief Whip Edward Heath replied to the Prime
Minister’s Office about Macmillan’s proposals, therefore, there was an
irrelevancy about his conclusions. Ironically, Heath, no doubt
recognising the political reality spelt out by Macmillan, basically
backed the Chancellor’s proposals. At the same time, he stressed that
this was not the time to make the changes, and instead they should
be reconsidered when petrol rationing was abolished.
Similarly, a letter from the Prime Minister’s Office to the Treasury
stressed that with regard to Macmillan’s proposals: ‘We are putting
the papers on the shelf for the time being.’ Indeed, far from Ministers
being given more travel privileges, a Cabinet meeting of 26
November decided that, other than those requiring police protection,
they should use smaller cars, and that drastic reductions should be
made in the number of central pool cars. A subsequent letter from the
Lord Privy Seal’s Office instructed senior Ministers that they should
abandon their large Humber Pullmans in favour of smaller Wolseley
18s. The letter was also concerned about the effects on GCS itself. It
was pointed out that, during the crisis, pool drivers would be
underemployed and lose overtime, while drivers of allocated cars
would continue to work long hours. The letter warned: ‘This would
lead to a very big discrepancy of earnings, between the two categories
of drivers, and would, I am told, lead to serious discontent.’ Ministers
were therefore asked to accept pool drivers in the evenings, in order
to give a fair share of overtime, and avoid trouble with the unions.
The travel problems for Ministers, although obviously a small
matter in the great scheme of things, seem somehow to symbolise
the terrible mess the government had got itself into over the Suez
crisis. Eden’s health had been in a fragile state for some time before
Suez, but it was utterly broken by the humiliation of the crisis, and
he was compelled to resign in January 1957. Ironically, his
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successor as Prime Minister was the man who had attempted to
make Eden see the reality of the modern situation on official car
use, Harold Macmillan.7
Suez Fever
The memories of the Suez crisis by long-serving GCS driver Denis Oliver
conjure up well the fevered atmosphere within the government at that time.
Oliver had joined GCS in May 1956, and was working night shifts.
Around the time he was due to finish one morning, he had a call to pick up
Lord Salisbury and take him to an emergency Cabinet meeting. Salisbury
was Lord President of the Council, and in the 1950s an influential figure
in Conservative Party circles, known as ‘the Kingmaker’.
Oliver waited while the Cabinet meeting continued all morning, when
Salisbury emerged and told his driver to take him home for lunch. Oliver
was again told to wait, before Salisbury came out again, and said that he
had to attend yet another Cabinet meeting. Oliver took him back to
Downing Street, and waited until early evening in order to take Salisbury
home again. By now, Oliver was almost due to start his next night shift!
YOU NEVER HAD IT SO GOOD, MINISTER
Even allowing for the distraction of Suez, it could be said that the
differences between Eden and Macmillan on official car use
represented a sharp dividing line between the old world and the new.
Eden, like Churchill, had been a Minister in pre-war days, and
apparently saw having use of an allocated car as a non-essential luxury
for most Ministers. In addition, Eden appeared uninterested in the
fact that the strict rules were being widely flouted. Macmillan, on the
other hand, recognised that the rules had become badly outdated and
unworkable, in an era when individual mobility through car use was
beginning to be the social norm.
The Suez crisis and petrol rationing had put a stop to any reforms,
but once installed as Prime Minister, it was only a matter of time
before Macmillan would return to the subject of official car use. The
opportunity came with the end of petrol rationing, and in May 1957
Macmillan called a Downing Street meeting on the subject of
Ministers’ use of official cars to be attended by, in addition to himself,
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the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Home Secretary, the Minister of
Works, the Chief Whip, and the Financial Secretary to the Treasury.
The outcome that the Prime Minister was looking for to this high-
powered meeting was made clear in a preparatory note produced by
Cabinet Secretary (and now Head of the Home Civil Service) Sir
Norman Brook. Having outlined the history, Brook emphasised that
the ‘austere’ rules introduced by Churchill were generally regarded by
Ministers as unduly rigorous, and after a time were not strictly
observed. Consequently, the principle of ‘no allocation’ had been
tacitly abandoned. On the other hand, Brook warned, the rules had
never been formally withdrawn or altered, and as a result Ministers
were uncertain what the existing practice was supposed to be. This
risked embarrassment in Parliament, and difficulty with the
Comptroller and Auditor-General. Recognising past failures, Brook
acknowledged: ‘The worst course of all would be to adopt new rules
without a reasonable assurance that they will be observed.’
In acknowledging present realities, Brook described how in fact
cars were allocated to all Cabinet Ministers and Heads of major
Departments, as well as the Attorney-General, Paymaster-General
and some Ministers of State. Consequently, he recommended that the
rules should refer to ‘Cabinet Ministers, Ministers in charge of
Departments, and such other Ministers as the Prime Minister may
decide’.
Brook also referred to how the 1952 rules had emphasised ‘official
purposes’ in terms of daily travel. In contrast, Brook pointed out that
in practice, Ministers used their official cars during normal working
hours for all journeys, including, for example, a visit to the dentist or
a private lunch engagement. In addition, many Ministers had found
the seven-mile radius restriction for home-to-work journeys
unacceptable, and had been in the habit of using their cars for home-
to-office journeys over greater distances, either at weekends or even
daily. The Cabinet Secretary therefore wondered if reference to
‘official purposes’ should be abandoned, and discretion left to the
good sense of the individual Minister, with repayment made for any
private use.
Brook also referred to the long-standing thorny subject of the long
hours worked by allocated drivers, and the problems here not only on
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the grounds of safety and humanity, but the high overtime costs for
GCS. On the other hand, he recognised that there would be obvious
objections to a firm rule that a Minister’s personal driver should not
be employed after a certain hour in the evening, and so he again
suggested the option of leaving it to the Minister’s discretion.
Brook had set out a framework that was hugely more liberal than
the Churchill rules, but that nevertheless appeared to recognise the
realities of present practice. Perhaps surprisingly, given the personal
interest of Macmillan and Brook, after the Downing Street meeting,
the job of drawing up a draft of the new rules was left to the Minister
responsible for GCS, Minister of Works Hugh Molson. In the event,
this proved to be an unfortunate decision, as Molson chose to adopt a
stricter interpretation of the rules than several Ministers had
anticipated.
In several respects, Molson did follow the line set by Sir Norman
Brook. This included the allocation of cars to Cabinet Ministers,
Ministers in charge of Departments, and such other Ministers as the
Prime Minister might indicate could have cars allocated to them. The
seven-mile limit for home-to-work travel was also extended to fifty
miles, although it was stipulated that this should happen only when
the Minister was seriously delayed through official duties and if no
other means of transport was reasonably available.
One rule that was to have later repercussions concerned the right
of Ministers to call on their own allocated car and driver in the
evenings. Here, Molson stipulated that from dinner-time on Mondays
to Fridays, and during the whole of Saturdays and Sundays, allocated
cars would be withdrawn, and a Minister requiring the use of a car
would draw on the car pool. This left no room for discretion on the
part of the Minister.
Molson was clearly wary of the whole business of setting out the
new rules, and in a covering note to Macmillan stressed that his task
in administering GCS had been difficult. He therefore wanted the
Prime Minister to issue the rules over Macmillan’s own signature.
This would have the effect of making 10 Downing Street ultimately
responsible for administering the rules.
As perhaps Molson had anticipated, his draft raised several
objections from a number of Ministers, particularly the point
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concerning no discretion in the evenings for Ministers with allocated
cars. In the light of a variety of comments, it fell to Sir Norman
Brook to produce a new draft. With regard to the use of allocated cars
in the evening, the wording had now been changed to: ‘Therefore,
after dinner-time on Mondays to Fridays, and at any time during
Saturdays and Sundays, a Minister will not, save in exceptional
circumstances, use his allocated car, but will draw on the car pool.’
Crucially, the addition of ‘in exceptional circumstances’ gave
Ministers the discretion to decide exactly what this meant.
The Minister of Works clearly saw the implications here, and in
commenting on the new draft recommended to Macmillan that ‘in
exceptional circumstances’ should be struck out. Molson also
suggested several other amendments, but Brook was clearly becoming
impatient with the Minister of Works, and in a sharply worded memo
to Macmillan the Cabinet Secretary stressed: ‘The important thing at
this stage is to get these rules out.’ In his reply to Molson, therefore,
the Prime Minister was not going to give way, and on the question of
the ‘exceptional circumstances’ reference stressed: ‘This is a point to
which some of my colleagues attach special importance.’
Nevertheless, as Molson had earlier requested, Macmillan did put
his name to the document, and so the first official Prime Minister’s
Rules for official car use were published (although not made public)
in June 1957.
By now, however, there was a distinct edginess in the relationship
between the Minister of Works on the one side, and Macmillan and
Brook on the other, and this was set to continue. In October 1957,
therefore, Molson sent a minute to the Prime Minister warning him
that the rules he had issued in June were not working satisfactorily.
In particular, he claimed that the drivers of allocated cars were
continuing to work overlong hours, due to what he considered to be
the misuse of the ‘exceptional circumstances’ provision. Molson went
on to explain:
In a typical week, before the Summer recess, these ‘exceptional
circumstances’ occurred on more than forty occasions amongst
twenty-one Ministers, and in the case of two Ministers, on every one
of the five working days of the week. On the night of 25 July, twelve
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Ministers kept their own drivers when a pool car could have been
provided.
The fact is that Ministers are regularly employing their own
drivers and are paying no attention to the rules. I can only report to
you these facts, which make it impossible for me to administer the
Car Service satisfactorily.
If the Minister of Works had been looking for sympathy from the
people at the top, he was to be sorely disappointed. Sir Norman
Brook was still clearly irked at Molson’s whole attitude to the new
rules, and in a minute to the Prime Minister pointed out that, in his
original draft, Molson had forbidden any discretion to Ministers.
Brook believed this was calculated to inconvenience Ministers and to
reduce the earnings of their drivers, and concluded:
I am not therefore surprised to hear that it is not working at all
[although it was Brook himself who had drawn up the new rules, and
included the ‘exceptional circumstances’ provision] . . . I certainly do
not see why the Prime Minister should put himself to the trouble
now of giving an interpretation of the rule which the Minister asked
him to adopt. On the whole I am disposed to recommend that the
Prime Minister should not reply to this minute from the Minister of
Works.
Macmillan left no doubt about his own attitude, with a handwritten
note at the bottom of Brook’s minute that read: ‘What a splendid
suggestion’ (i.e. not to reply).
In the event, Macmillan and Brook were not allowed to let the
matter rest. This was because Minister of Housing and Local Govern-
ment Henry Brooke had written to Molson complaining that they
were the only two Ministers sticking to the rules, with the result that
their drivers were highly indignant at the lack of overtime compared
with other allocated drivers.
On this occasion, Macmillan decided that he had to reply, but did
so in a highly pointed manner. In a minute to the Minister of Works,
the Prime Minister pointed out that he had been sceptical from the
start about a rule that tried to enforce use of pool cars for senior
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Ministers in the evenings, and that practical experience had now
confirmed that this was impractical. Macmillan concluded with the
icy remark: ‘I should be interested to know what recommendation
you, as the responsible Minister, now wish to make.’
The Prime Minister was clearly determined to do nothing to help
Molson. The clear inference of his message was that there was little
point in trying to enforce, as was surely the intention from the
moment the ‘exceptional circumstances’ provision had been inserted.
At this point, it might have been thought that Molson would have
considered it prudent to placate the Prime Minister, but remarkably
he chose instead to escalate the argument still further. The Minister
of Works was clearly by now incensed about the human and economic
costs of drivers working long hours of overtime, and so in his reply to
Macmillan he complained: ‘I cannot approve a state of affairs in which
four drivers are working more than seventy hours a week and two
nearly eighty. . .No commercial organisation would, I believe, dare
tolerate such long hours being worked by drivers, nor can I justify
this waste of public money.’ Rather than scrap the rule, Molson
recommended that, as in his original draft, the reference to ‘except-
ional circumstances’ should be dropped, thereby compelling
Ministers to use pool cars in the evenings.
Macmillan did not reply immediately to this challenging minute,
ostensibly on the grounds that he was about to leave on a visit to
Australia. However, in a minute to the Prime Minister when he
returned from his Australian trip, Brook confided, ‘We thought it
best to let this simmer a bit.’ The degree to which things were
allowed to ‘simmer’ is indicated by the fact that Molson had sent his
minute to the Prime Minister on 20 December 1957, but it was to be
3 April 1958 before Macmillan issued a reply! In this minute, not
surprisingly, the Prime Minister stated plainly that he would be
reluctant to issue an instruction that allocated cars could not be used
in the evenings and at weekends: ‘A rigid rule of this kind would in
some cases cause serious inconvenience.’ Instead, Macmillan again
put the ball back in the Minister of Works’ court by encouraging him
to speak to those Ministers using their allocated cars for more than
fifty-five hours per week, and ask them what they would do to avoid
this.
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Macmillan was therefore basically prepared to let the matter rest.
He had introduced rules that considerably liberalised official car use,
and was happy to turn a blind eye to those grey areas where discretion
could be exploited, even if GCS costs increased considerably as a
result. In fact, as we will see in Chapter Seven, the issue of whether
Ministers should use only one driver remains a live one to this day,
and goes to the heart of the delicate question of the degree to which
the special relationship between a single driver and Minister should
be preserved at all costs.
It is also worth noting that the preoccupation of Macmillan and
Brook was with the finer points of when Ministers might or might
not use their official cars, rather than the implications for GCS as an
organisation in terms of strategy and costs and revenue. To a large
degree, this set the tone for a succession of governments over the next
four decades, that by the late 1990s would lead GCS to the edge of
economic oblivion.8
MODERNISATION BY STEALTH
Meanwhile, having settled the Prime Minister’s Rules for official car
use by Ministers, in July 1957 Sir Norman Brook turned his
attention to the question of officials. Having consulted with the
Minister of Works and the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, Brook
reported that, during petrol rationing, all allocated cars for Perman-
ent Secretaries had been withdrawn. As this had produced savings
estimated at £15,000 a year, the Minister of Works was keen to
retain this permanently. Historically, however, by far the most
significant section of Brook’s minute was where he sketched the
situation he had found within the Departments with regard to
official car use. This description is worth quoting at length, as it
sums up perfectly the tension in the 1950s between the old
Whitehall world and the new:
I have had a talk about this with some representative Permanent
Secretaries. This showed that there are two attitudes of mind, and
pretty strong feelings, about it. On the one hand, the Heads of the
older Departments, with memories and habits going back to the pre-
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war days when there was no GCS, tend to make little call on official
cars except for urgent official business, and occasionally for
attendance at evening functions; and for these purposes they are quite
content to rely on the car pool system. On the other hand, the Heads
of the newer Departments and those with close links with industry
take the view that cars are part of ‘the tools of management’ and that
senior officials should have discretion to use them for home to office
journeys, for meals in the middle of the day, and for evening
functions. They say that they are embarrassed when they are without
transport, and are offered lifts by business executives who regard
with derision the restrictions imposed on the use of cars by civil
servants . . . I have much sympathy with the ‘modern’ view. An
intelligent use of cars saves time; and most of the time saved accrues
to the public service, not to the private life of the individual.
Nevertheless, Brook was politically sensitive enough to note that
Parliament was jealous of ‘perquisites’ for bureaucrats, and that the
Civil Service would not preserve its reputation unless it maintained
its humility. Brook’s solution was therefore a compromise that
superficially seemed to accept the old world view, but implicitly left
the way open for the new world. Consequently, although he suggest-
ed that all departmental cars should be operated from a central pool,
Permanent Secretaries under heavy pressure of work would be
allowed home-to-office journeys. Similarly, a Permanent Secretary
would have an allocated car only if he was ill or regularly obliged to
attend so many social functions in an official capacity that he could
not get through his day without one.
Given that many Permanent Secretaries could claim to be perm-
anently under heavy pressure of work, and also attended many official
social functions, it would not necessarily be too difficult a task to
exercise discretion. In many respects, therefore, this had the
appearance of an unofficial revival of the system of nominated cars,
with much left to the discretion of officials to, as David Eccles had
put it, ‘play the game’.
In his minute, Brook himself concluded that he would like to have
recommended a rather more liberal policy, but that political
sensitivities prevented this. In reality, however, the Cabinet Secretary,
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like his Prime Minister, surely understood very well that his rules
were paving the way for the inevitable victory of the modern world.9
Ike Returns
In August 1959, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower paid an official
visit to Britain. In his honour, GCS Superintendent Tom Hughes pulled out
all the stops, and arranged for twenty limousines to be made available for
the President and his entourage, for which he received an official thank you
from Head of the Civil Service Sir Norman Brook. As Hughes describes:
‘On arrival at the pick-up point, the convoy of limousines were a credit to the
Service, being highly polished (the normal standard) with not a speck of dust
to be seen. The drivers looked immaculate in their ex-service type of green
uniform, which blended very well with the black limousines of the day.’10
Being surrounded by this fleet of GCS cars and their drivers, it must
surely have evoked poignant memories for Eisenhower of being driven around
wartime London by Kay Summersby, and perhaps also some feelings of what
might have been.
THE MAKING OF A SERVICE
Just as GCS as a whole was entering the modern age in the 1950s and
1960s, so individuals were joining the Service in those years, and
helping to build its distinctive standards and traditions. GCS is of
course built on the work of many hundreds of individuals, but as a
representative sample, in this section we will concentrate on the
experiences of three particularly long-serving drivers, with between
them well over one hundred years of service.
Denis Oliver
Denis Oliver was working in the pathology laboratory at Great
Ormond Street Hospital when in 1956 he heard that his friend Peter
Smithson had joined GCS as a driver. Smithson recommended to
Denis that he should also apply, and so on 8 May he too became a
driver. GCS had done little recruiting in the late 1940s and early
1950s, as they had many people still serving from the wartime Motor
Transport Corps and Ministry of Aircraft Production. As Denis
remembers: ‘The large majority of drivers were women, and some of
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the former MTC people were quite aristocratic, such as Lady Patricia
French. This meant that Peter and I were two of the first of the
younger generation of that era to join GCS.’
As we saw in his recollections of the Suez crisis, Oliver began his
GCS career working on nights, which he regarded as good training,
as he got to learn the best routes between the Departments when the
streets were quiet. However, he quickly graduated to the allocated
cars, and drove a succession of well-known Ministers of that era. The
first of these was Geoffrey Lloyd, who had been a Minister under
Churchill during and after the war, but in 1956 was Minister of
Education. Oliver found that Lloyd was a very wealthy man, who had
a laissez-faire attitude towards his job: ‘He would not get up until
10 am, and then he would read all the newspapers. I would pick him
up around 11 am. Once at the Ministry, he would have people put his
letters up on a notice board, and then he would go along signing
them. I think that this did lead to a few queries.’
One particularly memorable passenger for Oliver arrived when he
took Lloyd to the home of Winston Churchill for dinner: ‘Churchill’s
driver was Sergeant Murray, his police driver from the war. However,
he wasn’t about at that time, and Churchill had received a call to be
at the House of Commons for a vote. He jumped in my car, and asked
me to take him there. He left his cigar in the car, and I still have it
today.’
Oliver also filled in for other drivers while they were away, which
meant that he got to know a lot of people. One of his passengers was
Sir Gilmour Jenkins, Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of
Transport: ‘During the week, Jenkins would stay with the composer
Vaughan Williams and his wife. Vaughan Williams was very bad on
his feet, and wore carpet slippers all the time.’ For a period, Oliver
drove the Minister of Transport, Ernest Marples, who had a great
talent for self publicity, including placing a sticker in his own private
car saying ‘Marples Must Go.’ This was at the time that he introduced
parking meters to the streets of Britain, and caused a public outcry.
Oliver was with him during this period, but found him to be one of
the few Ministers with whom he did not get on well: ‘He was a
dapper little man, who often wanted me to pick him up at about 6.30
am to take him to play tennis. I felt it all got a bit much.’
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Oliver managed to switch with another driver, and found himself
driving Minister of Health Enoch Powell. Throughout his political
career Powell went his own way and usually courted controversy,
most notably in 1968, when he was sacked as an Opposition spokes-
man by Prime Minister Edward Heath for his ‘rivers of blood’ speech,
warning of the dangers of large-scale immigration. Powell was noted
for his intellect, and had become a professor at the age of 25, and
Oliver found him to be ‘in many ways the most remarkable man I
ever met. He had an incredible brain, and there seemed to be nothing
he didn’t know about.’
In the 1960s, Oliver drove Labour Minister Harold Lever, like
Geoffrey Lloyd a fabulously wealthy man. As Oliver observes: ‘Lever
became a Treasury Minister. I think that the Labour government
wanted him for his economic expertise! He did have a lot of famous
friends. I remember on one occasion we picked up the film star Kirk
Douglas, and another time Lauren Bacall.’ A further glamorous
encounter for Oliver occurred when he took Lord Hailsham to the
opening of the National Film Theatre. Hailsham was accompanied
by the glamorous Italian film star Gina Lollobrigida, although as
Oliver recalls: ‘She wasn’t made up or dressed glamorously, and so
it was hard to recognise her from her films.’
In his early days at GCS, Denis Oliver became the Transport and
General Workers Union representative for the drivers, and as he
puts it: ‘I could never find anyone to replace me, so I kept the job
until six months after I retired in 1998!’ As we will see in Chapters
Four and Six, labour relations within GCS were fraught at certain
periods, particularly on the delicate issue of overtime, and the
relatively low basic pay for drivers. Given these union links, it
might seem surprising that Oliver drove Margaret Thatcher for
fourteen years as Prime Minister and former Prime Minister! How-
ever, as we described in Chapter One, they developed an extremely
high mutual regard, that continues to this day. In 1989 Denis
Oliver was awarded the British Empire Medal.
Irene Maykels
LikemanyGCSwomen drivers of that era, IreneMaykels had amilitary
background, and in the army drove brigadiers for three-and-a-half
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years. When she left the army, a contact in GCS suggested that she
should apply, and she took her test driving a van around central
London, before joining GCS in October 1956. Her career began with
driving vans carryingmessengers aroundWhitehall, but she eventually
graduated to become a pool driver, where she remained by choice,
because she preferred the regular hours of work. As she describes, in
those earlier GCS days many of the drivers were women, but there was
some resentment that they earned lower pay than the men drivers,
apparently on the grounds that they generally drove smaller cars.
One of the greatest changes within GCS in modern times has been
the decline in the number of women drivers. In the 1960s around half
the drivers were women, but the numbers nowadays are only a
handful. The chief reason for this appears to be the loss of the link
with the services. For those who had driven in the services, joining
GCS was seen as a natural transition, but in the twenty-first century
there are many other options for these women. One Minister who
appreciated a driver with a service background was Nigel Lawson,
Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1983 to 1989. His driver during
these years was ‘Cindy’ Ash. Lawson emphasises that he was
excellently served by Cindy, who acquired this inevitable nickname
in the army, and henceforth was never known as anything else.11 As
we will see in the concluding chapter, there are those who believe
GCS needs to re-establish its service links in order to solve current
recruitment problems.
For Rene Maykels, the traditions and culture of GCS are an
essential part of its character, and she regrets the trend away from the
more formal approach:
Current drivers say to me that nowadays Ministers ask drivers to call
them by their first names. I don’t think this is right. Even if they
asked me to call them by their first names, I would insist on calling
them ‘Minister’. In the earlier days, there was a mutual respect
between drivers and Ministers, but this seems to have been eroded
over the years.
Rene Maykels tells a story that illustrates very well the culture clash
between the traditions of the MTC and a more informal approach:
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In the early days, reflecting the MTC origins, some of the women
drivers were quite posh. One of these was Barbara Forbes. In the days
of the Conservative government in the 1950s and early 1960s, she
drove Lord Perth, and got on with him well. However, when a
Labour government was elected in 1964, she went to pick up her new
Minister [the story was in fact told to Irene by this Minister]. He said
to Barbara, ‘Good morning, love’, and got in the front seat. She
promptly told him in a haughty tone to call her ‘Miss Forbes’ and to
get in the back seat. She also warned him that she would give him a
month’s trial, at the end of which she would decide whether she
would continue to drive him. At the end of the month, the Minister
asked politely if he was still to be her passenger, and received the
reply: ‘I will give you a further trial, provided that you behave
yourself, and you can call me Barbara.’
She also recalls how, even in the 1960s, ministerial routines and
schedules could be much more relaxed than in the fraught modern
times:
In the days of Harold Wilson’s Labour government, Ministers would
generally leave when Parliament rose at the beginning of August,
and things wouldn’t get going again until early October. The
traditional start of the new Parliamentary year was the Judges’
Breakfast, when we took all the judges to the House of Lords. While
the Ministers were away, the drivers would spend the time painting
and cleaning the cars. The cars were not replaced so often in those
days, and some of the Wolseleys had seven coats of paint!
As a pool driver, Rene Maykels drove many Permanent Secretaries. In
her later years with GCS, these included particularly Cabinet
Secretary Sir Robin Butler. She remembers that, during the Falklands
War in 1982, when Sir Robin was Private Secretary to Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher, he often had to work late, and so she went to
McDonalds in Victoria Street to collect meals for him and his staff.
In 1988, Rene Maykels was awarded the British Empire Medal, the
first pool driver to be given this accolade. She saw this honour as a
tribute to the often unsung work done by all the pool drivers. By this
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time, the wearing of hats by drivers had largely disappeared but, true
to the traditions of GCS, she insisted on wearing her hat and uniform
to receive her award.
Beryl Osborne
Beryl Osborne (universally known as Ossie) joined the Service in
April 1961, by coincidence on the same day that the InterDespatch
Service, that delivers official mail, was founded. She had a
background as a Sergeant Instructor in the Territorial Army. In fact,
she drove IDS vans for five years, then pool cars for around another
five years, before finally moving on to the allocated cars and Ministers
in the early 1970s, driving first Fred Corfield, and then John Nott.
One significant sign of the times in the 1960s was a change in the
GCS uniforms. Until 1966, the women drivers wore uniforms that
were basically in the wartime tradition of the MTC, with battledress
blouse, shirt and tie. By the standards of the ‘swinging Sixties’ these
uniforms looked rather old-fashioned, and so couturier Charles Creed
was hired to design new ones. The new uniforms were in an air-
hostess-style green barathea with a waisted jacket and a light beige
rayon blouse without a tie. GCS Superintendent Sheila Thomson
confirmed that they had been very dissatisfied with the old uni-
forms, and added: ‘After all, we were wearing the same style before
1948 in khaki.’ At the same time, she was adamant that the modern
style stopped short of following the 1960s fashion for mini-skirts,
and declared: ‘We are not having our drivers jumping out of cars
with the present-day ridiculous length of skirt.’
Beryl Osborne remembers that the new uniforms were much more
stylish, and that with the old uniforms you had to starch the collars
that went with the tie, whereas with the new ones there was just a
blouse. On the other hand, she found that the new uniforms did not
wear so well: ‘They looked good at first, but tended to lose the stylish
look when they had been worn for a bit.’ In the event, these 1966
uniforms did not have a long life, and in 1969 were replaced by one
designed by GCS section leader Irene Gale, and pool driver Violet
Leach. It was reported that the new uniforms cost £13 6s each to
produce, compared with £13 4s for the old one, a cost which no doubt
added up for supplying to the many women GCS drivers.
The History of the Government Car Service
89
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Ossie visited Geneva for World
Health Organisation conferences, and stayed for several weeks each
time. In the 1970s and 1980s, she carried a succession of high-profile
Ministers. One of these was John Gilbert, a Labour Treasury and
Transport Minister in the mid-1970s. As Ossie recalls: ‘One hot
Summer, John Gilbert wanted to work on the roof of the Treasury, but
they would not give him permission. He had a flat in Earl’s Court, and
so worked from there quite a bit on the roof. I had to keep taking him
his red boxes, and it was quite a climb each time to the roof.’
In the 1980s, she experienced one strange encounter with Alan
Clark, the wealthy and eccentric Minister in the Thatcher govern-
ment, who became famous (or perhaps infamous) for his graphic
diaries that charted his experiences in those years. Clark let it be
known that he had a Renault car to sell, and Beryl and another driver
went down to his Sussex home to have a look at it. She explains:
He had told us that we could take the car, and keep anything over
£1,000 we got for it. However, when we arrived at his home and he
showed us the Renault it was not at all what we had expected. It was
in a very poor condition and was full of sand! Nevertheless, we
decided to take it, but had a terrible job getting it back to London.
We never could get it in a presentable condition, and in the end got
just £75 above the £1,000. It was hardly worth the trouble!
Also in the 1980s, Ossie drove Norman Tebbit. As we will see in
Chapter Five, this included the traumatic time of the 1984
Brighton Grand Hotel bomb, when Tebbit and his wife were
seriously injured. However, Tebbit and Ossie also experienced the
lighter side of security, when they were travelling on the motorway
with a police escort behind them: ‘One of the special tyres on our
protected vehicle burst. It was full of a thick gluey material, which
enables you to drive some distance with a burst tyre. This gluey
stuff splattered all over the windscreen of the following police car!
It was like something out of a comedy sketch.’
In the 1990s, Ossie applied to drive the Prime Minister while John
Major was in Downing Street. She went for an interview, but then
had second thoughts: ‘I was driving late one night in fog and
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thought, “Do I need this?” I was over fifty at the time, and driving
the PM is a big tie. For example, you had to drive up to Scotland to
meet him when he flew up there. I decided then to withdraw my
application.’
In 1994, Ossie was awarded the MBE for her services to GCS.
No Wedding Bliss for Chancellor
In July 1967, Chancellor of the Exchequer James Callaghan discovered that,
when it came to official car privileges, some senior Ministers were more equal
than others. Callaghan had sought permission to use his GCS car at his
daughter’s wedding, with the condition that he repaid the costs for the day.
This request did not go down well, and in considering it, one official
noted that the press would put the wrong construction on it. The reply to
the Chancellor noted that cars were generally only used for official
business, although it was conceded that there was some limited discretion
for journeys where time was saved. The Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary
and Home Secretary were allowed to use their cars for private purposes, on
the repayment terms of 1s 9d per mile. However, it was stressed that the
Chancellor was not entitled to this privilege, and so Callaghan’s request
was summarily refused.
JUNIORS MAKE THEIR PRESENCE FELT
The 1960s was basically a period of steady development and consoli-
dation for GCS, and was the most stable of its six decades. Even then,
the Service found itself part of an even larger Ministry, for in April
1963 the Ministry of Works took in the Air Ministry, Army and
Navy Works Departments to become the Ministry of Public Building
and Works. Tom Hughes describes how the fleet strength for the new
Ministry went up from 1,000 to 3,600 in the UK, and 1,600 over-
seas, and he undertook a survey of all the transport operations and
maintenance in the London and Home Counties area. GCS was of
course only a small part of this, and by 1967 the GCS fleet consisted
of 175 cars, of which eighty-eight were allocated.12
There continued to be no indication, therefore, that GCS as a
separate entity, with its own specialist needs, was to be given any
sort of proper attention by government. Instead, the decade was
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marked by periodic attempts to widen the use of allocated cars, to
take in Junior Ministers and Permanent Secretaries. The Prime
Minister’s Rules, framed by Harold Macmillan in 1957, may have
greatly liberalised car use, but there remained an underlying feeling
that the modern needs of government, and a greater emphasis on
personal mobility in society generally, required a further expansion
below the top rank of Ministers.
The push for this widening of the allocated base began in May
1962, when a letter to Macmillan from the Commonwealth Relations
Office stated that they now had only one allocated car, and requested
a second to be shared between the Joint Parliamentary Secretaries,
and also to be available for use by senior officials. This was justified
on the grounds of the heavy workload of the Junior Ministers, and the
fact that the car pool was not always able to meet requests at short
notice. In a pointed remark, the Ministry noted that it could be
analogous with the Foreign Office, which was one of the few Depart-
ments not to be totally dependent on GCS, and had its own service
for Junior Ministers.
Cabinet Secretary Sir Norman Brook recommended to Macmillan
that this request should be granted, but only if the Minister of Works
was satisfied that it would not lead to similar requests from other
Junior Ministers. In reality, of course, it was only too likely that, if
this request were to be granted, other Departments would quickly
follow suit.
This had the effect of concentrating minds, and by February 1963
the Chief Secretary to the Treasury was writing a memo to the Prime
Minister revealing that, after consultation with the Minister of
Public Building and Works, he was now proposing a ‘modest
relaxation of the rules governing use of cars by Junior Ministers’. It
was noted that Junior Ministers were not allowed official journeys
between home and railway station and office, or to and from lunch.
In contrast, Permanent Secretaries had the discretion to use official
cars to and from work when pressed for time, although they were
urged to exercise this discretion sparingly. It was emphasised that,
for both categories, the situation was accentuated by the fact that
there were in any case very few pool cars available. Significantly, as
in the 1950s, the letter invoked the comparisons with business in
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justifying a change: ‘I do not think this makes for efficiency,
particularly as measured by the standards of modern business.’ It was
therefore proposed that Junior Ministers should be placed on the
same footing as Permanent Secretaries, and that a small separate pool
of cars should be created to serve these two groups. Even then, the
new pool would contain only ten cars to serve sixty people.
These changes were accepted, but the degree to which Ministers
and officials were extremely nervous about the public reaction to any
information about official car use being made public is intriguingly
evident in advice given by his Office to Prime Minister Sir Alec
Douglas Home in December 1963, about answering Parliamentary
Questions on official cars: ‘It would be advisable to avoid any
reference to rules for use of official cars by Ministers, since this might
entitle Members to ask for these rules to be laid before the House.
This would be undesirable in the case of this confidential document.’
MPs and the public were therefore kept completely in the dark
about the very existence of the Prime Minister’s Rules, which had
already been operating for over six years! (It would be the 1990s
before the Prime Minister’s Rules were publicly available.) On the
one hand, there was a growing awareness within Whitehall that the
modern needs of government required an expanded Car Service, yet
at the same time there was a huge fear that any public recognition of
this fact would create great political embarrassment.13
STILL WAITING
The return of a Labour government in 1964, with Harold Wilson as
Prime Minister, did not herald any kind of significant changes with
regard to GCS. In fact, Ministers seemed quite content to accept the
system moulded by Churchill and then Macmillan. It was to be the
late 1960s before a new push was made to win more privileges for
Junior Ministers. This was triggered by a request from the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office in October 1968 to solve what it saw as
an anomaly with regard to its Junior Ministers. One of these
Ministers, Maurice Foley, was the only Parliamentary Secretary with
an allocated car. As we saw in the previous section, the Foreign Office
had enjoyed a special status here, and although this system had now
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lapsed, Foley continued to enjoy its benefits. The Foreign Secretary
Michael Stewart was therefore requesting that the Department’s other
Parliamentary Secretary, Will Whitlock, should also have an allocated
vehicle, rather than having to draw on the pool.
For his part, the Minister of Public Building and Works, Bob
Mellish, thought that a solution might be for the Foreign Office to
follow the example of the Ministry of Transport, where the two
Junior Ministers shared one allocated car. The Foreign Office,
however, was not happy to accept this, and Michael Stewart pointed
out to Harold Wilson that the Prime Minister himself had
previously granted an allocated car to one of their Junior Ministers
in 1965. This was on the grounds that Foreign Office Ministers had
to fulfil more official social engagements than Junior Ministers in
other Departments. This argument may have worked in 1965, but
by 1969 it became clear that sympathy for the Foreign Office was
wearing thin. This was evident in a minute to the Prime Minister
from his Private Secretary, who stated plainly: ‘I must say I begin to
tire of the preferential treatment which the Foreign and Common-
wealth Office claims for itself in so many spheres against the Home
Departments.’
As in the early 1960s, concern was also expressed about setting a
precedent, and in March 1969 these fears proved well founded when
the Prime Minister received a letter from the Secretary of State for
Education and Science, Edward Short, requesting an allocated car for
Minister of Sport Denis Howell, who was based in his Department.
Short cited the examples of Foley and the two Junior Ministers at
Transport, but was no doubt also well aware of the request for
Whitlock to have his own car.
For the Prime Minister’s Office, the warning lights were now flash-
ing, and in a minute to Wilson his Private Secretary pointed out that
the Howell request underlined the difficulties in conceding the
Whitlock request. He saw the choice as being an ad hoc decision on
individual cases, in which case both Howell and Whitlock would
probably qualify. Alternatively, the Prime Minister could choose to
hold firm. Harold Wilson left no doubt about his response, and in a
handwritten note on the minute declared: ‘No change – I’m not all
that keen on Foley continuing!’
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For now, the spirit of the times was against any change, but the
question refused to go away, and the need for a fresh outlook was
finally acknowledged by the Conservative government elected in
1970. Although these events took place in the early 1970s, they are
dealt with in this chapter, as they provide a conclusion to a
preoccupation of the 1960s.14
The Crossman View
In his classic Diaries, describing his period as a senior Minister in the
Labour government from 1964 to 1970, Richard Crossman captures
beautifully the spirit of the relationship between a Minister and ‘his’
driver. For most of his period in government, Crossman was driven by
long-serving GCS driver Molly Crawford, and an entry from December
1964 describes a family visit to Bertram Mills’ Circus at Olympia:
‘And then Molly arrived at two o’clock and we swept down to Olympia
in the Ministry car [Crossman did not appear concerned whether this
constituted ‘official business’!]. One of the few really nice perks a Minister
gets is that black saloon car always at his disposal. In London, where
parking is a nightmare, this is a tremendous thing. The children can sit in
front with Molly and I can start pressing on the handle and make the glass
screen move up and down. So the children like being in the Minister’s car.’15
Yet, as so often in close relationships of this sort, it was not always
plain sailing. For example, Crossman describes his reaction when going
to Buckingham Palace in August 1966 to receive the seals of office on
becoming Leader of the House of Commons: ‘I really hadn’t the courage to
tell Molly that I find her driving impossibly slow, so I took her and my old
Super-Snipe with me to the Palace.’16
Eventually, in October 1968, there came a parting of the ways, and in
describing this, Crossman gives perhaps the definitive summary of how the
Minister – driver relationship works:
‘Molly, by the way, is leaving me. I have had her for four years and we
get each other down. I now have a new kind of Austin which she hates.
However I am getting a new driver now, a man (Peter Smithson), who will
be at Paddington when I arrive on Monday morning. A driver is
important to a Minister because he is the person with whom you are together
more than anyone, except perhaps your Private Secretary. Somebody once
said in a very biting leading article that Harold Wilson can’t nominate
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peers because the only person he knows intimately is his driver. There is
something in this. You do get to know him or her extremely well and you
chat together.
‘Well, Molly couldn’t love me, compared with Keith Joseph [her previous
Minister] whom she could mother. I was rough and I shocked her in every
way because of my attitude to royalty, to the Privy Council, and so on.
I am only relieved that the change has taken place with the change of office
[Crossman had just been appointed Social Services Secretary], although for
all I know the young man may actually be unbearable.’
In the event, Crossman got on well with his new driver, and when he
left office in June 1970, he expressed concern about Peter Smithson’s
immediate future: ‘My last day with an official car. . . What will poor
Peter be doing? He used to tell me that he always liked driving for the
government because he could choose his own master but I hope he will be able
to, because it looks to me as if he might find himself unallocated and put
back in the pool.’18
MOVING ON
Harold Wilson may have put a block on allocated cars for Junior
Ministers, but it was very much a finger-in-the-dyke type of
exercise. Times were moving on and, by the early 1970s, what had
been in the air for a decade finally came to pass. The indication of
change came in a letter on 6 December 1972 from Head of the Civil
Service Sir William Armstrong to Prime Minister Edward Heath’s
Private Secretary, Robert Armstrong. From the outset, Sir William
made it clear that a new age had dawned:
There has been for some time dissatisfaction with the arrangements
for official cars both for Parliamentary Secretaries and Permanent
Secretaries. The limited number of cars allocated to individual mem-
bers of these categories, and the provision of car services for the rest
through the VIP car pool and the night pool, patently fail to
correspond to real need. They reflect historical attitudes and circum-
stances, not current ones, and in the case of Permanent Secretaries
(and as far as I can judge some Parliamentary Secretaries too) inflict
needless strains and inefficiency.
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The Head of the Civil Service went on to explain that in June 1970,
the month the new government took office, he had commissioned a
thorough study of the matter. The report had presented options, but
Sir William now took it on himself to make several recommend-
ations. At that time, twenty-four Permanent Secretaries continued to
rely on the pool, including the Heads of several major Departments.
Armstrong proposed that the Permanent Secretaries of nine major
Departments, including the Treasury, Cabinet Office and the
Department of the Environment, should have an allocated GCS car,
although the remainder would continue to use the pool.
The study also covered Parliamentary Secretaries, and although
Armstrong felt it was for Ministers to make decisions here, he
pointed out that eighteen out of twenty-five of these Ministers relied
on the pool, and that this was as unsatisfactory as the situation for
Permanent Secretaries. However, recognising the political sensi-
tivities, he conceded that giving an allocated car to every Parlia-
mentary Secretary could probably not be justified.
In a note following up Sir William’s letter, Private Secretary
Robert Armstrong told the Prime Minister: ‘I suspect that our rules
are now very old fashioned (as William Armstrong suggests) and that
it would be reasonable for all Ministers (including Parliamentary
Secretaries) and all Permanent Secretaries to have allocated cars. But
perhaps the right course is to take each change as it is suggested,
rather than to force the pace from here.’
Prime Minister Edward Heath quickly accepted Sir William’s
recommendations for Permanent Secretaries, and asked Environment
Secretary Geoffrey Ripon (the Minister now responsible for GCS) to
draw up recommendations for the Parliamentary Secretaries.
Following the lead given by Armstrong, Ripon agreed that giving an
allocated car to all Parliamentary Secretaries could not be justified.
Instead, he recommended that allocated cars should be made available
to eleven additional Parliamentary Secretaries, in addition to the six
allocations already made. A competitive element was introduced in
that the eleven cars would go to those Junior Ministers whose
workloads demanded above average use of GCS, compiled by
reference to GCS records of those Parliamentary Secretaries who had
made the greatest demand on the pool in the period October to
The History of the Government Car Service
97
December 1972. Ripon believed that this arrangement would result
in most Departments having an allocated car, although these would
only be granted on the clear understanding that cars were to be made
available by the Department for use by other Parliamentary
Secretaries in the Department concerned, whenever the need arose.
This compromise was eventually accepted by Heath in May 1973.
At the time, it might have seemed only a short step to giving all
Junior Ministers an allocated car. Remarkably, however, the nervous-
ness of Ministers on this point meant that the concession would not
arrive officially for another twenty years, in the early 1990s, although
it appeared by this time that the new rules were only catching up
with what in reality had become accepted practice.
Meanwhile, for Edward Heath and his government, the stakes
would soon become very high, as they became enmeshed in the
chronic economic and political crises of the 1970s.19
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CHAPTER 4
Expecting The Unexpected
1970–79
GCS IN THE PUBLIC EYE
In its first quarter of a century, GCS built a firm position inWhitehall by providing a service which ministers and
officials of successive governments found invaluable, despite
lengthy internal arguments about their scope of use. At least
in certain respects, it could be said that being a small part of
large Ministries helped the development of the Service, as it
could find its feet largely away from the public gaze. Even to
this present day, GCS drivers generally believe that remaining
out of the public eye is proof that they are doing a good job,
and for most of the 1950s and 1960s, with a few exceptions,
such as the issue of new air-hostess-style uniforms to the
women drivers, they largely got their wish.
Ironically, in 1970 GCS became part of another huge Ministry,
the new Department of the Environment, but the decade was to see
GCS thrust more into the public eye, chiefly through the swiftly
changing tide of events. This reflected a wider 1970s world that was
more unpredictable and less secure than the previous two decades.
For example, the sudden and unexpected quadrupling of the price of
oil in 1973–74 triggered huge problems for the British economy,
and led to both Conservative and Labour governments battling with
crises of high inflation and the collapse of sterling, that at times
seemed beyond their control. Associated drastic cuts in public
expenditure in turn placed the spotlight on previously overlooked
areas for possible savings (at least by the public and media) such as
GCS.
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In the earlier decades, most of the focus on economies was
generated internally, but in the 1970s GCS found itself the subject of
public debate concerning the cost of the Service, and the degree to
which it provided value for money. Throughout these debates, the
underlying persistent critical theme was that, at a time when
Ministers were demanding sacrifices of the public, was it right that
these same Ministers should be ferried around in chauffeur-driven
limousines?
In addition, in the later years of the decade, the economic crises
and the Labour government’s attempts to impose a limit on pay
increases, culminated in the catastrophic ‘Winter of Discontent’ in
1978–79, when widespread public sector strikes produced images
such as uncollected rubbish piling up in the streets. Once again, GCS
found itself caught up in this industrial unrest, and unable to prevent
a landmark half-day strike in 1978.
Meanwhile, the deepening crisis in Northern Ireland in the early
to mid-1970s saw the spread of IRA terrorism to the British main-
land on a large scale. As bombings became a frequent occurrence in
London and other cities, so the need for security took on new
dimensions. For GCS, security became a preoccupation that would
continue until the present day, and, as we will see in the following
chapter, for a period in the 1980s even threatened the identity of the
Service itself. From the early 1970s, however, drivers were made to
realise that the old, more relaxed world of the 1950s and 1960s had
gone for ever, and that they were potentially on the front line in the
need to protect Ministers.
Nevertheless, alongside the impact of these dramatic external
events, there was still of course a strong element of ‘business as usual’
for GCS in the 1970s, with the Service continuing to be in demand
from its ministerial clients. In fact, the Service saw some significant
additions to its customer base over the decade, with from 1970
official cars provided for the Leader of the Opposition, and from
1975 ex-Prime Ministers. Indeed, the inside story of how these
expansions came about, and how they were affected by external
events, provides fascinating insights into the workings of govern-
ment at that time, and in particular the characters of Prime
Ministers Edward Heath and Harold Wilson.
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A Damp Welcome
After becoming part of the new Department of the Environment in 1970,
in 1972 GCS moved from its long-time home in Kingston House in
Kensington to a headquarters adjacent to the DoE in Marsham Street
(now the site of the Home Office). GCS driver Beryl Osborne recalls that
she had mixed feelings about this move:
‘An advantage of the new headquarters in Westminster was that it
became much more convenient to pick up Ministers and officials than being
located in Kensington. On the other hand, the actual buildings at
Marsham Street were not very pleasant. In particular, the underground car
park had a great deal of moisture seeping through the ceilings. This would
drip on to the cars, and it became a terrible job to keep them clean.’
Former long-serving GCS driver Chris Green remembers that, when a
move from Kingston House was first proposed, a strange suggestion was
made that GCS should be moved to a site owned by Hammersmith and
Fulham Council. However, when, as a trade union representative, he went
to inspect these proposed premises, he realised that they would be completely
unsuitable, and quickly made his findings known to the DoE. Shortly
afterwards, the proposal was quietly dropped.
EDWARD HEATH, HAROLD WILSON
AND A MAGNANIMOUS GESTURE
From the outset, the 1970s provided unexpected outcomes, with the
first surprise being victory in the 1970 general election by the
Conservative Party led by Edward Heath. As Leader of the Tories,
Heath had already been defeated by the Labour government, under
Prime Minister Harold Wilson, in the general election of 1966, and
the opinion polls widely forecast a repeat result in 1970. The Labour
government elected in 1964 had survived a number of economic
crises, but by 1970 these conditions were much more favourable. In
the election campaign Harold Wilson projected an image of states-
manlike calm, but in the event this backfired badly, and appeared to
be interpreted by the public as complacency. Consequently, Edward
Heath was carried into Downing Street with an overall majority of
thirty.
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The arrival of Heath as Prime Minister had a significant impact on
GCS on two counts. Firstly, the Service found a new departmental
home in the Department of the Environment (DoE). The Labour
government had already been planning to merge the Ministry of
Housing and Local Government with the Ministries of Transport and
of Public Building and Works (the existing home of GCS). In
October 1970, however, the Heath government announced that these
Ministries would be merged into one huge DoE.
If GCS had been dwarfed within the Ministries of Supply and of
Public Building and Works, then it was an even smaller element in
the giant DoE. As for much of its history, despite the high value
placed by Ministers on the relationships with their drivers, GCS itself
appeared to be overlooked as an administrative entity. There appears
to have been no significant assessment of how it might fit into the
DoE structure, such as placing it closer to a possibly more natural
home in Transport (in the event, it was to be another thirty-five years
before this alliance took place), and so almost inevitably GCS found
itself as part of the Property Services Agency, basically the component
parts of the former Ministry of Public Building and Works, but now
located within the DoE.
This fashion for large scale planning and organisation was very
much a feature of the 1970s, and Edward Heath was one of its key
advocates. In this context, Peter Hennessy observes that no Prime
Minister since Lloyd George in 1916–17 had made such a deliberate
and determined effort to remodel the whole machinery of state. Like
Lloyd George, Heath saw such matters as first order problems, to be
tackled as a priority, and not as optional extras. They were integral to
what he saw as a more focused form of Cabinet government.1 In
setting up giant Ministries such as DoE (the Department of Trade
and Industry was also founded on similar principles at this time),
Heath believed that more rational and strategic planning could take
place. The danger was that an organisation such as GCS could become
lost within the grand vision, and fail to develop and implement a
long term strategy that suited its particular strengths.
Intriguingly, it is also possible to detect Edward Heath’s desire to
construct a more rational framework for the whole machinery of
government in his second decision to impact on GCS – to provide
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an official car for the Leader of the Opposition. As Heath had
himself been Leader of the Conservative Party for five years before he
became Prime Minister, he must have been all too aware of the travel
strains and inconveniences in fulfilling these responsibilities without
the use of an official car. Consequently, in October 1970 he provided
this privilege to his recently defeated Labour opponent, Harold
Wilson.
It says much for Heath’s perspective that he was prepared to place
his vision of how the needs of a Leader of the Opposition should be
officially recognised above narrower party political considerations. At
the same time, it could be said that the problems in actually
supplying the necessary vehicle to Wilson strangely foreshadowed the
huge problems Edward Heath would encounter generally as Prime
Minister in matching his vision to the reality of events.
In the case of Wilson, he was due to be supplied with a new Rover
3.5 litre car costing £2,640. At that time, as we have seen, these P5s
were the standard issue for Cabinet Ministers. Unfortunately, it was
reported that normal waiting lists had been aggravated by strikes,
and Wilson had to wait his turn for the Rover. Instead, he had to
make do with a 5-year-old Austin Princess, with a trade in value of
around £400. In fact, eight Cabinet and senior Ministers were also
waiting for new Rovers, and so were being moved around in
Princesses.
Looking on the Bright Side
A relative of a senior Minister in the 1970s remembers that their GCS
driver had a valuable saying: ‘If you don’t have time to clean the whole car,
then clean the side the Minister gets in!’ This driver also apparently had a
close affinity with GCS headquarters in Marsham Street, as for every
journey he went via that location, regardless of where he had started.
As the relative comments: ‘It seemed that he had to go to Marsham Street
to find his bearings, and would have lost his way otherwise.’
The driver had previously driven the Labour peer Lord Longford, and
on one occasion Longford asked the driver to take him to the ‘House of
Horrors’. The driver was a bit mystified by this, and so took his passenger
to the House of Lords, only to find that in fact Longford actually wished to
visit Madame Tussauds Waxworks, and their Chamber of Horrors!
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At the same time, the relative also recalls the characteristically high
degree of trust and friendship that developed between the driver and the
Minister:
‘The driver of course hears everything that is said in the back of the car,
much of it very private. If you couldn’t trust him to be discreet, then it
would be very difficult to carry on the business of government, but I never
heard of this trust being misplaced. The driver was also a real friend of the
family, and never regarded as a member of staff. Yet at times it seemed it
could be an awful life for the driver, having to keep such long hours, in
order to accommodate the Minister’s needs.’
POLITICAL DEFEAT
BY THE TIDE OF EVENTS
The delays in supplying new Rovers because of strikes was just one
small indication of the problems with industrial relations that would
eventually bring down the Heath government in1974. Even in 1970,
strikes were at their highest level since the general strike year of
1926, and the government’s solution was an Industrial Relations Act
that set up an Industrial Relations Court, with the powers to fine
unions for ignoring new procedures for settling disputes without
strikes. In reality, the Act only served to antagonise the trade unions
still further, and industrial unrest became even more widespread. The
climate of unrest was not enhanced by the government’s decision to
impose a compulsory prices and incomes freeze in November 1972,
that extended in modified form into 1973.
The situation was aggravated still further by wider economic
circumstances. In particular, the Yom Kippur offensive by Israel
against Egypt in October 1973 led to the oil-producing states within
OPEC immediately increasing prices by 70 per cent, and at the same
time cutting production, in protest at United States support for
Israel’s action. This totally unexpected turn of events badly hit the
British government’s anti-inflation policy, and in November 1973 a
State of Emergency was declared as power workers and miners began
industrial action. As the crisis deepened in December, the govern-
ment declared a three-day week, and cut £1,200 million from public
spending.
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Nevertheless, the strikes continued, and led to lengthy power
cuts, so that in February 1974 Edward Heath declared a general
election on the basic question: ‘Who Governs Britain?’ In the
event, this call rebounded on Heath, and although the election
produced no overall majority for any party, the Prime Minister was
unable to construct a coalition with the Liberals, and resigned.
Consequently, in March 1974 Harold Wilson returned as Prime
Minister.
Edward Heath came to office as a Prime Minister with good
intentions and high principles, but the tumultuous tide of events
tended to reveal an obstinacy in his nature that manifested itself in a
lack of political judgement and timing. Hennessy comments here
that, although Heath inspired great loyalty in close associates, to
many colleagues he could appear stiff and remote.2 Ironically, the
traits of character evident in Heath during the ‘Who Governs
Britain?’ election were also to be seen in his use of an official car as an
ex-Prime Minister.
Exits and Entrances
A description of how GCS handled the departure of Edward Heath and the
return of Harold Wilson to 10 Downing Street in March 1974 provides a
textbook example of the quiet efficiency with which the Service deals with
these types of momentous political events:
‘The day Edward Heath handed over the Premiership he was driven to
Buckingham Palace in the PM’s Rover, and a short while later Bill
Housden [of GCS] followed in a smaller car with Harold Wilson. While
the statesmen were in the Palace, Bill and Mr Heath’s driver changed cars.
In due course, the new Leader of the Opposition left Buckingham Palace in
the smaller car, and later, Bill drove away with Mr Wilson in the PM’s
Rover. The wheels of fate had indeed turned full circle’.3
The poignancy of the harsh changing fortunes of politics are also
beautifully illustrated in a letter written in March 1974 by John Nott, a
Minister in the Heath government, to his GCS driver Beryl Osborne (as we
have seen, known universally as ‘Ossie’:
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‘Dear Ossie,
I am so sorry that I have not written to you earlier to thank you for all
your help over that two years. You did a marvellous job. Your smiling face
and happy disposition were always a pleasure to your boss. In spite of all
those late nights I hope that life was not too dull under the Tories – if you
know what I mean!
Thank you so much for all your good work. I enjoyed having you as my
driver very much. As soon as we get rid of this lot – including your new
charming boss (whoever he may be) I hope that your services will be
available again!
Yours ever
John Nott.’
In the event, ‘Ossie’ did indeed once more become driver for John Nott, when
he returned as Trade Minister in the Conservative government elected in
1979.
AN EX-PRIME MINISTER’S EXCURSIONS
The following year did not see a revival in the political fortunes of
Edward Heath. In October 1974, as Conservative Leader, he was for
the third time out of four defeated in a general election by the Labour
Party led by Harold Wilson, who was returned as Prime Minister
with an overall majority of three. In February 1975 he was challenged
for the Conservative Party Leadership by Margaret Thatcher, and in
the ballot of Tory MPs was defeated by 130 votes to 119. At this
point Heath resigned, and he was succeeded as Conservative Leader
by Margaret Thatcher, when she defeated three male rivals in a second
ballot.
This sequence of events left Heath with the status of an ex-Prime
Minister and Party Leader. Ironically, he had not enjoyed a long
period with use of an official car as Leader of the Opposition, since his
defeat as Prime Minister in February 1974. At least some consolation
was shortly to be at hand from his old political adversary Harold
Wilson. In deciding to make an official car available to ex-Prime
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Ministers, it could be said that Wilson was returning the favour
bestowed on him by Heath in 1970, when a GCS car was made
available to the Leader of the Opposition. At the same time, as we
will see, there were perhaps also more personal motives behind the
Prime Minister’s decision. Nevertheless, on 12 February 1975, only
eight days after Heath’s defeat by Thatcher, Harold Wilson wrote in
friendly terms:
My Dear Ted,
I have for some time had in mind the possibility of providing
access to the Government Car Service for former Prime Ministers.
It has long seemed to me that the extent to which former Prime
Ministers are left to fend for themselves in these matters is not
really consonant with the dignity of the office and the distinction
which attaches to having held it. To that sort of consideration we
now have to add considerations of security. Against that, of course,
it is important that any arrangement should be defensible in terms
of use of public funds.
I should like to make the following proposal:
(i) A former Prime Minister should be entitled to have access to
the Government Car Service without charge for attendance
at official engagements and functions in and around London
for which he is invited as a former Prime Minister and for
Parliamentary business connected with his former business as
Prime Minister. It would be for the individual to exercise his
judgement as to what Parliamentary business qualified in
this respect.
(ii) A former Prime Minister should be entitled, if he so wishes,
to have have access to the Government Car Service on a
repayment basis for other journeys in and around London.
The repayment could be calculated on the basis of a mileage
payment made to civil servants who use their own cars for
journeys on official business. This arrangement would apply
only for journeys in and around London, but it would enable
a former Prime Minister coming up from the country for an
The History of the Government Car Service
107
official engagement to be met at the station or airport and
conveyed to and from his engagement in reasonable comfort
and speed.
The cars would not be provided on an allocated basis, and it would
be necessary to make arrangement on an ad hoc basis for each
journey.
I will also write and tell Anthony Avon, Harold Macmillan, and
Alec Home what is proposed.
Yours sincerely,
Harold Wilson.
The references to the three other living former Prime Ministers at the
end of the letter was a reminder that, at that time, former Prime
Ministers were generally expected to assume the role of elder states-
men. In fact, the tone of the letter, with such phrases as ‘coming up
from the country for an official engagement’, has almost Edwardian
echoes of the country gentleman making the occasional visit to the
capital city. It is interesting to note that the reply Wilson received
from Lord Avon (as Anthony Eden, Prime Minister 1955–57) seemed
to fit this stereotype: ‘A car could be useful when I have to attend
official or semi-official memorial services as, for instance, I am due to
do next week.’ Lord Home (as Alec Douglas Home, Prime Minister
1963–64) also expressed gratitude for the offer and expected to avail
himself of it. In contrast, Harold Macmillan (Prime Minister
1957–63) replied with what might be described as characteristic
understated scepticism and detachment: ‘This is a kind thought, but
I seldom come to London, and can manage all right when I do. But I
may ask for help later on.’
The letter written by Wilson might have been sufficient for these
three former Prime Ministers, but it proved to be totally inadequate
in the case of Edward Heath. To a large degree, this was
understandable. It could be said that Heath represented an early
example of the modern trend towards younger Prime Ministers (he
was to live for another thirty years after leaving Downing Street), and
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in the mid-1970s showed no signs of becoming any kind of elder
statesman. On the contrary, he remained an active MP, and a
particularly voluble critic of Margaret Thatcher, his successor as Tory
Leader. In these capacities, he displayed every inclination of a person
determined to remain at the forefront of political debate, and perhaps
to return to high office at some time in the future.
In this context, giving Heath use of an official GCS car was never
likely to just mean ‘travelling up from the country for an official
engagement’. In fact, within three months of Heath being granted a
car, official concern was mounting within Whitehall about not only
where he was taking it, but also his interpretations of official busi-
ness. This manifested itself in a number of memorandums between
the DoE and the Prime Minister’s Office, and culminated in a draft
letter of May 1975 which it was suggested should be sent from the
Prime Minister to Ted Heath. The draft letter emphasised that ‘the
Government Car Service is embarrassed by your recent request for a
car from London to Gosport [on the south coast of England], as the
instructions are to provide transport just in and around London … It
is also emphasised that this must be a repayment service.’
In the event, this letter was not sent to Heath. In any case, as we
have seen during his period as Prime Minister, by nature Heath was
a man with a strong will of his own, and was not likely to accept with
equanimity attempts to curtail his movements in a GCS car.
Nevertheless, Whitehall officials were not about to give in easily, and
continued to closely monitor Heath’s GCS movements. Consequently,
only a month after the first draft letter, the Prime Minister was
confronted with a new draft, that was even more strongly worded
than its predecessor: ‘I have been advised that you have made journeys
to Oxford, East Hendred, Gosport, Southampton, Hamble, and West
Malling (this latter a 232-mile journey), whereas I had in mind only
journeys in and around London. I would be grateful if you would
limit use of the Government Car Service to journeys in and around
London or we could assess repayment rate for such journeys.’
The officials appeared to be particularly concerned about the cost
of Heath’s excursions well beyond the outskirts of London. When he
was given details of Heath’s movements and this draft letter, however,
the Prime Minister was clearly reluctant to take any action. Although
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he had set out the rules in his original letter, he appeared sensitive
about confronting his former political adversary with the hard facts.
In any case, the original letter had not been specific about exactly
what constituted ‘in and around London’, and had left it to Heath’s
discretion as to what Parliamentary business qualified for these
journeys. Consequently, on 24 June 1975 a letter was sent from the
Prime Minister’s office to the DoE that postponed the possibility of
any immediate action (this was always one of Wilson’s great strengths
as a political tactician): ‘. . . The Prime Minister has noted this [the
record of Heath’s GCS movements]. He does not wish to take any
action at present, but has asked that the matter should be reviewed in
the Autumn.’
In the light of this recommendation, a schedule was kept of all
Heath’s GCS journeys from 1 June to 31 October 1975, but on 2
December 1975 Wilson finally put the issue to rest. In a letter from
the PM’s Office to the DoE it was stressed: ‘The Prime Minister does
not think it necessary to undertake regular six-monthly reviews [of
Heath’s GCS movements] whose results are reported to him. He will
leave it to you to raise any problems which arise in the future, but
there is no need to make regular reports.’
In the event, Wilson must have been aware by this time that, as
so often, events had radically changed circumstances. This was
because, in November 1975, for the second time in twelve months,
an IRA bomb exploded outside Heath’s London home. This was a
period of particularly intense IRA activity in the capital. For
example, on 23 October a car bomb had exploded outside the
London home of Conservative MP Hugh Fraser, and had killed a
passer-by, Professor Gordon Fairley, a renowned cancer specialist. In
addition, on 27 November, the campaigner and television
personality Ross McWhirter was shot dead at his home by an Irish
gunman. Finally, on 12 December, the Balcombe Street siege ended
peacefully, six days after four IRA gunmen took a husband and wife
hostage in their Marylebone flat.
In this tense security climate, it was perhaps hardly surprising that
a Home Office Memo of 12 December 1975 (the day the highly
charged and emotional Balcombe Street siege ended) recommended
that, at a stroke, Heath’s status as a GCS customer should be trans-
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formed. The memo noted: ‘In view of the current threat assessment,
the Metropolitan Police thought it necessary to allocate personal
protection to Mr Heath. This provision will be reviewed weekly. The
Police consider that it would greatly improve protection if Mr Heath
could be driven in a Government Car Service car for all journeys while
personal protection is considered necessary. It would be helpful if a
car could be allocated to him. This is covered by government rules
concerning Ministers and security.’ A letter from the Prime Minister’s
Principal Private Secretary of 16 December noted that the Prime
Minister had been consulted, and strongly supported the view taken
by the Home Office. Consequently, Heath would have his GCS car.
This vehicle would be provided without payment for official
engagements, but with repayment when on private or party business.
Although the security problems were all too real, it could also be
said that providing Edward Heath with an allocated car precluded
any further political embarrassment over what exactly constituted
travel ‘in and around London’.
BILL HOUSDEN, HAROLD AND MARCIA,
AND TURMOIL AT NUMBER TEN
As we have seen, it was the GCS driver Bill Housden who took
Harold Wilson back to 10 Downing Street as Prime Minister in
March 1974 after an absence of nearly four years. In fact, as we briefly
described in Chapter One, Housden had one of the most remarkable
careers of any GCS driver, and had long and close associations with
two Prime Ministers. Having been one of the early drivers to join the
Official Car Service in 1946 at the age of 28, in 1947 he became
driver to the President of the Board of Trade in the Labour govern-
ment, Harold Wilson. At 31 years of age, Wilson was by far the
youngest member of the Cabinet, and he and Housden built a close
relationship. However, in 1951, when the Conservatives returned to
power, Housden had to find a new Minister. Remarkably, he was
allocated (apparently despite Churchill’s strict rules) the Minister for
Housing and Local Government, Harold Macmillan. Housden then
stayed with Macmillan in his rise up the ministerial ladder, culmin-
ating in the latter becoming Prime Minister in 1957.
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Housden drove the Prime Minister until Macmillan resigned in
1963, but when Harold Wilson returned to government in 1964 as
Labour Prime Minister, he specifically requested that Bill Housden
should be his GCS driver. Housden then stayed with Wilson
throughout his two Premierships, his spell as Leader of the Oppo-
sition, and later as an ex-Prime Minister. Not surprisingly, given
this long association, Housden and Wilson became extremely close,
and this relationship extended to the families of the two men.
Housden had first met his wife Doris at Kingston House in 1947
when she was also an OCS driver, and in 1951, when their only
child Jill was christened, they invited Harold Wilson and his wife
Mary to be her godparents. The Wilsons were also in attendance
when Jill was confirmed in 1967, and then when she was married
in 1971.4
Housden was therefore immeasurably more than just a GCS driver
for Wilson, and was surely the type of figure Lady Falkender had in
mind when she referred to the drivers as the ‘Outer Cabinet’. However,
a unique and highly controversial account by an insider of life within
10 Downing Street during Harold Wilson’s second term as Prime
Minister, between 1974 and 1976, suggests that life at the top of
British government was anything but an easy ride for Housden.
Bernard Donoughue was Senior Policy Adviser to Harold Wilson,
and Head of the Prime Minister’s Policy Unit, a body independent of
the Civil Service. As such, he was a key member of the tightly knit
so-called ‘Kitchen Cabinet’ that surrounded the Prime Minister.
Other members here included the Prime Minister’s Press Secretary,
Joe Haines, and his Private Secretary, Albert Murray. Donoughue’s
detailed and intimate diary account of the period paints a picture of
life at Number Ten totally dominated by the powerful personality of
the Prime Minister’s long-serving (1956–95) Private and Political
Secretary, Marcia Williams (although she became Lady Falkender in
1974, Donoughue refers to Mrs Williams throughout his diary by her
earlier name).
There is something of a paradox at the heart of Harold Wilson’s
second period as Prime Minister, for although he successfully steered
the government through difficult economic conditions and a
politically sensitive 1975 referendum on Britain’s continued
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membership of the European Economic Community, he seemed to
lack the energy that had characterised his earlier spell as Prime
Minister. Peter Hennessy notes that Wilson’s return had a lacklustre
feel about it, and that he himself had no illusions about being a
renewed hero, even to his party.5 In fact, it appears now that the Prime
Minister was contemplating the date for his retirement almost as soon
as he returned to Number Ten. This climate tended to leave the way
open for strong-minded characters such as Marcia Williams to
dominate the scene, and apparently left Bill Housden in a vulnerable
position.
Bernard Donoughue describes Bill Housden as ‘the Prime
Minister’s colourful driver for many years, [who] also assisted Marcia
in many capacities including chauffering her on shopping trips and
ferrying her mail from Downing Street to her home. He was often
unhappy, and frequently held informative conversations with the
author, Joe Haines and Albert Murray.’6
That Housden was apparently being asked to serve well above and
beyond the call of duty clearly became a sensitive matter for GCS, and
something of an embarrassment for other drivers generally, as
Donoughue describes here in an entry from 13 November 1975:
Since she [Marcia Williams] is in bed ill, Bill Housden has spent the
day doing her shopping and errands in the PM’s car. One of the
drivers has complained to the Civil Service Department that the
Number Ten drivers cannot log all their journeys, and so claim
precise overtime, and implied that it was because too much time was
spent on non-governmental duties. I know that the other drivers are
angry that Bill is always occupied on Fridays taking Marcia to the
hairdresser’s, shopping, etc. So they have to go away for the PM’s
trips to Liverpool [location of his Huyton constituency], etc, and Bill
usually stays in London.7
Housden clearly confided on a regular basis with Donoughue about
his extremely stormy relationship with Marcia Williams. This is
well illustrated in a detailed and graphic diary entry from 2 July
1974:
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As I [Donoughue] arrived in Downing Street, Bill Housden was
driving away from the door in the PM’s car. He pulled up and talked
bitterly of Marcia’s attacks on him. She had called him a liar, accused
him of being friendly with Albert [Murray] and me – clearly a
criminal offence – and of conspiring with Albert to prevent her
attending the Socialist International at Chequers [the Prime
Minister’s country home] last weekend. She had ordered him not to
come into her house, but to leave her letters [which he took round to
her house every day] on the doorstep.
Bill, who gives me the latest information nearly every day, had
complained to the PM, who had said, ‘It was best not to have any-
thing to do with her.’ The PM apparently has not communicated
with her for a week. Bill said he had nearly had enough and dare not
tell his wife, who would make him leave – ‘and then it would be in
the newspapers within 48 hours’.8
On another occasion (8 January 1975), Housden offered Donoughue
a lift home in the Prime Minister’s Rover:
He [Housden] told me how Marcia had been attacking him every
day. This morning she was so awful that he finally plucked up
courage and walked out of her bedroom where she was lying sick –
and went downstairs saying that he could not put up with any more.
After a few minutes the Asian maid came down with a long letter of
apology.9
Yet amidst this turmoil, we should bear in mind that Bill Housden
found himself in this situation only through his extremely long and
close relationship with Harold Wilson. This clearly placed him in a
unique position to gain an insider’s view of the Prime Minister’s mind
and character. For example, Wilson’s announcement in March 1976
of his intention to resign as Prime Minister came as a great public
shock, and triggered a great deal of speculation about his motives for
this decision. Housden, however, had for some time been confiding to
Donoughue that he did not expect the Prime Minister to serve out his
full term, and in January 1976 correctly forecast that Wilson would
go by Easter.10
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Despite the close relationship, Housden was also capable of
delivering a coolly analytical and quite profound analysis of Wilson’s
character:
Bill Housden says that Harold Wilson has no lasting personal loyalty.
Once he has gone, none of us will hear another word from him. ‘Once
you have served your purpose, you will be dropped, that applies to all
of us.’ Bill says he knows Wilson better than anybody, having worked
closely with him for twenty years. In 1970 Bill never heard a word
from him after his election defeat until Wilson was given the use of
an official car – then he telephoned Bill to come and be his driver
again.11
Housden was to continue serving Wilson, as by now, as Wilson him-
self had ensured, former Prime Ministers were entitled to an official
car! As we will see, this again caused some controversy. Nevertheless,
given the quality and length of his service, the award of an MBE to
Housden in the Prime Minister’s resignation honours list was an
undisputed accolade in a generally controversial list of names.
Saying Goodbye
Barbara Castle was a close associate of Harold Wilson, and had been a
senior Minister throughout his two periods as Prime Minister. When James
Callaghan took over as Prime Minister in April 1976, she suddenly found
herself out of favour and out of office. In her autobiography, she describes
how a sympathetic word from GCS driver Winnie Dabin (long-standing
driver for Labour Minister Michael Foot) was able to make this traumatic
experience more bearable:
‘The transition from power to powerlessness is full of awkward moments
. . . One of an ex-Minister’s duties is to say goodbye to the Queen, and I
stood in Speaker’s Court at the House [of Commons] wondering about the
best way to get to Buckingham Palace – the ministerial car is the first
thing to go. I rang Ted Short [a Cabinet colleague], also on his way to the
Palace, to ask if he would take me in his car. Winnie, Michael Foot’s
driver, took pity on me as I stood waiting for him in the cold. Did I not
know I was allowed to use my ministerial car for an occasion like this?
“It is absurd the way no one explains this to you.” ’12
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THE PRICE OF BEING
AN EX-PRIME MINISTER
When Harold Wilson resigned as Prime Minister and left Number
Ten in April 1976, he became eligible for an official GCS car and
driver, as a privilege that he himself had initiated a year earlier. In
fact, there were those who believed that this had been his main
motive all along! Amongst this number was Tony Benn, a senior
Minister throughout Wilson’s two terms as Prime Minister, who had
nevertheless become semi-detached from the government through his
opposition to UK membership of the EEC during the 1975 referend-
um, and his interventionist strategy as Industry Secretary in
1974–75. Hennessy describes Benn as the chief tension-arouser for
Wilson’s Cabinets, and suggests that the Prime Minister used the
fledgling but quickly influential Policy Unit (headed by Bernard
Donoughue) to combat Benn’s interventionist industrial strategy, so
that Benn was moved to the post of Energy Secretary in 1975.13 Benn
cannot therefore be described as an unbiased observer of Wilson’s
activities. Nevertheless, Benn’s analysis, with the aid of his GCS
driver, does throw an interesting light on Wilson’s thinking and state
of mind during his latter days as Prime Minister.
As we saw in Chapter One, Tony Benn and Harold Wilson at least
had one thing in common, in that they both built up a close
relationship with long-serving GCS drivers. In the case of Benn, the
driver was Ron Vaughan, who had driven him as a Minister since
1968. In his diaries, Benn describes a conversation with Vaughan on
25 April 1975 that suggests, as so often, GCS drivers had wind of a
major change in government long before anyone else:
I learned from Ron Vaughan that Harold Wilson had arranged that in
future all former Prime Ministers were to have their own car and
chauffeur for life. That’s never happened before, and indeed even until
1970 even the Leader of the Opposition didn’t have a car and a
chauffeur. It was Heath who agreed that for Harold. Of course now
Harold has returned the favour, but he has also given a car and driver
for life to Home andMacmillan. The drivers in the car pool are saying,
‘The crafty bugger must be preparing to get out, and then he’ll have a
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car for life.’ That’s the conclusion to be drawn, because when he does
go, he’ll never be made Leader of the Opposition again.14
Intriguingly, on 22 March 1976, just after Wilson had made his
surprise official announcement of his intention to resign as Prime
Minister, Benn confronted Wilson directly with the GCS theory from
nearly twelve months earlier:
‘By the way, Harold, I’ll tell you who knew your secret before anyone
else’, I said.
Harold had been boasting how it had been a well kept secret, and
he said, ‘Who?’
‘The Government Car Service.’
‘What do you mean?’
I said, ‘As far as I remember, Ted Heath provided you with a car
when you were Leader of the Opposition, the first time that had ever
happened, and you gave him a car when you won in 1974. But last
year when Ted Heath gave up the Leadership of the Tory Party, you
made a ruling that all ex-Prime Ministers would have a car. I gather
you foisted a car on Sir Alec Douglas-Home, who didn’t want one,
and Lord Avon, who didn’t want one. Well, the word went round the
Government Car Service that the reason you’d done this was because
you were going to retire.’
I said this jokingly, but Harold began to look very sick. He said,
‘Not at all, it’s for security reasons.’
Marcia [Williams] was just smirking and it was obvious Harold
didn’t like it. She said to me, ‘You are a naughty man – of course
that’s right!’
So Ron Vaughan had been absolutely bang on.15
As we have seen in the case of Edward Heath, by 1976 there was of
course a security element in providing a car for an ex-Prime Minister,
but this had not been to the forefront in Wilson’s original letter to
Heath in February 1975. Nevertheless, a letter from the Prime
Minister’s Office of 25 March 1976 makes it clear that, as an ex-
Prime Minister, Wilson should be treated in the same way as Heath
was at that time, and be allocated a vehicle.
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Ironically, within a few months, there was to be official concern
expressed about the use of an official car made by Wilson, in a similar
tone to that adopted for Heath a year earlier, although again with
apparently no satisfactory resolution. In this case, a DoE memo of 1
July 1976 expressed concern that Wilson had recently been at his
holiday home on the Scilly Isles but that, in contravention of the
rules, his GCS car had not been returned to headquarters. Instead, it
had been reported that the car was ‘being used by a certain lady’. It
was emphasised that any such use was quite improper, but that when
the driver Bill Housden was tackled about this, the questions were
met with evasion.
Sensitivity about the use that was being made of Wilson’s car was
no doubt heightened by the fact that, at this time, the whole question
of the cost of the GCS fleet had become a matter of public debate,
with controversy over the basic idea of the ex-Prime Minister being
given use of an official car. Consequently, a report in the The Times in
May 1976 gave leaked details of a review on the case for revising the
system of providing cars for use by Ministers and Civil Servants,
conducted by an interdepartmental committee under the chairman-
ship of the Civil Service Department. In a tone that would become
increasingly familiar to GCS over the decades to follow, it was alleged
that many junior civil servants had been making use of costly
chauffeur-driven cars for routine work, and that too many vehicles
were kept ready outside London for visiting Ministers and senior civil
servants. The threat to the GCS was clear in that The Times reported
there was argument in Whitehall over the merits of preserving the
present Service, which cost about £2 million a year, or using more
hire and self-drive cars.16
At that time, the GCS fleet comprised about 480 cars, with
seventy-two allocated vehicles. The chief concern in 1976, however,
appeared to be the situation in the regions. It was reported that in the
previous year the southern region had claimed that significant
savings could be made by tighter controls and regular use of hired
cars. The southern region had made radical changes some years
previously, but these had not been followed in other parts of the
country. Consequently, the interdepartmental committee had been
set up to look into the whole matter. An official investigator had
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discovered that about half of journeys made outside London were by
junior staff of various Departments. The investigator found that
chauffeurs were kept waiting, and that often journeys were short but
with long waiting periods. Among people found to be using GCS cars
were health and social security officers making circular tours of
claimants’ homes, Inland Revenue officers collecting taxes and
making property valuations, and DoE staff inspecting construction
and maintenance works.
Nevertheless, the Property Services Agency, that controlled GCS
within the DoE, argued that there was strong opposition to the idea
of using more self-drive cars and hiring cars for peak periods of
demand. This was because it was necessary to keep a minimum
number of drivers and cars round the country for visiting Ministers
and high civil servants. Junior staff could use these cars when they
were not needed elsewhere.
The interdepartmental report also highlighted the sensitive matter
of Ministers using GCS cars for private or domestic purposes, and
found here that in the past few years just over £800 had been received
by the DoE from Ministers authorised to take vehicles for private,
political and personal use on payment terms.
Perhaps surprisingly, The Times reported that, although the report
contained recommendations for changes in the interests of economy,
it was unlikely to be shown to Ministers, as the matter was regarded
as administrative and best handled by departmental managers.17 This
suggested that the changes would be more in the form of incremental
economies, rather than any basic appraisal of GCS as a whole. In the
event, as we will see in the next chapter, it was only in the second half
of the 1980s that the whole of GCS and its regional structure would
be placed in the melting pot with its very existence at stake.
In the mid-1970s, it was perhaps the fact that the interdepart-
mental investigation had taken place at all that demonstrated
changing times for GCS, and that from now on it could expect to be
subject to greater public scrutiny. It was significant here that The
Times report chose to place the examination of GCS in the context of
the government also seeking to limit the use of cars by businessmen.
This point illustrates the hard political and economic reality that, in
the mid-1970s, the British economy remained in a highly delicate
The History of the Government Car Service
119
state, with high oil prices, high inflation, rising unemployment, and
a serious balance of payments deficit combining to maintain the state
of crisis that had continued unabated since 1973. In this climate, any
hint of extravagance by ministers and officials in their style of travel
could have disastrous political consequences.
This new GCS prominence was well illustrated in June 1976,
when Conservative MP Neville Trotter tabled a series of Commons
questions on the cost of GCS. Trotter revealed to the Sun newspaper:
‘I put down these questions after seeing Chancellor of the Exchequer
Denis Healey drive away from the Commons, without offering
anyone a lift, at 12.45 am, after delivering his attack on company
cars.’18 Healey had plans to tax private industry employees with
company cars and homes, and Trotter saw it as hypocritical that
Ministers’ cars and living accommodation would be excluded from
the plan. He believed that a hired bus could be used to take both
Ministers and MPs home from the Commons.19
The answers given to Neville Trotter included the information that
average weekly overtime for GCS drivers came out at forty hours and
two minutes, although one driver had logged the huge total of
seventy-four hours and twenty minutes overtime, costing £118. In
fact, without overtime, drivers’ pay would have been halved. Conse-
quently, average earnings came out at £4,628, but this comprised
£2,250 in basic pay, £130 disturbed meals allowance, and £2,248
overtime.20
It was perhaps not surprising, therefore, that officials should be so
sensitive about the use ex-Prime Ministers made of their official cars.
In fact, that Harold Wilson should have use of a GCS vehicle at all
had become a matter of some political controversy, and officials had
to respond to some hostile correspondence. Although Tony Benn and
the GCS drivers had picked up on Wilson’s original decision, the
initial supply of vehicles to ex-Prime Ministers appeared to pass
without much public attention. It was only when Wilson himself
received a vehicle that the media highlighted the fact, and provoked
a public reaction. This contrast could perhaps be explained by the fact
that Wilson’s sudden departure had generated an avalanche of
speculation about the reasons, and the supply of a GCS vehicle
seemed to somehow suggest something of a feathering of the nest.
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Amongst the correspondence received by the Property Services
Agency was a letter of 24 June 1976 from a Mr C. P. Coulson, who,
clearly with some feeling, wished to make a request of the
government: ‘The tax payers are providing the sum of £10,000 per
annum to run Mr Wilson’s official car. Why is this so, and if this offer
is available to every motorist, could you let me have details of this
allowance?’
Coulson was obviously determined not to be ignored, and on 17
July wrote again, complaining that he had yet to receive a reply.
Eventually, on 13 August, Coulson’s letter was answered by W. F.
Hutchings, Principal Transport Officer at the PSA, who chose to
adopt a similarly ironic approach: ‘My advice to you is to become an
ex-Prime Minister at a time when, following IRA action, security
deems it dangerous for certain ex-Prime Ministers to travel on public
transport or in their own cars as freely and safely as you or I can do.’
The controversy over ex-Prime Ministers and their GCS vehicles
would eventually blow over, but out of the public eye there were also
other sensitive aspects of official transport where change was afoot.
RELIEVING THE LOAD ON MINISTERS’
SPOUSES
Given the character and sensitivity of the Service, the official Prime
Minister’s Rules on use of GCS cars are never likely to change in a
sudden and radical manner. In reality, changes appear to take place
either as a result of accepted practice becoming a norm that is then
officially acknowledged, or through discreet elite lobbying for
‘special case’. In the former case, grey areas such as travel by Ministers
from work to home, or the entitlement of Junior Ministers to an
allocated vehicle, can shift almost imperceptibly in terms of accepted
practice over a number of years, so that an eventual change in the
rules, in effect, only accepts what is already happening.
A good example of the latter ‘special case’ is provided by a letter
sent from the wife of the Lord Chancellor to Marcia Williams in
1974. The rights of Ministers’ spouses to use official cars is always
likely to be a contentious and politically delicate matter, but at this
time at least one wife of a Minister had reached the limits of her
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endurance. Elwyn Jones had been a Labour MP, but in 1974 moved
to the House of Lords to become Lord Chancellor. This involved
taking an official residence, but for his wife, Polly, the limitations on
her using her husband’s GCS car had become too much, and she was
clearly letting off a considerable head of steam when she wrote to
Marcia Williams on 18 November 1974:
I am working all out to help Elwyn and to do a good job, for the
country generally.
It is a question of transport. We have no car of our own. I don’t
drive. I am seventy, and have an arthritic back. The rule apparently
is that only the Lord Chancellor may use his car, even when he is out
of London. This makes it impossible to get about on errands running
this place in the Lords without transport. Instead, I have to hang
about in the rain waiting for taxis. This wastes valuable time and I
catch cold. I do think something should be done to help me, and
other Cabinet wives who don’t have cars of their own.
I talked to Mary [the wife of Harold Wilson] the other day, and
she tells me that she is allowed to have use of Harold’s car (when he
is not needing it) on condition that she pays the proper taxi fare. This
seems to me absolutely fair and reasonable . . . The Lord Chancellor’s
Department says that I must never use the car unless Elwyn is sitting
in it. This ridiculous veto can only be changed by specific instruct-
ions from the top man.
So, dear Marcia, I would be deeply grateful if you could bring this
matter to Harold’s attention.
Given the account by Donoughue, there was perhaps some irony in
the fact that the wife of the Lord Chancellor chose to write to
Marcia Williams about this matter! Nevertheless, there did appear
to be significant inconsistencies between the Lord Chancellor’s and
Prime Minister’s Offices about when and how a spouse could use an
official car. When the letter was passed on to Principal Transport
Officer, W. F. Hutchings, he was unsympathetic, and commented
with some of the irony he also employed in his reply to the Coulson
letter on ex-Prime Minister’s vehicles. Consequently, Hutchings
wondered why the Lord Chancellor’s wife could not order taxis
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ahead, and commented that some Ministers had in fact complained
about the need to share cars with others. He also pointed out that
there were insurance aspects, and continued to emphasise that,
when a Minister was away, the GCS driver was told to report to
headquarters.
In the event, as in the case of Edward Heath and his trips beyond
the environs of London, Harold Wilson proved to be more
sympathetic to a ‘special case’ than his officials. If the letter from the
Prime Minister’s Office to GCS of 12 February 1975 had a sexist tone
about it, it did at least gave the Lord Chancellor’s wife the basic
concessions she had been looking for:
With regard to the clarification on rules for use of cars by wives of
Ministers. The Prime Minister does not object in principle to the
proposed clarification of rules on use of cars by wives [that they
should be allowed to use the car alone on certain occasions], but
would like the drafting tightened to make it absolutely clear that the
concession does not apply to wives representing Ministers at private
or political functions, only to wives representing husbands at official
and public functions.
It was perhaps understandable that the change should be referred to as
a ‘clarification’, given the apparent inconsistencies between Depart-
ments, but a line had been crossed in that spouses were now recognised
as having a certain official role to play, with associated rights.
As a footnote, when a new Prime Minister’s memorandum on the
use of GCS vehicles was produced in 1979, on this occasion it
contained an acknowledgment of a change in the rules through a shift
in accepted practice. Consequently, a letter from the Cabinet
Secretary to the Controller of PSA Supplies noted that the new
memorandum was little different from its predecessor, except for
‘weekend concessions’ for Cabinet Ministers. This would allow them
to use cars from regional pools for journeys to their homes in the
regions at weekends. However, it was acknowledged that this would
in fact do no more than regularise the de facto position that had
emerged in recent years.
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Miss Bunny and the GCS Women
During the 1970s GCS women drivers continued to make the news for a
variety of achievements and activities. Particularly prominent here was one
of the original GCS drivers, Nancy Simmons, universally known by her
nickname of ‘Bunny’. In the early 1970s, Bunny was invited to visit
Malaya by the Chief Minister, Prince Abdul Rahman. Bunny had driven
the Prince on two occasions when he visited London to discuss Malayan
independence. On the second occasion, he specifically asked for ‘Miss
Bunny’, and invited her to Kuala Lumpur for the independence
celebrations.21
Bunny Simmons was involved in a more controversial visit to London
in 1973, when she drove Portuguese Prime Minister Marcello Caetano.
The presence of Caetano provoked large-scale and violent demonstrations,
and the Evening News described how ‘The star of this week’s Caetano circus
was the buxom woman driver who whisked the Portuguese premier around
at the wheel of an official Daimler.’ The paper was not able to gain the
identity of Bunny, but it described how ‘this fearsome woman driver threw
the big car around with the nerve and skill of a [former World motor
racing champion] Jackie Stewart’.22
Bunny Simmons finally retired in 1979, after thirty-three years service
to GCS. Her final job was to drive Chinese Leader Chairman Hua on his
visit to Britain. After Hua had flown off, Bunny was congratulated and
thanked for her service by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.23
Another long-serving GCS employee was Section Leader Irene Gale, who
retired in 1972 after twenty-four years in the Civil Service. Her retirement
card was signed by, amongst others, Prime Minister Edward Heath and
Environment Secretary Peter Walker. However, the newsletter DoE World
described how she was retiring ‘after just over a century in government
work’.24 This unfortunate mistake was picked up by the national press,
with one newspaper commenting: ‘Never ever say women drivers are without
experience.’25
Irene Gayle was succeeded as Section Leader by Joyce Hinchcliffe, who in
1977 was awarded the British Empire Medal after only nine years service
with the DoE, because of her exceptional ability.
DoE World was on better form when they interviewed GCS driver Ena
Green in 1975, who told them that she preferred working as a pool driver
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because of the regular hours. She confided that her dream was to one day
hire a Rolls and drive around in it all day: ‘And the day after I’m going
to get myself chauffeur-driven in one.’ On a more mundane level, she
described how her duties included the cleaning of the Wolseley car: ‘Many’s
the time I’ve been up at the crack of dawn with my bucket and sponge.’
The author of the article noticed that on the dashboard was a notice in
red: ‘WARNING. It is the responsibility of the driver to ensure that there
is a minimum of 2mm of tyre tread.’ DoE World commented dryly: ‘This
is not a job for the rebellious.’26
SECURITY MATTERS
Probably the most basic way in which the nature of the GCS job
changed in the 1970s was the change required in the need for security.
A portent of things to come occurred early in the decade, although
perhaps not from the source that might have been expected. As we
have seen, the industrial relations legislation planned by the Heath
government proved to be highly controversial, and in January 1971 a
bomb exploded outside the Hertfordshire home of Robert Carr, who as
Employment Secretary was the Minister responsible for the Industrial
Relations Bill. Responsibility for the bomb was claimed by an
extremist group calling themselves The Angry Brigade, which had
previously claimed responsibility for, amongst other things, planting
bombs near a BBC van during the Miss World contest, and at the
Department of Employment offices in Westminster.
Neither Carr nor his family was injured, but damage was done
not only to the house, but also the Minister’s official Daimler car,
and this narrow escape clearly pushed GCS into an urgent
realisation that security needed to be taken to a new level. Conse-
quently, by the end of January a ruling had been sent out to drivers
that, from now on, they would not be allowed to take cars home.
Instead, away from the Kingston House Headquarters, vehicles
would only be allowed to be kept overnight in a locked garage that
had been checked and approved by Metropolitan Police Special
Branch. At the time, the Evening Standard reported that many of the
GCS drivers were not happy about this change. It quoted one driver
as saying:
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Most of us are a bit upset about this because it puts us in an awkward
position for getting home at night. Very often we could find our-
selves stranded. Not many of us can put the car in a locked garage,
so we have to leave it at Kingston House. For people who live out of
town – where the public transport system is not very good late at
night – this new rule is a bad blow.27
As the threat from the Angry Brigade was supplemented, however,
and then replaced, by even more savage and deadly attacks from the
Provisional IRA, GCS had to learn to accept security as a way of life,
with a need to provide a number of senior Ministers with armoured
vehicles, and generally to ensure frequent visual checks. In 1972, it
was agreed that the Prime Minister should use official cars for all
journeys in Britain on security grounds, although when on private
business, he would pay using Civil Service rates.
At that time, it was decided that these security arrangements
should apply to the Prime Minister alone, but in October 1973
Ministers came up against a tricky dilemma between security risks
and political sensitivities. Party conferences are usually classed as
private business, but on this occasion the police recommended that,
for the Conservative Party Conference in Blackpool, official cars
should be used by the Foreign Secretary, the Defence Secretary, the
Home Secretary, and the Northern Ireland Secretary. However, a
memo from Downing Street to the Head of the Civil Service, Sir
William Armstrong, stressed that a separate political question was
whether it would be a good idea to have five large official cars to be
seen driving around Blackpool. As we have seen, Britain was in the
midst of an energy crisis at the time, and there was obviously a great
deal of sensitivity about the public image of Ministers preaching
restraint while being seen in a popular holiday resort, riding around
in official limousines. In the event, a Downing Street memo a couple
of days later revealed that the Prime Minister was indeed considerably
worried about the political impact, and after discussions with the
Ministers concerned, it was decided that only Heath himself would
use an official car in Blackpool.28
Perhaps two entries from the diaries of Tony Benn provide the best
flavour of these fraught 1970s times, when GCS had to adapt to the
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realisation that urban terrorism had come to stay as a perceived means
of attempting to secure political ends. Firstly, the entry for 9
December 1975:
Ron Vaughan told me this evening that government drivers had been
told to take Ministers a different route home tonight because with
the Irish terrorists holding two hostages in Marylebone [the
Balcombe Street siege], there is a real fear that the IRA might try to
kidnap Ministers to trade them off. I spoke to Stan Orme [a fellow
Minister], who said that his government detective is desperately
worried. I rang Caroline [Benn’s wife] to tell her to bolt the front
door and close the shutters and not let anyone in. What an extra-
ordinary time.29
Secondly, the entry for 1 April 1979:
Hilary [Benn’s son] gave me for my birthday. . . a long stick with a
mirror and torch attached so that I could look under my car for
bombs. Joshua [another son] had given me exactly the same. So
touching.30
These gifts had been given extra point because of the events two
days earlier, when Conservative MP Airey Neave was killed when a
bomb attached to his car exploded as it left the underground car
park at the House of Commons. Neave was Shadow Northern
Ireland spokesman and had taken a hard line on Ulster and terror-
ism, but he was also a close advisor of the Conservative Party Leader
(and shortly to become Prime Minister) Margaret Thatcher. As Benn
commented, the death of Airey Neave introduced the possibility of
tremendous police protection, and pressure for a tightening up of
security measures.31
Although Neave was not a Minister, his death within the
boundaries of the Houses of Parliament brought security matters very
close to home for GCS. Jerry Doyle, now GCS Director, describes how
the security needs that first arose in the 1970s destroyed for ever some
of the traditional and distinctive charm of the Service:
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In earlier years Ministers’ cars were always black, but in the 1970s
we started to use all colours, as this is an effective security device. We
also used to use a Crown signatory badge instead of Vehicle Tax. This
was signed by me. However, for the cars we now use just the standard
tax disc, and then claim the tax back. This makes the cars more
inconspicuous.
In addition, the Prime Minister has always had four cars. For
many years these cars always had the same number plates, which
were carried on when we purchased new cars. The increased security
concerns of the 1970s meant that this had to go, and the Prime
Ministers cars now have assorted number plates. I would say that the
assassination of Airey Neave, combined with the Brighton bomb at
the 1984 Conservative Party Conference, were very big factors in the
tightening of security.
As we will see in the next Chapter, the Brighton bomb triggered a
series of events that would threaten the very existence of the GCS.
GCS and The Lighter Side of Security
One retired GCS driver remembers that security alerts in the 1970s could
have their lighter side. He describes how, on one occasion during the period
of Edward Heath’s government, a GCS driver was carrying as his
passenger Northern Ireland Secretary Francis Pym. They were travelling
down Whitehall, with the car in front of them containing an elderly couple.
For some inexplicable reason, the man at the wheel of this car decided to
perform a slow U-turn. This meant that the car was now blocking the road
ahead of Pym’s GCS vehicle.
Given the high level of security at that time, and the passenger he was
carrying, the driver feared the worst, and assumed they were about to become
victims of an IRA ambush. He shouted out to Pym: ‘It’s a hit. Get down!’
The GCS driver then accelerated at high speed straight into the car in
front, hurling it to one side, and careered away down Whitehall. This left
one bemused elderly couple literally wondering what on earth had hit them!
One another occasion, the driver himself had been detailed to go to the
Foreign Office and pick up Lord Cromer, the British Ambassador to the
United States, in order to take him to Chequers, the Prime Minister’s
country home. He had to wait for his passenger, but eventually he saw a
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group of five men coming down the staircase. Assuming they were the people
he wanted, and without looking too hard, he went up to the man in the
middle of the group and introduced himself. He then realised that in fact he
was talking to United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and that
the people with him were all secret service men! Kissinger looked quite angry
and disconcerted, and was immediately hustled away by his bodyguards.
As the driver describes, it was very interesting to see the aftermath of this
incident:
‘I think that the secret service men must have had a good telling off from
Kissinger for allowing me to walk up to him like that. Later that evening,
I was waiting at Chequers when Kissinger appeared again. He isn’t very
tall, and you could hardly see him for the secret service men, who totally
surrounded him. On their way out, they kept looking all around, and were
checking everything. They were obviously determined to take no chances this
time!’
BENDING WITH THE ECONOMIC WINDS
Underscoring the great majority of the 1970s years were the success-
ion of economic and industrial crises that punctuated the decade.
From the quadrupling of the oil price in 1973–74 there was no
settled period of stability, and in fact the public and political mood
of unease tended to intensify as the decade progressed.
The trend of events certainly had an impact on GCS, with the first
indication of this in October 1973, when several Ministers in the
Heath government were anxious to set a good example in econo-
mising on fuel. The matter was discussed at Cabinet, and in a follow-
up, Housing Minister Paul Channon wrote to the Prime Minister
advising that, after discussions with ministerial colleagues, it had
been agreed that a low-key presentation would be appropriate.
Channon therefore sugggested that the economies should be
presented not as an important initiative, but as a responsible piece of
housekeeping, which the government was undertaking as a matter of
course. He also advised that it would be best to avoid large concen-
trations of GCS cars, particularly at Parliamentary divisions.32
As things turned out, however, Ministers’ new travel arrangements
proved to be anything but low-key, and instead received a great deal
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of press coverage, much of which was by no means what the govern-
ment had been looking for. At the suggestion of Junior Environment
Minister Reginald Eyre, several of the twenty-mile-per-gallon 3.5
litre Rovers were taken off the road, and were replaced with what
became known as 35mpg ministerial Minis. Many years before
official concerns about global warming through carbon dioxide
vehicle emissions and the greenhouse effect, Paul Channon was shown
bent double getting into a Mini, with Reginald Eyre squeezed into
the back of the car, ready for the GCS driver to carry them the short
distance from the DoE to the Commons33 (the press did not appear to
consider the possibility that the two Ministers might have chosen to
walk).
Reginald Eyre hoped that the economy exercise could save around
1,500 gallons of petrol per week. The impact was lessened when it
was reported that a senior member of the Cabinet, thinking he was
helping the ‘save petrol’ drive by using a small car in London, was
astonished to be passed by his regular car full of his Junior Ministers!
Consequently, he immediately switched back to his larger car until
the situation could be sorted out. A somewhat embarrassed DoE
spokesman admitted: ‘It is possible that something like this has
happened. But it should not happen. Perhaps someone needed to get
from A to B in a hurry and had to take a big car.’ The by now some-
what desperate spokesman added hopefully: ‘It could happen that in
order to carry out the changes some junior people had to move the big
cars about. And of course junior people could possibly have used big
cars to carry some vital message.’ Nevertheless, the spokesman
claimed that two thirds of the ‘big cars’ were already off the road and
were being replaced with the British Leyland 1800. Even Prime
Minister Edward Heath had cut back from three to two 3.5 litre
Rovers.34
Even though it might be easy to smile now at the largely cosmetic
attempts at fuel economy in 1973, the energy and economic crises for
the government were real enough, and within four months were
instrumental in prematurely seeing off the Heath government. The
British economy remained in a highly fragile state when James
Callaghan succeeded Harold Wilson as Prime Minister in April 1976,
and by September Britain was compelled to borrow £2.3 billion, its
The History of the Government Car Service
130
maximum entitlement, from the International Monetary Fund to
prop up the pound. Sterling continued to collapse, however, and
embarrassingly for the government, Chancellor of the Exchequer
Denis Healey had no choice but to turn back from Heathrow Airport
and return to Westminster in his GCS car, only minutes before he had
been due to take off for a financial conference in Hong Kong. At the
Labour Party Conference, the Prime Minister made an uncom-
promising speech, saying that the option of cutting taxes and
boosting government spending ‘no longer exists’.
Inflation continued unabated, and trade unions were unwilling to
accept the pay increase restraints suggested by the government, with
strikes, particularly in the public sector, becoming rife. By February
1978 Ministers were again being asked to econmise on fuel, but it
was a sign of the times that by now this was because of a go-slow by
tanker drivers rather than fuel prices as such. However, reporters
found that Ministers seemed little inclined to heed the plea from the
DoE. Typical of the response was that by Overseas Development
Minister Judith Hart, who said that she would happily go by tube,
but would not be allowed to take her ministerial red boxes, contain-
ing confidential papers, on the train.35
In July 1978 the industrial unrest finally spread to GCS itself,
when the drivers went on strike for half a day. The drivers historically
were classed as industrial civil servants, and were protesting at the
government’s 10 per cent pay offer. Instead, they wanted parity with
the non-industrial civil servants, who had been awarded a consoli-
dated pay increase of 10 per cent, plus a further 9.5 per cent. The
industrial action was part of a wider action by 4,000 London civil
servants, but 150 GCS drivers and 200 Metropolitan Police drivers
stopped work from noon until midnight. It meant that Prime
Minister James Callaghan had to use his own Rover 2000, driven by
his Parliamentary Private Secretary, to travel from Downing Street to
the Commons for Question Time, and had to pass through a picket
line outside Parliament.
Long-serving GCS driver Peter Smithson vividly expressed his
dissatisfaction to The Guardian: ‘I have never been on strike before and
have never considered it until now, but we are all getting to the
desperation stage. The man driving a Cabinet Minister gets less than a
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lavatory attendant, and yet we are expected to shoulder a lot of
responsibility for a Minister’s safety.’36
Denis Oliver, Secretary of the Transport and General Workers
Union GCS branch, emphasised to the Evening Standard that when
Parliament was in session he rarely saw his family in the evenings,
and was also called upon to work at weekends. He also set out the
problems concerning the traditional emphasis on overtime amongst
GCS drivers:
For five months of the year, when parliament is in recess, we have
practically no overtime at all. That means in these periods we are
taking home a little over £40 a week. The argument is constantly
being put forward that we have the option of overtime. But why
should we be penalised for working all hours of the day and night?37
Oliver also argued that in the private sector the drivers would be
earning £65 a week, plus perks and overtime.
It could be said that the unrest within GCS was a barometer of the
national mood, and in the ‘winter of discontent’ that followed during
1978–79 a succession of strikes placed the Labour government in an
even more defensive position. Consequently, in the general election
called in May 1979, the Conservatives were returned with an overall
majority of forty-three, and Margaret Thatcher became Britain’s first
woman Prime Minister. In the event, her close relationship with GCS
would become almost literally a matter of life and death for both
parties.
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CHAPTER 5
Living Dangerously
1980–89
THE THATCHER EFFECT
As with the rest of the political world, for GCS the whole of the1980s was dominated by the personality, policies and political
style of the Conservative Prime Minister from 1979 to 1990,
Margaret Thatcher. Never an individual to be easily deterred from her
purpose, the length of her term as Prime Minister, brought about by
three clear-cut election victories, allowed her the opportunity to
attempt a fundamental shift in the culture and values in Whitehall
and well beyond.
At certain crucial times, the fate of GCS appeared to become
entwined with that of the Prime Minister herself, and to a surpri-
singly significant extent the course of events reflected the complex-
ities of her character. On the one hand, there was Mrs Thatcher’s
powerful ideological commitment to the virtues of privatisation,
competition and the free market, together with associated suspicions
concerning what she saw as the inefficiencies of the public sector. To
a remarkable degree, these enormously strong beliefs were shaped
from an early age, living above her father’s grocery shop in Grantham,
and in turn they had a significant influence over GCS. As she herself
describes in her autobiography:
My ‘Bloomsbury’ was Grantham–Methodism, the grocer’s shop,
Rotary and all the serious, sober virtues cultivated and esteemed in
that environment . . . For the truth is that families and governments
have a great deal more in common than most politicians and econo-
mists like to accept. Although the consequences of flouting funda-
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mental rules are somewhat different for states than for households,
they are still ruinous – indeed, more ruinous in the case of states,
because they have the power to bring whole nations down with
them.
. . . The great advantage I had over many of my contemporaries in
politics was that whereas they had first to be persuaded of the
theoretical advantage of monetarism, free trade and deregulation, the
technical arguments and insights were so completely in harmony
with my fundamental instincts and early experience that I was much
more easily convinced – and my convictions helped me to convince
others.1
These firm beliefs apparently had some ominous implications for
GCS. Peter Hennessy quotes the Conservative MP Julian Critchley:
‘She [Mrs Thatcher] cannot see an institution without hitting it with
her handbag.’2 Indeed, from the mid-1980s GCS found itself exposed
to some hefty blows, and this proved to be a tremendously difficult
period for the Service, with many treacherous pitfalls to be avoided.
After thirty-five years in which, despite habitually finding itself as a
small cog within giant Ministries, GCS had established itself firmly
in the Whitehall structure, the Service survived to the end of the
decade only by the skin of its teeth. The crisis was such that the
distinctive identity, and even existence, of GCS was under threat from
the possibility of, successively, privatisation, a takeover by the
Metropolitan Police, or the Service being dispersed to the parent
Departments.
Ultimately, GCS survived through two other important facets of
the Prime Minister’s personality and priorities. Firstly, there was the
sensitive matter of security. One of the defining moments of Mrs
Thatcher’s period as Prime Minister was the IRA bomb which
exploded at the Grand Hotel in Brighton, where she was staying
during the 1984 Conservative Party Conference. Although the Prime
Minister herself had a narrow escape, five people were killed. The
bomb understandably triggered new concerns about the security of
Ministers, and there was strong pressure for responsibility for driving
senior Ministers to be taken away from GCS and handed over to
Metropolitan Police Special Branch.
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As we will see, however, in one of the key turning points in GCS
history, the Prime Minister and other Ministers resisted this pressure,
and the Service retained its key responsibilities. In turn, this acknow-
ledgement of the strategic importance of GCS on security matters
significantly reduced any possibility of privatisation. As a Prime
Minister who always stressed the importance of national defence and
security, it was unlikely that Mrs Thatcher would risk losing control
of GCS.
Secondly, it is possible to see a more personal element in Mrs
Thatcher’s loyalty to GCS. We described in Chapter One her
considerable emotion at the funeral of her GCS driver George Newell
in 1981, and her emotions were always more complex than the one-
dimensional ‘iron lady’ image suggested. Significantly, Peter
Hennessy observes that a combination of assertiveness and sensitivity
was at the heart of her style throughout the days of her ascendancy.
He quotes the journalist Woodrow Wyatt (a friend and admirer of
Mrs Thatcher) as observing: ‘she’s very sensitive underneath and it
takes a lot for her to screw herself up to face all the hostility she is
getting unjustly’.3
Once again, it was here that the GCS’ golden asset of the
personal and intimate relationship between driver and Minister
could come into its own, and the Prime Minister was noted for her
appreciation of good personal service. In this context, it is possible
to see how GCS fitted in to her analogies with running a family
business. Significantly, Mrs Thatcher referred to living in the flat at
the top of 10 Downing Street as (like Grantham) ‘life above the
shop’, and she and her husband Denis decided that they would not
have any live-in domestic help.4 The combination of attention to
domestic detail, combined with matters of high state, make Mrs
Thatcher’s period as Prime Minister unique. Here, Jerry Doyle,
Director of GCS, describes his surprise at seeing Mrs Thatcher
clearing glasses and bottles after an official function; even as Prime
Minister she liked to tidy up. It is certainly difficult to imagine any
other British Prime Minister doing this work! In turn, as part of
the ‘family business’ aspects of being Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher
could appreciate the quality of personal service and consideration
given by GCS.
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Away from domestic life, however, it was the drama and tragedy of
the Brighton bomb and its aftermath that truly defined the
relationship between Mrs Thatcher’s government and the GCS.
The Rover P5 Grand Entrance
As with so many Prime Ministers, it was the moment when Mrs Thatcher
emerged from Buckingham Palace in the GCS Rover P5 when the full
impact of her new status began to sink in:
‘Denis and I left Buckingham Palace in The Prime Ministerial car.
My previous car [as Leader of the Opposition] had already gone to Mr
Callaghan. As we drove out through the Palace gates, Denis noticed that
this time the Guards saluted me. In those innocent days before security had
to become so much tighter for fear of terrorism, crowds of well-wishers,
sightseers, press and camera crews were waiting for us in Downing Street
itself. The crowds extended all the way up Downing Street and out into
Whitehall. Denis and I got out of the car and walked towards them.’5
SECURITY AND THE 1984 BRIGHTON BOMB
A welcome early indication for GCS of the new Prime Minister’s sym-
pathetic regard for the Service came early in her period as Prime
Minister. Given Mrs Thatcher’s enthusiasm for economies in the
public sector, it might have been thought that GCS would present an
early target for her handbag. In May 1979, however, the month she
took office, a letter from her Private Secretary to the Department of
the Environment acknowledged her agreement that any attempt to
achieve savings in the area of GCS- allocated cars to Ministers would
probably be a false economy. She was therefore content with the
allocation proposed by the DoE.
At this time, of course, the assassination of Airey Neave in the
House of Commons car park was still an extremely recent event, and
the need for ministerial security was clear. The fact that the IRA was
continuing its campaign of murdering high-profile targets was
demonstrated even more starkly a few months later, in August 1979,
when Lord Mountbatten was blown up by a bomb on his boat while
holidaying in Ireland. Three other people were also killed.
Mountbatten, a cousin of the Queen, and the last Viceroy of India,
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had a huge public profile, and although he himself had rejected any
personal security, his death highlighted still more the potential
vulnerability of public figures.
These types of attacks continued periodically over the next few
years. For example, in October 1981 the Royal Marines chief, Lieut
General Sir Stuart Pringle was injured when a bomb went off
under his car, while in November of the same year a bomb
exploded at the home of Attorney General Sir Michael Havers
while he was away. The highest profile IRA attacks in London
during this period occurred in July 1982 when bombs exploded in
Hyde Park, killing two guardsmen and seven army horses. Later
that same day, a bomb exploded under the bandstand in Regents
Park, killing six soldiers.
In March 1979, it had been decided officially that the senior
Ministers who would be allowed to use their GCS cars for all journeys
would be the Prime Minister, the Defence Secretary, the Foreign and
Commonwealth Secretary, the Home Secretary and the Secretary of
State for Northern Ireland. The level of security given to these
Ministers was upgraded in the early 1980s, although in June 1983
the Prime Minister did feel the need to issue a note which warned
that since travel by Ministers was often very much in the public eye,
they must all strive to make the most efficient and cost-effective
arrangements for travel, using common sense about the means they
adopted.
By 1984, the Prime Minister herself was looking for a new driver,
and the long-serving Denis Oliver was proposed for the job. Oliver
himself, however, was initially reluctant to take it on:
I had been driving Humphrey Atkins in the earlier years of the
Thatcher government. He was one of the Foreign Office Ministers
who resigned at the outbreak of the Falklands War in 1982, but he
had earlier been a Northern Ireland Minister, and so he continued to
use a GCS car on security grounds. I enjoyed driving him, and when
it was suggested that I should switch to Mrs Thatcher, I wasn’t too
keen. Nevertheless, Humphrey Atkins himself persuaded me that it
was too good an opportunity to miss, and so in the end I accepted.
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Crucially, Denis Oliver makes it clear that there were also other
pressures at work here that gave an extra urgency to ensuring his
appointment, and in fact would prove to have enormous implications
for the whole future of GCS:
At the time, the police were pushing very hard to take over respon-
sibility for driving the Prime Minister. However, Mrs Thatcher was
a big supporter of GCS, and was determined to retain one of our
drivers. I think it was also very important that her Private Secretary
[later Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Home Civil Service
1988–98], Robin Butler, had a very high regard for GCS. I believe
that, apart from the personal relationships that were built up with
GCS drivers, they both thought that GCS could be trusted to be
more discreet than the police.
In the event, within a few months of taking over the job, Denis
Oliver found himself at the heart of a massive security crisis. In the
early hours of the morning of 12 October 1984, a twenty-pound IRA
bomb exploded in the Grand Hotel in Brighton during the
Conservative Party Conference. Many senior Ministers, including the
Prime Minister, were staying in the hotel at the time. Five people
were killed, including Conservative MP Sir Anthony Berry and the
wife of the government Chief Whip, John Wakeham. Those seriously
injured included the Employment Secretary, Norman Tebbit, and his
wife, and John Wakeham himself. The Prime Minister had a lucky
escape when the bathroom she had been in shortly before was badly
damaged. Nevertheless, the bomb sliced four floors out of the centre
of the building, and was the most devastating terrorist attack ever
perpetrated against British politicians.
Denis Oliver’s account of the dramatic events of that night speaks
for itself:
I was sharing a room at the Grand Hotel with the Downing Street
number two driver, Bob Rumble. When the bomb went off, it blew
in the door of our room. The Grand is a Victorian hotel with a lot of
old plaster, and I will never forget the thick dust that seemed to fill
the air. It clogged up your lungs, and I could taste it for days
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afterwards. It seemed very strange to look out from our room and see
rubble, and an open view of the sea beyond, as the whole frontage had
been blown off.
We managed to make our way to the Prime Minister’s room,
wondering what we were going to find. We were the first to get
there. She was with her Private Secretary Robin Butler, and was still
in her evening dress from the event the previous evening. They had
been working on her big Conference speech for the next day, and she
was putting it into her case. She was very calm, and said to me,
‘Denis, I can’t believe that this has never happened before now.’
Denis Thatcher emerged from an adjoining room in his dressing
gown and said, ‘What’s going on?’ With all the chaos around, it
could have sounded an amusing remark, if the situation had not been
so serious!
Fortunately, the stairs were still intact, and I made my way down
to the ground floor, and over rubble, and out though a window in the
bar. The original idea was to get the Prime Minister away from the
hotel as quickly as possible. However, some people had been seen in
the grounds of the hotel, and there was a fear of snipers. This meant
Mrs Thatcher had to stay in the hotel while the surrounds were
checked.
Another problem was that the Prime Minister’s car had been left
at the police station, and so I needed to find a way of collecting it. I
spotted a car with the keys still in the ignition, and assumed that it
was a police car. No one seemed to know anything about it, so I
decided to ‘requisition’ it! When I arrived at the police station I
informed them that one of their cars was standing outside, then left
them to it while I went to collect the Prime Minister’s car. I was able
to pick her up at the hotel, and we spent what was left of the night
at Lewes police station. We had to make an early start, as Mrs
Thatcher was determined to go back to Brighton to make her Confer-
ence speech as planned.
Denis Oliver’s coolness and presence of mind at a moment of great
crisis proved beyond doubt the ability of GCS to rise to the occasion.
In the light of later events, it is impossible to overestimate the value
of this in ensuring the continued existence of GCS.
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Some of the most dramatic pictures from the bombing were of the
badly-injured Norman Tebbit being carried carefully from the hotel
wreckage. Beryl Osborne was Tebbit’s driver at that time, and she
recalls her initial shock and the dramatic aftermath:
As the Tebbits were based in Brighton for the week I was at home in
London. I woke at about 7.30 am to hear the news. I thought that I
would be travelling to Brighton that day to pick them up and bring
them back to London, but instead I had to take the Tebbits’ children
down there to be with their parents. I went with them to see
Margaret Tebbit in intensive care, while Norman Tebbit had to have
a skin graft. It all meant that I was working from the hospital for
some time. The wards where they had been taken were full of flowers
and gifts – almost too many to manage. However, Norman Tebbit
would still have his ministerial red boxes while he was in hospital,
and I had to take these down to him.
Incredibly, Norman Tebbit had a bottle of whisky in his hotel
room at the Grand, and it was found intact in the rubble. On the
other hand, Margaret Tebbit lost her engagement ring, and sadly it
was never found.
Later, Margaret was taken by helicopter to Stoke Mandeville
hospital for specialist treatment, and I took the children there to see
her arrive. As it happens, Stoke Mandeville is quite near to the Prime
Minister’s country home at Chequers, and Mrs Thatcher allowed
Norman Tebbit to stay there so that he could be near to his wife.
GCS CRISIS AND A VITAL VOTE OF
CONFIDENCE
It was almost inevitable that such a traumatic event as the Brighton
bomb would have some serious implications for GCS. The manner in
which the IRA had come so close to assassinating the Prime Minister
and a large number of her Ministers could only place an even higher
premium on the need for high-quality security at all times. One of
the key factors that gives the GCS its unique character is that, despite
the obvious serious security implications of its work, it has always
maintained a separate identity and character from the police and
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security services. However, particularly at times of crisis such as in
the mid-1980s, this distinctive character in itself leaves GCS
vulnerable to pressure from within government that some of its
responsibilities should be taken over by others.
This was precisely what happened during this period, and on 27
March 1986 a letter was sent from Home Secretary Douglas Hurd
to Environment Secretary Kenneth Baker (the Minister responsible
for GCS) that had extremely serious implications for the Service.
Hurd set out the situation plainly:
The Interdepartmental Committee on Ministerial Protection, which
is chaired by Home Office officials, recommends that in future
ballistically protected vehicles used by Ministers should be driven by
police officers rather than GCS drivers.
A small number of Ministers . . . are driven on a regular basis in
vehicles that are specially armoured against rifle, grenade and mine
attack. These cars are driven by GCS drivers.
The police say that in emergency the extra training and wider
experience of police officers may be crucial. Some GCS drivers receive
additional training at Hendon [the Metropolitan Police Training
College], but Metropolitan Police Special Branch do not feel this
equates to the rigorous selection and protracted training procedures
which their own officers have to undergo.
It is also the police view that in critical situations in which the
skill of drivers could be crucial, opportunities for misunderstanding
between the Special Branch protection officer and the driver are
much greater when there is a GCS driver rather than a police officer.
However, the Controller of the Crown Suppliers pointed out that
this would have an adverse effect on GCS morale.
It could be said that Hurd’s last observation represented a particularly
good example of Whitehall understatement. In suggesting that GCS
staff lacked the skill and professionalism to drive senior Ministers, the
tone of the letter undermined the raison d’être of the Service. The loss
of these senior Ministers to police drivers therefore risked sending out
the message that GCS fell short of the necessary high standards to do
the job. Even more seriously, in practical terms, the reality of the
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police driving senior Ministers could be seen as the thin end of the
wedge, that would eventually lead to a full takeover. In fact, as we
will see, later in the 1980s the Metropolitan Police attempted exactly
a takeover of this sort, and their chance of success could have been
considerably higher if they had already been driving Ministers.
Given that Hurd was reporting a recommendation by the author-
itative Committee on Ministerial Protection, the tone of the letter has
a great deal about it of a fait accompli – that the DoE should be
expected to swiftly fall in line with the expert advice offered. In the
event, however, the reply sent to Hurd by Environment Secretary
Kenneth Baker, on 17 April 1986, could hardly have been more
dismissive of the Home Secretary’s arguments:
I am bound to say that I do not find the basic arguments put forward
about the use of police drivers convincing.
As far as I am aware, no one has ever criticised the reactions of the
GCS drivers on those rare occasions when they have faced a potential
threat. Just the contrary, they have usually been highly commended.
If their present level of training is thought to be inadequate let us,
by all means, improve it, but personally I doubt if the Prime
Minister and our other colleagues would want to make the changes
proposed by the police, particularly if they involved the provision of
armed police officers at nearly three times the cost of the present
service. I believe they greatly value the level of service and close
rapport they enjoy with their present GCS drivers.
In recognising the gravity of the threat to the GCS, Baker took the
proactive and combative approach of totally defending the Service.
Crucially, in referring to the Prime Minister, and the value placed on
the close relationship with GCS drivers, Baker was playing his trump
card, given Mrs Thatcher’s high regard for the Service and her own
drivers. Kenneth (now Lord) Baker recalls that although he was
sympathetic to Ministers in some cases having police drivers, he felt
that the proposal from the Home Secretary was totally unnecessary:
‘The great majority of Ministers were not threatened by the same
level of threat as of today. I think the recommendation had arisen
because some Ministers had had a rough ride when they had visited
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university campuses, as indeed I was to [as Education Secretary].
However, the GCS drivers were quite capable of dealing with those
situations.’6
Lord Baker also acknowledges the importance of the golden GCS
asset of the driver–Minister relationships:
Having been a Minister for many years, including in Edward Heath’s
government, I came to realise that it was very easy to create bonds
between Ministers and their own drivers, and indeed with the
Minister’s family. I felt this was a much better relationship which
should be maintained. As far as I could recall I do not think I con-
sulted other Ministers. I thought the Home Office was overreacting.7
Crucially, in this potentially life-and-death struggle for GCS, it was
Baker’s arguments that won the day. In a letter of 26 June 1986 from
Douglas Hurd’s Private Secretary to the DoE, the Home Secretary
conceded defeat: ‘Having considered the matter further in the light
of Mr Baker’s letter, the Home Secretary is not now minded to pursue
the proposal.’
As Baker had acknowledged, however, there was a need for GCS
drivers to upgrade their training on security. It took some time for
the necessary courses to be put in place, but at a meeting of the
Committee on Ministerial Protection in July 1989 it was reported
that a three-week course had been introduced at Hendon Police
College the previous September, to provide police training for GCS
drivers. The Committee hoped that all the drivers would attend the
course, and would like it extended. GCS entered six candidates of
their choosing per course on the anti-terrorist driver training courses
held every six months.
A particularly intriguing contribution at the meeting came from
Commander Howley of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch, who
made it quite clear that they had by no means accepted defeat on their
hopes of assuming responsibility for driving senior Ministers. In a
pointed discussion on the perceived problem that some GCS drivers
might well be too old and unsuitable for the job, Howley observed
that there was an underlying difficulty because of the inevitably close
relationships between GCS drivers and Ministers. Confirming the
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principal reason for the outcome of the crucial Hurd–Baker exchange,
he complained that the driver–Minister relationship was the major
stumbling block to Special Branch taking over responsibility. He also
believed that there was a problem in flushing out unsuitable drivers
because of difficulties in justifying this with the trade unions.
Moving forward to the present time, selected GCS drivers continue
to take the anti-terrorist course, although this is now mainly operated
in-house by GCS. In addition, all new drivers take the Advanced
Driving Test, as it is considered that this provides an effective
stepping stone to the security training. Nevertheless, as we will see
in Chapter Seven, the points raised in the Hurd–Baker exchange
remain relevant, with responsibility for driving Prime Minister Tony
Blair being transferred in 2003 from GCS to the Metropolitan Police
on security grounds.
The Minster Men
In the mid-1980s, some light relief from heavy matters of security was
provided by the saga of two former Prime Ministers vying for the GCS car
of their choice. The story began in 1984, with a memo to Environment
Minister Sir George Young from Senior Transport Officer B. R. Wilson.
It was pointed out that James Callaghan used a Ford Minster as his
GCS vehicle, but this had done 130,000 miles and needed replacing.
Mr Callaghan was requesting a new Minster. This was because he had
arthritis and needed a larger car to stretch his legs out.
Wilson observed that a new Minster was not really on, as it would
cost £20,000, and this was about three times the cost of the Austin
Ambassador or Montego, the type of car that would usually be supplied to
Mr Callaghan and other ex-Prime Ministers. Callaghan had been given a
Montego and Vauxhall Carlton to try out, but they did not suit. He was
now being driven in a Ford Granada diesel.
The situation was far from being resolved, as in July it was reported
that the Granada was unsuitable because it could not keep up with
Callaghan’s escort vehicle. Consequently, in order that he could be supplied
with a Minster, he was being asked to pay the difference between this and
the usual car supplied. This request clearly did not meet with success, and
in August it was finally decided that the Management and Personnel
Office should pay the full cost of the replacement Minster.
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The story resumed in February 1985, when Wilson reported that
he had heard from Ted Heath. Because of increased travel commitments,
the ex-Prime Minister considered that the size and power of his present
GCS car was insufficient to enable him to properly discharge his duties.
It was noted that Heath’s present car, an Austin Ambassador, was due for
early replacement, and that he would generally have been provided with one
of the new 2 litre Montego Automatics, but in view of his increased level
of need, this would not be ideal. Wilson concluded: ‘Mr Heath would,
we understand, like to have a Minster, such as that recently allocated to
Mr Callaghan.’
It was clearly difficult to favour one ex-Prime Minister over another,
and so in June 1985 Ted Heath duly received his new Minster!
EFFICIENCY FIRST
The victory for GCS on security did not mean that the Service had
left its survival problems behind. On the contrary, to a large degree
the crisis on security marked just the beginning of a very long and
precarious journey for GCS, which would continue to the end of the
decade. This new uncertainty revolved around a major culture
change in Whitehall that placed much greater emphasis on
efficiency and value for money, through better financial manage-
ment, improved information systems, and clearer objectives. In
addition, as the 1980s progressed, the radical remedy of privati-
sation emerged as the preferred solution for large chunks of the
public sector. From 1985, GCS found itself pitched into the heart of
these tumultuous changes, and there was no doubt that the Service
was a vulnerable target. Although no one ever doubted the high
quality of personal service that GCS provided to its customers, when
light was shone on the darker corners of its organisation and
finances, some serious criticisms emerged. At least to some extent,
there was perhaps an inevitability about these shortcomings, given
that for so many years GCS had formed a small part of giant
Ministries, and lacked a focused leadership. Nevertheless, it became
clear that the status quo was not an option for GCS, and that within
government and Whitehall its very existence was being seriously
questioned.
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The chief catalyst for change was a 1985 Efficiency Scrutiny of
GCS carried out under the supervision of the Cabinet Office
Efficiency Unit. The existence of the Efficiency Unit in itself graphic-
ally demonstrated the priorities that Mrs Thatcher had set for
Whitehall. The individual chosen by the Prime Minister to lead the
new order was Sir Derek Rayner of Marks and Spencer, and Mrs
Thatcher describes her thinking behind this innovation:
I . . . asked Sir Derek Rayner to set up an Efficiency Unit that would
tackle the waste and ineffectiveness of government. Derek was
another successful businessman, from what everyone used to describe
as my favourite company, Marks and Spencer. The two of us used to
say that in politics you judge the value of a service by the amount you
put in, but in business you judge it by the amount you get out. We
were both convinced of the need to bring some of the attitudes of
business into government. We neither of us conceived just how
difficult this would prove.8
Peter Hennessy describes how the chief weapon employed by Rayner
was a scrutiny programme conducted by young officials who became
known as ‘Rayner’s Raiders’. Their task was to examine specific
blocks of work, rather than to take on the impossible job of looking
at everything. They were to work to a strict timetable, and report to
Rayner himself as well as their Permanent Secretary. The thinking
behind this focused approach was that an investigation in depth
would yield lessons that could then be applied over a wide area. The
purpose of the scrutinies was therefore action not study.9
Hennessy also describes how Rayner reasoned that Ministers and
their officials are better equipped than anyone else to examine the
use of their resources for which they are responsible. Nevertheless,
Rayner required, and received, the wholehearted support of the
Prime Minister for his programme of scrutinies, and that without
this key element he would have had little chance of success in
pushing through his reforms, given the many sceptics of their value
within Whitehall.10 In 1983 Rayner was succeeded as Head of the
Efficiency Unit by Sir Robin Ibbs, but the programme of scrutinies
continued.
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In 1982, and arising from the results of the scrutinies, the
Efficiency Unit carried its reforms a step further and produced a
management blueprint in the form of the Financial Management
Initiative (FMI). This was intended to be a system in which managers
at all levels would have a clear view of their objectives; well defined
responsibility for making the best use of their resources; and the
information necessary to exercise their responsibilities effectively.11
The reference to information highlighted the role of one other key
individual in this drive to imbue new values in Whitehall. By chance,
the first Environment Secretary (the Department responsible for
GCS) in the Thatcher government was Michael Heseltine who,
unusually for a Minister, had a keen interest in management and
information systems, and was determined to push through reforms in
his own Department, and then see them spread throughout
Whitehall. The process of management control he introduced became
known as the Management Information System for Ministers
(MINIS).
Heseltine himself intended that MINIS would give Ministers a
thorough understanding of what each activity of the Department
cost, by defining each task in detail and allocating the costs of the
civil servants involved. He believed that no such system had existed
before, and although MINIS in itself was neutral in its effects on staff
numbers, under this detailed scrutiny the opportunities for econo-
mies would soon become apparent. Consequently, when Heseltine
took over at the DoE in 1979, it employed some 52,500 people
(including the Property Services Agency, the home of the GCS). By
the time he left three years later, the numbers had been reduced to
37,500.12
The efficiency and economy armoury of ‘Rayner’s Raiders’, FMI
and MINIS took internal scrutiny and appraisal to new levels of
intensity, and from 1985 GCS was to feel the full force of these radical
new methods.
‘One Jag’ Willie Whitelaw
As we saw in the case of ex-Prime Ministers, it could be difficult for GCS
to enforce economies on eminent figures, and this could also prove the case
with senior Ministers. William Whitelaw was Mrs Thatcher’s valued
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Deputy, and had served as Home Secretary since 1979, but in 1983 he
received a peerage and became Leader of the House of Lords. In June 1984
Senior Transport Officer B. R. Wilson received a letter from Whitelaw’s
Private Secretary saying that, as Home Secretary, Whitelaw had used a
Jaguar provided by the Metropolitan Police. However, as Lord President of
the Council (his new office) he had been using a Rover, but had found this
too small. He had then been provided with a Ford Granada, but this was
also unsatisfactory. The letter concluded by stating plainly: ‘Lord
Whitelaw has had enough.’ The message clearly had the desired effect, for
in July Whitelaw was issued with a 4.2 litre Jaguar with automatic
transmission, in sapphire blue.
Nevertheless, Wilson was clearly mindful of the pressure to make
economies, and was not prepared to let the matter rest. Consequently, in
September he issued a memo that, without naming Whitelaw, was clearly
aimed at him, and in contrast cited the good example set by Education
Secretary Sir Keith Joseph. As one of the chief advocates of monetarist
policies, Sir Keith had emerged as a severe critic of what he saw as
extravagant public expenditure, and Wilson’s memo suggested that, at least
in this case, the Education Secretary was determined to practice what he
preached. Wilson therefore wished to issue a reminder:
‘Ministers should not expect to change their car for a more expensive
model just because the Department is prepared to pay . . . Individual requests
for change are considered on their merits. I would like to note that last year
Sir Keith Joseph gave up his Rover in favour of an Austin Ambassador,
and consequently saved his Department £2,000–3,000 per annum’.
PRIVATISATION
AND THE LADY’S NOT FOR TURNING
In the early 1980s, as with much of the public sector, it would still
have been almost unthinkable that an organisation integral to the
workings of government, such as GCS, might be privatised. As
Margaret Thatcher herself acknowledges, the Conservative election
manifesto of 1979 had been quite cautious on the subject, and the
depth of the recession in the early 1980s meant that there was not
much prospect of successful privatisations in these years, due to low
market confidence and large losses by the nationalised industries.13 In
The History of the Government Car Service
150
attempting to curb the high inflation rates of those years by
controlling the supply of money, the government found unemploy-
ment rising rapidly, and by 1983 it stood at a post-Second World
War record level of 3.25 million. In 1981 a number of inner city
urban riots, most notably at Brixton in London, and Toxteth in
Liverpool, had further threatened the credibility of the government.
The Prime Minister, however, was determined to stick with her
economic strategy, and in a landmark speech to the 1980 Conser-
vative Party Conference declared: ‘The Lady’s not for turning.’ As
the decade progressed, her political and economic position did
indeed strengthen, notably through such events as the retaking of
the Falkland Islands from Argentina in 1982, the government’s
landslide victory in the 1983 general election, and in 1985 the
dramatic victory over the miners at the end of their year-long strike.
The gradual falls in inflation and unemployment in the second half
of the decade also made market conditions more fertile for
government sell-offs. As Hennessy describes, from the mid-1980s,
the high Thatcher years took hold, and with them came a much
more personal style of government, in which the Prime Minister was
able to implement policies based on her fundamental ideological
beliefs.14
The big privatisations commenced with British Telecom in 1984,
and this was swiftly followed by British Aerospace (1985), the
shipbuilding industry (1986), the National Bus Company (1986),
British Gas (1986), British Airways (1986), Rolls-Royce (1987),
British Airports (1987), Leyland Bus and Truck (1987), and BP
(1987).15 The huge size and high speed of these privatisations demon-
strated that there were no longer any sacred cows in terms of being
kept in the public sector, and it was during this period of momentous
change that GCS also found itself as a possible candidate for a trip to
the market.
Hard Driving
Margaret Thatcher’s driver Denis Oliver leaves no doubt that she was not
at all keen on leisure time or days off, and ‘absolutely hated holidays’.
Instead, she always yearned to be at the centre of things, although this
placed stiff demands on her staff.
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One such occasion he remembers was at the time of the terrible
Hungerford massacre in August 1987, when Michael Ryan killed fourteen
people, before shooting himself. On that day, Denis Oliver and Mrs
Thatcher were in Cornwall in the south-west of England. The original
plan was for the Prime Minister to fly up to Edinburgh for an engagement
the next day, where she would be met by Bob Rumble, the Downing Street
number two driver. When Mrs Thatcher heard about events in Hungerford,
however, she decided that she must go there immediately, and a helicopter
was laid on to take her. Denis Oliver contacted Bob Rumble, who was
driving up to Scotland, and had got as far as Milton Keynes. Denis told
him to turn round immediately and go to Hungerford, so that he could pick
up the Prime Minister.
The problem was that there would now be nobody on hand to meet Mrs
Thatcher when she arrived in Edinburgh the next day. Denis Oliver decided
that the only thing for it was to do the job himself, and so he drove overnight
from Cornwall to Scotland, in order to make the early morning rendezvous
with the Prime Minister! As he says: ‘Long hours never bothered me, and you
had to be ready for anything when you worked for Margaret Thatcher.’
THE BARROW REPORT EXPOSES GCS
WEAKNESSES
In 1985 ‘Rayner’s Raiders’ finally arrived at GCS when an Efficiency
Scrutiny of the Service, together with the InterDespatch Service, was
carried out under the Supervision of the Cabinet Office Efficiency
Unit. The scrutiny itself was led by Bruce Barrow, an official at GCS’
parent, the Crown Suppliers (a component part of the Property
Services Agency). The final report was placed in the libraries of both
Houses of Parliament. Barrow stressed that both GCS and IDS
provided an extremely high standard of service, but nevertheless he
found a number of areas where efficiency could be improved. Signifi-
cantly, many of Barrow’s criticisms concerned problems of unclear
objectives and poor communication. Given the enormously long-
standing problems of GCS’ lack of identity in giant Departments, it
was perhaps surprising that he did not deal with this fundamental
cause of the problems, but instead he concentrated on finding specific
solutions to individual difficulties.
The History of the Government Car Service
152
For example, Barrow concluded that management objectives and
responsibilities were not sufficiently clearly defined, and were not
understood by all levels of staff. He argued that the GCS and IDS
Superintendents, responsible for day-to-day running of the services,
were key personnel, but were not geared to achieving financial targets
because budgetary information was retained and monitored centrally
at Headquarters. Unfortunately, Barrow found that communication
between Headquarters and the Superintendents tended to be poor,
particularly in the case of IDS. He believed that a fundamental
problem was that management was hindered severely rather than
helped by being tied to the Property Services Agency’s computing
and accounting systems, which limited flexibility and sometimes
prevented proper commercial decision making. Nevertheless, he did
find that GCS driver costs were lower than many commercial
analogues (although the reverse was true for IDS).
On repair and maintenance, Barrow emphasised that his terms of
reference did not include reviewing the Central Vehicle Workshop at
Peckham, although this did not stop him from commenting that,
from what he had seen, there was much scope for improvement. In
particular, he believed that vehicles were kept off the road for longer
than necessary. In addition, maintenance costs, which were adversely
affected by security requirements, London traffic conditions, and a
particularly demanding clientele, could be improved.
It could be said that, although these criticisms exposed some
serious weaknesses, at least, after forty years of life, GCS was for the
first time receiving detailed attention that treated it as a separate
entity with an existence in its own right. In his recommendations,
Barrow recognised the urgent need for improvement when he argued
that GCS and IDS should introduce a new management structure
and ensure that there were proper job descriptions and financial
targets clearly understood at all management levels. Significantly, he
believed that the Department should bring in help from elsewhere
in the Civil Service, or outside if necessary, to assist in implementing
the recommendations, with particular emphasis on a review of
workshops. For example, a reduction in downtime for all vehicles
would bring down the numbers of spare vehicles and thereby
improve costs. In total, Barrow argued that there was scope for
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savings of over £1.6 million, or approximately 28 per cent of the
budget.
Barrow also conducted a survey of GCS customers, and
significantly, from the point of view of any possible privatisation
plans, this was particularly favourable to GCS. The survey found that,
when compared with the private sector companies used by GCS to
supplement its own service, the customers valued the much higher
level of service from the pool’s own drivers, who were found to be
more reliable and who knew their way around better. Consequently,
Barrow recommended that Superintendents should take a tougher
line in letting contracts, and place business elsewhere if there was
insufficient improvement. Nevertheless, Barrow believed that
individual users should also consider carefully the cost benefits of
making maximum use of taxis, as these could be 60–70 per cent
cheaper than pool cars.
Crucially, therefore, Barrow came to the conclusion that it would
not be appropriate to privatise GCS, partly for security reasons, but
also because, when the market was tested, the private sector was
found to be quoting prices some 30 per cent higher than GCS were
quoting at that time. In addition, the overwhelming response from
customers was that GCS provided good value for money.
Later in 1985, an Action Plan for implementation was agreed after
consultation, and this absorbed the main elements of the Barrow
Report. This included the appointment of a fleet manager and an
accountant within the Transport Branch of the Crown Suppliers, as
well as upgrading the GCS Superintendent post in order to give
wider responsibility, including management of the Trading Account.
In addition, it was decided that a new management structure was
needed, including proper job descriptions and financial targets
understood at all levels. It was also hoped that new computer systems
at Crown Suppliers would bring about a more interactive means of
monitoring performance and improved systems of reporting.
A letter from the Head of the Efficiency Unit, Sir Robin Ibbs, to
Environment Minister Sir George Young in December 1985 made it
clear that there had been differences of opinion with GCS on the need
for a fleet manager, but Ibbs argued that the Barrow scrutiny recom-
mendations would rely heavily on this individual, and it was vital
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that this person should be in place as soon as possible. Ibbs was also
heartened to see accepted targets for reductions in vehicle downtime,
while there was also a need for specific financial targets, as these
would provide much sharper aims.
The Barrow Report had exposed many aspects of GCS that had
previously been given little or no detailed attention, and at least the
workings of the Service were no longer being taken for granted. At
the same time, in attracting this political attention to GCS, the
Report also encouraged further debate about its future, and so
prolonged the period of uncertainty.
REPERCUSSIONS OF BARROW
It was not only the Barrow report itself that exposed weaknesses in the
management of GCS, and raised questions about its future. In
particular, evidence provided to Barrow by the Branch Chairman of the
Transport and General Workers Union pulled no punches. As we saw
in the previous chapter, in 1978 the GCS unions took industrial action
on pay and conditions, and seven years later it was evident that relations
had not improved. The TGWU evidence therefore began by stating
that management had for some time received intense criticism from the
union side, and also noted what they regarded as disturbing articles in
the press, most notably a recent one in the Daily Mail that was headed
‘Ministers’ Cars to go Private’ and appeared to emanate from the office
of the Crown Suppliers.
The union clearly feared that GCS privatisation was in the air, and
complained also about what they saw as excessive cuts in the size of
the car pool since 1979. It was concluded: ‘Doubtless the economies
can be justified, but at what cost?’ The evidence also criticised what
it saw as the ever-increasing volume of paperwork generated by top-
heavy management, and recommended that GCS be separated from
the Crown Suppliers which, because it operated as a trading fund, was
incompatible with running such a highly specialised and sophisti-
cated service. Even allowing for its clear vested interest, the union’s
overall judgement on GCS was terribly negative. Ominously, it also
went on to emphasise the threat from an emerging rival: ‘The present
state of GCS is pitiful. Staff–management relations could not be
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worse, and morale among staff is at an all time low. Among our
“predators” are the police, with seemingly no financial restrictions. In
fact, they have recently ordered six new fully armoured Jaguars.’
In fact, the union’s suspicions about the possible privatisation of
GCS, despite the Barrow findings, appeared to have some credibility
from evidence emanating from the DoE. In June 1985, a DoE
ministerial memo, whilst quoting the Barrow Report, emphasised
that GCS privatisation was being re-examined as part of a wider
review of the Crown Suppliers by the Cabinet Office. The memo also
referred to the plan for GCS to change its headquarters from Marsham
Street to a new site in Ponton Road in Nine Elms, and it was
concluded here: ‘Relocation can only make the business more
attractive in the event of any privatisation venture taking place.’
The reality that GCS privatisation was still very much on the
policy agenda was made quite explicit in a letter of 7 August 1985
from Environment Minister Sir George Young to the Head of the
Efficiency Unit, Sir Robin Ibbs. Young made it clear that the two
men were in agreement on this matter: ‘Like you, I am not convinced
by the case made in the Barrow Report against privatisation, and I do
not accept that some move could not be made in this direction.’ In
the event, the question of GCS privatisation would remain open for
some time to come.
TO PRIVATISE OR NOT TO PRIVATISE?
Remarkably, between 1985 and 1987, four more government reviews
of various types would consider the sensitive question of whether to
privatise the whole, or at least part, of GCS. The situation was com-
plicated by the eventually separate decision to privatise the Crown
Suppliers. There appeared to emerge a general recognition that GCS
could not be treated in the same way as the bulk of government
suppliers. Indeed, part of the long-standing GCS problem was caused
by classifying it as a supplier, rather than a provider, of a specialised
service. However, the spirit of the late 1980s favoured privatisation of
almost any public sector assets, unless a strong case could be made
otherwise, and so for GCS to remain in the public sector, the case had
to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
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Given Sir George Young’s doubts about the recommendations of
the Barrow Report, it was perhaps not surprising that another review
would quickly follow. This arrived later in 1985, in the form of a
Cabinet Office led team known as the Turton Review. This did not
disagree with the conclusions of Barrow, but nevertheless proposed
that the Crown Suppliers should at least test the water by means of a
formal tender that evaluated the cost of providing a predetermined
level of service by the GCS, and by private chauffeur-driven services
with adequate security safeguards.
Before any prospect of the Turton proposals being taken forward,
another review arrived in the form of one carried out in 1986 by the
Central Unit on Purchasing. Unlike Barrow and Turton, this review
was on the wider question of the future of the Crown Suppliers as a
whole, and concluded that all those services not associated with the
main procurement activity should be contracted out, but signifi-
cantly certain parts of the car service were identified as possible
exceptions for security reasons.
The next review was carried out in 1987 by the consultants Coopers
and Lybrand and Samuel Montagu, on the more direct question of the
feasibility of privatising the Crown Suppliers. On GCS, this review
concluded that it would not be feasible for the small protected fleet
used by senior Ministers to be privatised, although it could be
transferred to come under the control of another government body
such as the police force (as had of course been recommended by
Douglas Hurd in 1986). With regard to the remaining larger
proportion of first call cars, the consultants believed that these could
be provided by the private sector. They recommended therefore
transfer to the private sector as part of an existing business on a stand-
alone basis, or a management buyout. It was argued here that contract-
ing out would not provide acceptable continuity, although it was also
acknowledged that GCS privatisation would be a particularly sensitive
issue. Nevertheless, the consultants had apparently opened the door to
splitting GCS, and then privatising the great bulk of its services.
Yet another review of the Crown Suppliers was carried out by Dewi
Jones, in parallel with the Coopers and Lybrand/Samuel Montagu
study, and this also reported in 1987. Like its parallel study, the
review by Dewi Jones concluded that the high-risk vehicles and
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drivers should not be privatised, but in contrast it was recommended
that they should be transferred to the Departments concerned, with
backup drivers and vehicles provided by the Metropolitan Police. In
the case of the remaining first call cars, Dewi Jones sided with the
Turton Review, and recommended a market testing. At the same
time, the report also recommended that if the first call cars and
drivers remained in the public sector, then they should be transferred
to the relevant Departments. It was also recommended that the pool
cars should be tendered to the private sector.
The bewildering array of recommendations and solutions provided
by the various reviews illustrated the complexity and sensitivity of
GCS privatisation, but the overall effect appeared to be to muddy the
waters, and to make an actual decision even more difficult. At least a
small resolution arrived in February 1988, when in a statement to the
House of Commons, Junior Environment Minister Christopher Chope
confirmed that some Crown Suppliers activities would have to remain
in the public sector for security and other reasons. These activities
included the GCS secure car service. Given that none of the reviews
had recommended privatisation of this service provided for a few
senior Ministers, Chope’s announcement was hardly a surprise, and left
open the larger question of the fate of the remainder of GCS services.
Around this time, Chope asked for ministerial views on the possi-
bilities of the private sector providing government cars. In January
1988, however, it was reported that Environment Secretary Nicholas
Ridley had accepted advice from Chope to privatise the Crown
Suppliers. Ridley was one of the chief long-standing advocates of the
benefits of privatisation generally, and a key supporter of the Prime
Minister in her crusade to improve Whitehall efficiency. It was there-
fore enormously significant that it was also reported that Ridley had
backed away on the prospect of privatising GCS, as he was alarmed
about the security implications for Ministers.16 It illustrated the
special regard that even the most hard line Thatcherites had for GCS,
and that in these circumstances a sell-off of any section of the Service
was highly unlikely.
One Department clearly disturbed about the turn of events was the
Treasury, where it was hoped that at least some parts of GCS would
be sold to the private sector. In a letter from a Treasury official to Don
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Routh, the Controller of Crown Suppliers, surprise was expressed that
the Chope statement had given such a categorical assurance that GCS
would remain in the public sector. Surprisingly, the Treasury had
apparently not picked up on the fact that Chope had been referring
to the relatively small protected part of the GCS service provided for
senior Ministers, but nevertheless they had no doubt got wind of
Ridley’s opposition to a sale of any part of GCS. The Treasury letter
claimed that the statement was not consistent with ministerial policy.
Instead, it was argued that government policy rested with a letter
written to the Environment Secretary in November 1987 by Civil
Service Minister Richard Luce. In this letter, Luce stated: ‘Provided
certain security conditions were met, I would not rule out
privatisation of some parts of the GCS, on security grounds at least.’
The Treasury argued strongly that this option needed further
investigation. It believed that this involved defining fairly rigorously
what the relevant security criteria were, and then ensuring that
privatisation plans met them, as well as meeting the more specific
views of Ministers. The Treasury letter concluded: ‘I suspect we will
want to give Ministers a range of options for consideration, ranging
from retention of the whole of GCS within the public sector and
retention of various parts.’
The Treasury intervention was significant given its enormous
power within Whitehall, and given that it clearly saw privatisation of
at least part of GCS as a viable option. It demonstrated that the fate
of GCS still hung in the balance, and that almost anything was still
possible.
Nevertheless, a decisive turning point arrived on 11 April 1988,
with a letter written from the Security Division of the Cabinet Office
to Bruce Barrow, now at the Crown Suppliers Transport Department
(TCS) Privatisation Unit. The letter confirmed some crucial definite
recommendations:
The Security Services have come down firmly against privatising
three out of four components of the GCS (the secure cars, the
remainder of first call cars, and the pool) . . . They leave open only the
possibility of privatising the regional GCS, provided that suitable
vehicles can be supplied from London for the transport of Ministers
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known to be under a higher than average threat. However, you may
now feel that there is no point in pursuing the possibility of privat-
ising any part of GCS.
The intervention by the Security Services carried enormous weight,
particularly in a decade where ministerial security was a hugely
important issue. To go against this advice would therefore carry enor-
mous political risks, and so explained Nicholas Ridley’s apparent
disinclination to consider privatising any part of GCS. Consequently,
the intervention quickly appeared to settle the long-running debate.
This was illustrated in a July 1988 letter from the DoE to the Regional
Director of the Yorkshire and Humberside Region. It confirmed that
Ministers had accepted the advice of the Security Services, but also
referred to the situation with regard to the regional GCS:
The privatisation of the Regional GCS, with the possible exception
of the Belfast service, was not ruled out on security grounds, but the
scattered regional units without London would be unlikely to be
attractive to purchase. It is therefore recommended against including
the Regional GCS in the package for sale. Instead, there should be
separate consultations to ensure that satisfactory arrangements
continue for the regional services once the remainder of TCS’ regional
transport operations are privatised.
In the event, as we will see, the ‘satisfactory arrangements’ for the
Regional GCS, at least in England, basically entailed its closure.
Meanwhile, back in Whitehall, a memo from the Private Secretary of
Environment Minister Christopher Chope pointed out that an early
announcement not to privatise GCS could avoid industrial trouble,
which was considered more likely here than in other parts of TCS.
This confirmation duly arrived on 28 July 1988, when Chope
announced to the House of Commons the package of Crown Suppliers
activities to be privatised, but that this would not include GCS.
With the privatisation question finally settled, attention turned to
where GCS could now find a home, but here the options considered,
together with the general uncertainty, only served to place the
survival of the Service in even more doubt.
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‘Take Courage’ for a New Home
In December 1986 GCS moved to its current site at Ponton Road in Nine
Elms. The whole site was originally redundant railway marshalling yards
that had been partly occupied by the former Courage brewery distribution
warehouse, and GCS took over this lease (owned by the BBC Pension
Fund). Nevertheless, the GCS headquarters became known as ‘the Courage
Building’ in order to distinguish it from the purpose-built, but now
separate, Transport Crown Suppliers workshop next door.
A DoE memo of 1985 stressed that relocating GCS could only make the
business more attractive in the event of any privatisation venture taking
place, which suggests that this was one of the key motivations for the move.
However, in the event the whole situation at the site was considerably
complicated by the decision to privatise the GCS parent group the Crown
Suppliers, but to keep GCS itself in the public sector.
Significantly, a Metropolitan Police letter to the Crown Suppliers of
1988 stated that the police assumed they would have the TCS Workshop if
they took over GCS. In practice, however, TCS decided that they would keep
their present workshop, and let go the ‘Courage’ GCS workshop. In turn, this
meant that the GCS workshops were now required to become self-contained.
In order to achieve this aim, in 1989 the PSA confirmed that work would
begin shortly to replace the existing three ‘fast turn-round’ bays with six bays
capable of providing full service facilities for all GCS vehicles.
A further complication was the intention in the late 1980s to privatise
IDS, and so it was decided that GCS would have exclusive use of ‘the
Courage Building’ for security reasons. However, these IDS plans failed in
1990 when the management buy-out team, who had submitted the only
acceptable bid, withdrew from the competition.
Pool driver Irene Maykels was the staff representative for Health and
Safety, and remembers that there was a lot of union opposition to the Ponton
Road move. She was asked by management if she would help in organising
the staff facilities at the new headquarters, and she agreed, on condition it
was recognised that she was doing it for all the staff, and was not taking
sides. Consequently, she was able to ensure that the rest rooms were decorated
and had all the necessary fittings, and that there were separate rest rooms for
men and women. She also discovered that the heating was turned off each
night at 8 pm, and saw to it that it remained on for the benefit of drivers who
had to wait until the early hours to pick up Ministers.
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GCS SURVIVES!
Given the decision to privatise the Crown Suppliers, a decision had to
be made about the future of GCS. As so often throughout its history,
however, there was clearly considerable uncertainty within Whitehall
about what to actually do with GCS, and it has to be said that there
was not exactly a queue to acquire it. This lack of interest was made
clear in a 1988 DoE memo that emphasised the final destination of
GCS was not yet settled. There was a slight hint of desperation in the
memo when it concluded: ‘We are seeing if any Departments want to
take it on, but none has so far shown an inclination to do so.’
The moment of truth arrived in December 1988, with a memo
from the Home Office Procurement Unit that weighed up the various
options available for the future destination of the London GCS. The
options were listed as:
(a) The Cabinet Office
(b) The Home Office
(c) The Metropolitan Police Office
(d) The Property Services Agency – as an interim measure.
Perhaps surprisingly, but fortunately for GCS, the option suggested
by Dewi Jones in 1987, of each Department taking responsible for its
own transport, was not amongst the options considered. Never-
theless, at least two of the options proposed, of takeovers by either the
Home Office Supply and Transport Branch or the Metropolitan
Police, threatened the basic existence of the GCS. The fate of the
Service therefore was now truly in the balance. However, the memo
quickly dismissed option (a) by stating that the Cabinet Office did
not want to take responsibility for GCS (ironically, in the 1990s GCS
would come under Cabinet Office control). With regard to the Home
Office, it was concluded that there was no obvious relationship
between the Home Office Supply and Transport Branch and GCS.
Crucially, in the case of the Metropolitan Police, which as we have
seen had been pressing for some time to take over at least some GCS
responsibilities, the memo pointed out that the Metropolitan Police
was not a government Department and did not have resident
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Ministers. Consequently, GCS would be separated from its customers.
In addition, it was argued that any police takeover would be likely to
raise objections from the London local authorities. That left the
fourth option of GCS remaining with the PSA, and the memo recom-
mended this course of action, on the grounds that GCS provided a
‘common service’ for central government.
The evaluation of the options again illustrated the difficulties for
government in classifying exactly what GCS does. In the end, there
was something of a ‘least worst’ feel about the recommendation to
keep GCS with the PSA, on the basis that none of the other options
considered was really appropriate. At least the likelihood of GCS
staying with the PSA, even as an interim measure until something
more appropriate could be found, offered genuine hopes that GCS
would survive intact. The problem now was to find exactly where
within the PSA the GCS should be placed, and even here the process
was by no means simple.
After all the uncertainty, there was clearly pressure to settle
matters before the end of 1988, and on 22 December a meeting was
held to discuss the transfer of GCS and IDS from the Crown Suppliers
to the PSA Directorate of Home and Regional Services (DHRS),
involving 215 GCS staff. Things had clearly been happening at a very
fast pace, and this was illustrated at the meeting when Mr Kent of
DHRS Management complained that, for reasons unknown to his
section of the PSA, the original intention to transfer the London GCS
to Staff Management General Services had fallen through, and he had
been advised only a week previously that his Division was to assume
responsibility for GCS. It was explained to Kent that Staff Manage-
ment General Services was ultimately rejected because it provided
domestic services for only PSA itself, and not for other Departments.
It was also mentioned at the meeting that the PSA had been favoured
over the Metropolitan Police as the destination for GCS.
The narrowness of the verdict was illustrated on the day after this
meeting that settled the fate of GCS, when the Crown Suppliers
received a letter from the Metropolitan Police Receiver. The letter
made it clear that the police had by no means given up hope of taking
over GCS, and were still pressing for a decision in their favour. In
order to sweeten the pill, the letter emphasised that the police would
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be happy to take on all the GCS drivers. If the decision had gone this
way, however, it would surely have spelt the end for GCS in any
recognisable form.
In any case, the die had already been cast, and on 1 April 1989 the
PSA Directorate of Home and Regional Services formally took
responsibility for GCS. This did indeed prove to be an interimmeasure,
and as we will see, in the 1990s, the GCS would find itself swept up in
a new Whitehall revolution for creating arm’s-length Executive
Agencies. Nevertheless, GCS had survived the truly momentous events
and changes of the 1980s, and lived to fight another day, although this
was to be at the expense of losing its regional services.
The ‘Outer Cabinet’ Strikes Again
As in the decades before and since, the 1980s was no exception to the ‘Outer
Cabinet’ of GCS drivers knowing more about the outcomes of reshuffles
than many of the Ministers themselves. This was well illustrated in a
newspaper report of July 1989 that speculated on an imminent Thatcher
reshuffle from the perspective of the drivers. Arts Minister Richard Luce
(who as we saw in 1987 left open the possibility of GCS privatisation!)
was particularly grateful for some welcome reassurance here:
‘I was being driven along Whitehall when, apropos of nothing, my
chauffeur said over his shoulder, “By the way, Minister, I thought you might
like to know that there’s a reshuffle coming up.” I was a bit shocked and
said, “Good God, that’s terrible.” But my driver smiled reassuringly and
said, “Don’t worry, Minister, your job is safe.” He was right on both counts.’
On the other hand, the odds against Environment Secretary Nicholas
Ridley remaining in his post had lengthened to 17–2, and one driver was
quoted as saying that he had settled for much shorter odds only ten days
ago, but still expected a handsome return for his £40 investment. The
driver’s money was safe, as Ridley was moved to the Department of Trade
and Industry in the reshuffle.
Further GCS tips included the switch of Tom King to Defence Secretary,
but also the sacking of Paul Channon from Transport, and both of these
also came to pass. However, Welsh Office Minister Wyn Roberts explained
that he was excluded from the loop: ‘Although there is a great network of
this kind of information among all drivers, none of it reaches my ears
because my chap knows more about horses than reshuffles.’17
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THE DEMISE OF THE REGIONAL GCS
There was some irony in the fact that the GCS Regional Offices were
the one section of the operation that the Security Services considered
might be suitable for privatisation, but from the outset they were not
considered viable for any sort of sale. Instead, while the remainder of
GCS survived, it was quickly decided that the regional structure was
expendable. In fact, the Regional GCS was of only limited size, and
in 1988 consisted of a pool of twenty-four cars in Edinburgh, Cardiff
and Belfast, together with centres in England in Leeds, Newcastle
and Bristol. The situation was further complicated by GCS frequently
employing private contractors in the regions to complement their
own services, and this tended to compromise the case in favour of
maintaining a specific regional presence. Nevertheless, once it
became clear that their services were in jeopardy, the regions them-
selves were anxious to emphasise the specific advantages of main-
taining a GCS presence, and to point out occasions when this had
proved valuable. In particular, several DoE Regional Directors argued
strenuously in favour of retention.
For example, a letter of 12 November 1987 from the DoE
Northern Regional Office Director in Newcastle to the Controller of
the Crown Suppliers stressed the value of retaining the unique assets
of GCS drivers:
My concerns are centred around confidentiality, security and relia-
bility. Ministers and senior officials must feel that they have a
freedom to discuss confidential issues with us as they are driven
about. They cannot do this in a private hire car. The drivers know the
police, and are trained to drive under police escort. I shudder to think
what might have happened during the Prime Minister’s visit if we
had not had the GCS cars from here and from Leeds. On reliability,
we have one or two horror stories already this year on the use of
private hire services. One involved a Minister left in the lurch sans
car, sans red box! Not all Ministers would have been prepared to
laugh that off.
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A similar style of letter was written on 3 May 1988 from the DoE
Regional Director in Leeds to the Crown Suppliers Privatisation
Unit:
Ministers that live in the region tend to be fairly regular users of GCS
and are fairly regular in their habits. When Leon Brittan was Home
Secretary a GCS car was almost on permanent duty in and around
Ripon [part of his constituency] each weekend. When the Prime
Minister visits the North of England (including the North West), it
is the Regional GCS from this Region that provides the cars for her
party. On the one occasion that I was travelling with a Secretary of
State (Patrick Jenkin) and pickets made a determined effort to turn
over the car, it was reassuring to know that we were being driven by
a competent GCS driver. That occurred in this Region.
If Ministers are to be consulted, I would suggest that consultation
should extend beyond Mr Chope [the DoE Minister responsible for
GCS], who is not a typical user. He only uses the Regional GCS
occasionally. Other Ministers, including those in other Departments,
have an interest.
These pleas from the Regions failed to cut any ice with the DoE, and
in July 1988 a letter from an Establishment Officer to the trade union
side Secretary spelt out the fate for the English Regional offices in
Leeds, Newcastle and Bristol, where five drivers were employed. It was
made clear that the Regional operation was now viewed as financially
untenable, although the writer, no doubt sensitive to the decision at
that time not to privatise GCS as a whole, was also anxious to
emphasise that the situation with regard to London was very different:
The results [of a review of the Regional GCS] have shown that the
services in Leeds, Newcastle and Bristol are not cost-effective, and
cannot be made so. Because demand is uneven, frequent use is made
of private contractors to cover for peaks. Our analysis of the position
shows that the private sector can provide a comparable service more
cost-effectively than the Regional GCS (this is not, however, the case
in London, where, because of the larger size and broader customer
base, the GCS is more effective than the private sector).
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We have therefore decided to accept applications for voluntary
redundancy we have received from the drivers, and to close down the
Regional GCS in Leeds, Newcastle and Bristol . . .We shall establish
contracts with approved private sector contractors to provide a
chauffeur-driven car service that Departments can use if they so wish.
The decision to close the Regional operation was made somewhat
easier by the fact that two of the five drivers involved were on long
term sick leave, while the other two drivers in Leeds and Newcastle
themselves set up as private sector contractors. An internal Crown
Suppliers memo of June 1988 expressed some concern that the fact
these GCS drivers were setting up as private contractors might be seen
by rival companies as unfair competition and patronage. Nevertheless,
it was considered that the solution had the virtue of satisfying the
Regional Directors, and so would allow the Crown Suppliers to
dispose of the Regional GCS in the North and North East.
The situation with regard to Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast was
somewhat more complicated because of the need to consult with the
Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland Offices, while in the case of
the latter there were also obvious security implications. The basic
plan was to hand over these operations to the respective national
offices, and by December 1988 (at the meeting that settled the
destination of GCS within the PSA) it was possible to announce the
outcomes.
In Scotland, the situation was complicated by the fact that the
Scottish Office already drove its own Ministers, and so were only
minority users of the Edinburgh GCS. As it had been decided that
the eight Edinburgh cars were unlikely to be attractive to any
purchaser, the Environment Secretary would remain in control (a
1988 GCS memo had emphasised that the Edinburgh cars were
under-utilised and losing money, and that there was a need to use
more outside contractors).
In Wales, the Secretary of State Peter Walker had agreed that the
Welsh Office should take over the two Cardiff cars, of which they
were virtually the exclusive users.
Similarly, Northern Ireland Secretary Tom King had agreed that
his Office should take over the six Belfast cars, for security reasons.
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There had also clearly been a rethink about the situation in Bristol
since earlier in the year, and here, unlike the situation in the north of
England, it had now been decided that the PSA South West should
take over the single car and driver.
At the meeting where these changes were announced, it was
considered that it might be better not to announce the Edinburgh,
Cardiff and Belfast changes, as there might be some sensitivity in
drawing attention to the Northern Ireland service.
The decisions made in December 1988 brought to a climax the
tremendously turbulent Thatcher decade for GCS. It was reduced in
size, and clearly continued to face large-scale organisational and
financial problems, but at least it could enter the 1990s basically
intact and in a position to hope for a period of greater stability.
Dear Denis
Driver Denis Oliver remembers Margaret and Denis Thatcher as a devoted
couple, but that there could be some great banter between them. He recalls
one occasion when he was driving Mrs Thatcher to Chequers, the Prime
Minister’s country home. On the way there, they were due to drop off Denis
Thatcher, who was to make a speech at the annual dinner of
Buckinghamshire Rugby Referees’ Society:
‘Mrs Thatcher knew what this type of affair could be like, and so she kept
warning Denis that he must be careful, and not have too much to drink.
However, as soon as we pulled up outside the venue, the doors burst open, and
two men came staggering out, obviously the worse for wear. They immediately
spotted Denis, and gave him a cheery wave and greeting. Mrs Thatcher
sighed, and said “Oh dear, they’re drunk already.” I think she realised that
there wouldn’t be much point in lecturing her husband after that!’
On another occasion, the official car was stuck in heavy traffic, and time
was running short for the next appointment. It was clear that Margaret
Thatcher was getting impatient, and eventually she said to her husband
Denis: ‘All this traffic congestion nowadays is terrible.’ Denis Thatcher
replied: ‘The trouble is Margaret, you’ve made everyone too prosperous,
they’ve all got cars now.’ The Prime Minister clearly didn’t think much of
this remark, and in her most exasperated tone said: ‘That’s what I intended
to do Denis, but now can you tell me what we can do about this awful
congestion?’
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It could be said that this story sums up well the transport policy
dilemmas of successive governments over the past fifty years!
THE BRITISH LEYLAND DILEMMA
The long-standing relationship between GCS and the largest UK
vehicle group British Leyland (BL) illustrated particularly well the
‘Buy British’ dilemmas for both the Service and successive govern-
ments. Given BL’s strategic position as an employer and manufacturer
(when Mrs Thatcher came to power in 1979, BL accounted for around
45 per cent of the vehicles produced in the UK), it was always
inevitable that there would be great political pressure on GCS from
MPs with a constituency interest for the Service to purchase these
vehicles. However, although BL vehicles (particularly Rovers,
Jaguars, Austin Princesses and Austin Montegos) formed the back-
bone of the GCS fleet, they were not always the most reliable of
vehicles or necessarily the most appropriate for the requirements of
the Service.
The situation was still further complicated by the fact that in 1975
BL had been acquired by the government after the company fell into
deep financial trouble. This meant that government now literally had
a vested interest in BL’s recovery, and this was well illustrated in
October 1980, when GCS accepted an invitation from BL to take
twelve Metros on a week’s trial. The Metro was BL’s new small car
model, and carried many hopes on the part of both the company and
Ministers. It was therefore ideal publicity for BL when Mrs Thatcher
arrived to open the Motor Show at the wheel of a Metro, and was able
to reveal that she had already driven the model in Downing Street:
‘While they were parked outside Number 10 I asked the chauffeur to
move over and I had a quick drive.’ The Prime Minister was even able
to work in a reference to her recent ‘the lady’s not for turning’ party
conference speech when she declared: ‘I managed to do it without any
U-turns . . . these only get you back to where you started.’ GCS
drivers were also quoted with highly favourable impressions of the
Metro. For example, Peter Smithson, driver for Chancellor of the
Exchequer Sir Geoffrey Howe, revealed that: ‘Sir Geoffrey had a go
and he said “We’ve got a winner here.” ’18
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The Metro was one of the more successful BL models, although it
was too small to ever be considered for regular GCS use. The wider
dilemma for the government was that Ministers, such as Mrs
Thatcher, who were firmly wedded to free market principles, had too
much invested politically and financially in BL to see the company
slide into oblivion. This delicate situation was particularly well illu-
strated in the case of BL’s 1981 Corporate Plan, with BL seeking the
huge sum of a further £990 million of public funding as the price to
be paid for maintaining the volume car business. The Prime Minister
had hoped to find a middle way between total closure and fully
funding the Corporate Plan, but ultimately was compelled to bow to
political imperatives: ‘We agreed to accept BL’s Corporate Plan,
involving the division of the company into four more or less
independent businesses. We settled the contingencies which would
lead to the plan being abandoned. We set out the objectives for
further collaboration with other companies. And – most painfully –
we provided £990 million.’19
For the moment, all the government could do was to continue to
support BL and hope that, eventually, a recovery would allow the
company to join the list of privatisations. Meanwhile, the GCS
loyalty to BL did have its critics, even, perhaps surprisingly, amongst
the trade unions. For example, in its evidence to the 1985 Barrow
Report, the Transport and General Workers Union argued: ‘The
GCS choice is restricted to BL principally for political reasons, but
this tends to inflate costs due to their unfortunate record of
mechanical unreliability. The vehicles are also kept out of service too
long for minor repairs.’
Nevertheless, in time the fortunes of BL did improve, and in 1988
the company was sold to British Aerospace and became the Rover
Group. By the end of the decade, the company continued to dominate
GCS vehicle purchases. It was significant, however, that, for the first
time, environmental criteria were now beginning to influence the
choice of vehicles. Consequently, a PSA memo of September 1989
listed the current allocation of vehicles between Ministers:
(a) THE PRIME MINISTER:
Daimler Sovereigns
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(b) CABINET MINISTERS AT HIGH RISK:
Jaguars
(c) CABINET MINISTERS UNDER NO SPECIFIC THREAT:
Rover 820 series
(d) OTHER MINISTERS AND SENIOR OFFICIALS:
Austin Montegos, Ford Sierras, and Vauxhall Cavaliers.
It was explained that GCS continued to operate only British-built
and badged cars. However, the introduction of the Sierras and
Cavaliers (owned by US companies) had been authorised by the
Secretary of State for the Environment in order to promote the
government’s policy of lead-free fuel. Lead in petrol had become a hot
political issue at that time, particularly due to its alleged adverse
effects on the learning capabilities of children, and there was great
pressure on the motor industry to produce vehicles that did not
require this fuel ingredient. Significantly, the memo also pointed out
that having a wider range of vehicles and colours was also a good
security safeguard.
In the years that followed, environmental criteria would become
much more to the forefront in GCS vehicle purchasing policy. At the
same time, the gradual decline of the Rover Group, combined with
the inexorable trend towards the globalisation of car manufacture,
inevitably led GCS away from a ‘Buy British’ policy, towards one of
purchasing the vehicles that best suit its purposes.
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CHAPTER 6
In SAFE Hands?
1990–97
TAKING THE NEXT STEPS
After the intense dramas and crises of the Thatcher era, it wasperhaps inevitable that GCS, and indeed Whitehall and
Westminster as a whole, would be anticipating a somewhat quieter
life in the 1990s. At least superficially they achieved it in the years
presided over by Mrs Thatcher’s successor as Prime Minister, John
Major. He served as Prime Minister from 1990 to 1997, which
included an unexpected general election victory in 1992, but his
political style was the exact opposite of his predecessor. Where Mrs
Thatcher led unambiguously from the front, accompanied by her
swinging handbag, Major had a much quieter and softer style, and
placed far greater reliance on consensus and teamwork.
Similarly, for GCS, after apparently living on the brink of
privatisation, and then even extinction, for much of the 1980s, the
early 1990s offered at least a brief respite of consolidation.
However, just as John Major’s public image as a grey personality
and cautious politician could be deceptive, and hide an at times
quite zealous public service reformer, so, just below the surface,
GCS continued to exist in a climate of considerable uncertainty,
with many of its organisational and financial problems continuing
to be unresolved. In the event, in 1993 GCS was carried forward by
one of Whitehall’s most radical reforms that had begun in the
Thatcher era, but was continued with great enthusiasm by the
Major administration. Consequently, in that year GCS became one
part of the new Security Facilities Executive (SAFE), one of the so-
called Next Steps Executive Agencies.
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The term ‘Next Steps’ was coined by the Efficiency Unit in its
1988 Report, Improving Management in Government: The Next Steps. It
was therefore intended to indicate where reforms should now be
taken after the years of detailed scrutiny reports by ‘Rayner’s
Raiders’ and the innovations of the Financial Management Initiative.
The solution that the Efficiency Unit came up with was the truly
radical proposal for a basic separation within government Depart-
ments between the making of policy and its implementation. In
essence, it was argued that it was not practical to expect Ministers
or senior civil servants to actually manage their Departments, and
that consequently there should be a fundamental split between a
small corps of senior officials who would advise Ministers and
sponsor policies and services, and a range of Agencies where staff
would actually deliver the services. In order to achieve this arm’s-
length relationship between Department and Agency, each Next
Steps Agency would be headed by a Chief Executive with real power
to determine pay and recruitment policies, as well as developing
their own style of management. In turn, the Chief Executive’s
performance would be assessed through the achievement of agreed
organisational and financial targets.
In reality, of course, it can prove far from straightforward to
genuinely separate policy making from implementation, and there
can be many grey areas. For example, an Agency Chief Executive will
almost inevitably at times take quite basic policy decisions in order
to do the job and hit the targets. Nevertheless, the Next Steps
Agencies have given much greater autonomy and responsibility to a
huge range of government activities. Given the long-standing
difficulties for GCS in finding an appropriate home, therefore, the
Agency approach offered real hope of an identity that would not only
give greater independence and a proper recognition of its distinctive
place in the Whitehall world, but would also allow it to find its own
destiny and explore areas of potential growth.
Unfortunately for GCS, however, as a Next Steps agency SAFE was
not really the ideal home. Having been identified for over forty-five
years as part of the government supply chain, as the title of SAFE
implied, GCS was now reclassified as principally a security organi-
sation. The specific aim of SAFE, therefore, was to be a first choice
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supplier of quality security related services which fully met the needs
of its customers, and offered good value for money. This meant that
GCS’ fellow organisations within SAFE included not only the
InterDespatch Service, but also London Custody Services and the
Special Services Group, both of which were explicitly security
organisations.
There is, of course, a very significant security element to the
services provided by GCS, but ultimately it is a great deal more than
that in terms of fleet management and its unique relationships with
its customers. Ironically, in the mid-1980s GCS had nearly lost its
most significant security responsibilities to the Metropolitan Police,
but by the early 1990s it appeared that the large number of security
crises over the previous twenty years had given a restricted perception
of what GCS actually did.
Consequently, as part of SAFE, GCS still really failed to find its
own identity. In fact, its financial position tended to deteriorate, and
by the mid-1990s it was making heavy losses, so that once again its
whole future appeared to be in doubt. Into this void stepped the
distinctive presence of the newly appointed Deputy Prime Minister
Michael Heseltine. As Environment Secretary in the early 1980s and
then 1990s, Heseltine had been the Minister responsible for GCS,
but his 1995 appointment as official Deputy to John Major based
him in the Cabinet Office, and gave him considerable powers and
responsibilities, including that for the Next Steps Agencies such as
SAFE.
With his characteristic enthusiasm for reforming the machinery of
government, Heseltine once more raised the possibility of
privatising GCS. In the event, however, he discovered, like several
before him, that there was little enthusiasm amongst his fellow
Ministers for this course of action. Instead, in April 1997, and just
before the Conservatives left office after eighteen continuous years in
power, GCS and IDS were split from SAFE and combined to form
the Government Car and Despatch Agency. The new Agency did not
in itself solve the GCS financial crisis, but at least, after over half a
century in existence, the Service finally had the opportunity to deter-
mine its own destiny.
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Steven Norris and the Transport Case for GCS
One 1990s Minister who understood clearly the key importance of GCS
as a transport organisation in oiling the wheels of government was
Steven Norris. As a Transport Minister from 1992 to 1996, in his
autobiography Norris acknowledges the loyalty and discretion of his two
GCS drivers, John Underwood and John Hougham, and stresses that a
Minister’s relationship with his or her driver is as important as that with
any Whitehall official. He also emphasises that the phrase ‘ministerial
limo’ would cause a hollow laugh in his tiny Rover 400 issued to a
Junior Minister, particularly with three officials cramped into the rear!
Norris goes on to spell out perhaps the definitive case for the essential
value of GCS:
‘The Minister’s car is frequently targeted by the tabloids as a great
luxury, but the truth is the job could simply not be done without it.
The timetable is so tight, and the amount of paperwork each Minister
has to take home so great that, however much I would have enjoyed coming
in on my bicycle, the whole notion was simply impractical. A tight
programme of meetings, speeches, conferences, seminars and more meetings in
the Department, the Cabinet Office, Parliament, and every major venue in
the City, not to mention frequent trips out of London by rail and air, all
require precision, timing, and a minimum of delay.
‘I was actually unusual in being the first and probably only Minister to
decide to use the tube to avoid delay and sample the product at first hand.
On occasions it made real sense, but normally there simply wasn’t the time
to indulge in politically correct tokenism. And at the end of a seventeen-
hour day, a lift home was more of a necessity than a luxury.
‘In any event, in typically British fashion, the car disappeared on
Thursday evening, because Friday is traditionally a constituency day for
Ministers as it is for backbenchers. As it is only available for government
business, I would bid John a good weekend on Thursday evening and meet
him again on Monday morning.’1
TRANSITION AND CHANGE
Although the early 1990s was in part a period of transition for the
GCS, it was also a time of continued uncertainty and change. This
was primarily because Whitehall reforms such as Next Steps were
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working their way through the system, while the John Major govern-
ment itself injected some fresh ideas and policies.
As Peter Hennessy explains, although the Efficiency Unit
produced the Next Steps Report in 1988, it was never intended that
they would implement the plan once it had been approved by the
Cabinet. The idea was always to turn it over to foster parents, who
turned out to be the new Head of the Home Civil Service, Sir Robin
Butler, and the man he picked for the post, the Project Manager
recommended in the 1988 Report, Peter Kemp. It was Kemp who
provided the entrepreneurial drive and enthusiasm that allowed the
Executive Agency concept to take off, and ensured that it would
permeate Whitehall as a whole. The basic plan was that Departments
were required to review all their activities and consider five possi-
bilities: abolition; privatisation (the government’s preferred course);
contracting out the work; putting it into an Agency; or leaving it as
part of the departmental workload. Once an activity had been
identified as a candidate for Agency treatment it would pass through
a Project Liaison Group to the Project Executive made up of
representatives from Kemp’s Project Team, the Treasury, the
Efficiency Unit and the sponsoring Department itself. The charter for
each Agency was to be set out in a Framework Document.2
Kemp saw the Next Steps project as producing a new hybrid,
combining the best characteristics of both the public and private
sectors. However, from the perspective of SAFE and GCS it was
enormously significant that Kemp warned against the dangers of
‘badge engineering’, whereby blocks of work would be labelled as
‘Agencies’ just for the sake of it. In fact, in his first year in the job
(1988–89), Kemp scaled down the rate of creation of Agencies from
sixteen to eight.3 It has to be said that this focus on what consti-
tuted a legitimate Agency appeared to be lacking a few years later
in 1993, in the unusual mixture of organisations that made up
SAFE.
Next Steps was a programme that the Major government inherited
from Margaret Thatcher, although much of its great momentum took
place during his administration. Major succeeded Thatcher as Prime
Minister in November 1990, in the middle of a Parliament. In the
run-up to the general election of 1992 the opinion polls suggested
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that his tenure at Number Ten might be relatively brief, but against
expectations Major won an overall majority of twenty-one, and so was
able to make his own impact on the Whitehall machine.
Two of his own initiatives he had already set in motion were the
Citizens Charter and Market Testing. The Citizens Charter was
launched in 1991, and aimed to improve public services in order to
respond better to the needs and wishes of customers and users, and to
find more effective ways of organising and delivering public services.
In practical terms, this meant that many Agencies developed a range
of key targets relating to customer service.
Perhaps of deeper significance was the Market Testing concept
introduced in the 1991 White Paper Competing for Quality. This
identified competition as an effective means of improving quality and
value for money for the customer and taxpayer, and set out proposals
with the aim of promoting fair and open competition in the provision
of central government services throughout the public sector. This
meant that Departments and Agencies reviewed their activities to see
how value for money could be improved. Activities could be
abolished, privatised or contracted out, or awarded to an in-house
team following a competition.
Hennessy observes that, in one area of public service reform, Major
‘out-Thatchered’ Thatcher by shifting certain Civil Service activities
permanently from the public to the private sector. Here, he
emphasises particularly that in the first two operational years of
Market Testing (1992–94) some £1.8 billion of state activity was
subjected to the process, and 55 per cent of it eventually shifted to
the private sector.4 However, we will see that, in the case of GCS,
Market Testing and privatisation came up against the by now well
established arguments concerning security.
Nevertheless, Hennessy argues that the political storms which
enveloped the later years of Major’s period as Prime Minister have
distracted attention almost totally from Major the incremental consti-
tutional reformer – and continue to do so.5 The problems included
particularly the economic crises that followed Britain’s enforced
departure from the European Union’s Exchange Rate Mechanism in
1992, and the increasingly wide and tense differences on EU policy
within the Conservative Party itself.
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However, the period 1990–97 was to effectively carry GCS from a
small cog in a large departmental wheel, to being given the oppor-
tunity to prove itself as an Executive Agency in its own right.
A Major Hazard
Twelve months before he became Prime Minister, John Major found himself
literally stuck at the end of Downing Street. We saw earlier how Margaret
Thatcher greatly enjoyed getting out of her car in Downing Street to greet
the welcoming crowds when she first arrived at Number Ten as Prime
Minister in 1979. At the same time, she regretted that by the end of her
premiership, the needs of security no longer made such an event possible.
This was because, in December 1989, large security gates were constructed
– controversially – to control access.
When Chancellor of the Exchequer John Major was leaving Downing
Street after a Cabinet meeting, he found his GCS Rover grinding to a halt
in the wet cement that had been laid to hold the new gates. No amount of
manoeuvring could remove the vehicle, and Major was forced to switch cars
in order to leave for his next meeting. Meanwhile, a tractor was called to
haul out the Rover from the rapidly setting cement. Fortunately for John
Major, the stalled Rover proved not to be an omen for his own 1990
arrival at 10 Downing Street, by now complete with security gates.6
THE MAKING OF AN AGENCY
Although the 1989 transfer of GCS to the Property Services Agency
Directorate of Home and Regional Services marked the climax of a
long period when its identity and even existence was at real risk, it
did not in any way provide the Service with a more stable and certain
future. Instead, on 1 April 1990, just a year after joining Home and
Regional Services, GCS was on the move again. This time, it formed
part of Property Holdings, a new section of the DoE that absorbed a
range of miscellaneous functions that, like GCS, were required to stay
within central government. These formed the Directorate of Special
and Central Services (DSCS). Just another year later, however, on 1
April 1991, signs emerged that at least some sort of longer term plan
for GCS was being formulated when four assorted organisations,
including GCS, were brought together to form the Transport and
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Security Services Division (TSSD). In addition to GCS, the other
three organisations forming the new Division were the long-standing
GCS associate the InterDespatch Service, London Custody Services
(LCS), which provided security guards for government buildings, and
the Special Services Group (SSG), which offered a range of technical
security services. The new TSSD had a total of around 1,200 staff and
a 1991–92 turnover of £45 million. The Division was to be headed
by John King.
In forming TSSD, there were clearly thoughts that it might have
the makings of a Next Steps Agency, but in 1991 this was apparently
still seen as only a possibility. The continuing uncertainty was
reflected in a DoE memo of 20 March 1991 that announced the
launch of TSSD. The memo acknowledged that the Department was
not yet ready to come to any conclusions about Executive Agency
status for GCS and LCS, because it had only just been possible to
consider the organisational implications of the decisions to place IDS
and SSG within Property Holdings. The memo, however, mused that
there might be something to be said for creating one Executive
Agency covering all four units, but this was just one option.
Significantly, it was admitted that the miscellaneous components
within DCSS were not large enough to form individual Agencies, but
equally they were not sufficiently interrelated to form a discreet unit
of work (the problem of ‘badge engineering’ warned against by the
Head of Next Steps, Peter Kemp). Consequently, it was considered
that full Agency status was unlikely. On the other hand, it was argued
that Next Steps principles could be applied to those units that were
separately accountable and wholly concerned with service delivery,
and that this could offer the best way forward.
In this context, the memo was clearly keen to stress that, since
1989, there had been a recognition that GCS should be given more
freedom to stand on its own feet, and so it emerged as one of the
organisations where the Next Steps principles could apply.
Consequently, it was emphasised that GCS now operated with much
greater freedom, and that its 189 cars and 200 staff charged levels
intended to recover full costs – £4.2 million in 1989–90. GCS was
now responsible for determining its own charging rates, although
there was some concern about cross-subsidy within the various levels
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of service available to customers of the first call fleet, and between the
first call fleet and other services.
That the DoE was seeing GCS in Next Steps terms was also made
clear in the memo’s observation that it was possible to compare
charges with those levied by private car hire and taxi firms, and that
performance indicators were to be introduced in order to achieve this
and to measure the ratio of overheads to costs. Crucially, it was
concluded that GCS met the government criteria for Next Steps to a
reasonable extent, although one cautionary note was sounded in that
the Service did make policy decisions on behalf of government
(possibly referring here to such matters as vehicle investment), and so
could be unsuitable under the Cabinet Office guidelines on the
separation between policy making and implementation.
If the 1991 memo was reluctant to commit itself on Agency status
for TSSD, by the end of 1992 any doubts had apparently evaporated.
In December 1992, therefore, Environment Minister Tony Baldry
announced that TSSD was now indeed a candidate to become an
Executive Agency, some time between October 1993 and early 1994.
Baldry revealed that detailed negotiations on an Agency framework
document had been set in hand, and that the final shape of the
Agency would depend on the outcome of Market Testing and other
organisational and efficiency initiatives. For his part, John King, the
Head of TSSD, believed that ‘TSSD is a natural candidate for Agency
status because it offers a clear-cut and coherent set of services. We
now have a clear remit to forge a strong identity, and market what we
believe are top quality services.’7
Consequently, there was no doubt that TSSD was now well
advanced in the pipeline to become a Next Steps Agency. A key fact
here was that, by 1993, the arm’s-length Executive Agency concept
had taken off in a big way, and there was by now an inexorable process
for large areas of government activities to be treated in this way. So
much so that by the end of 1993 the number of Agencies totalled
ninety-two. Together with the thirty-one Executive Units of HM
Customs and Excise and the thirty-three Executive Offices of the
Inland Revenue, which were also working fully on Next Steps lines,
they now employed 60 per cent of the Civil Service. Taken in this
context, it was clear that Next Steps had moved rapidly from an
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experimental concept to standard procedure, and that TSSD was in
line to join the torrent of new Agencies. On the other hand, the
enthusiasm for the new concept had perhaps caused some of the
earlier warnings about ‘badge engineering’ to be laid to one side.
A Lonely Heath
We have seen in previous chapters how former Prime Minister Edward
Heath somehow never appeared to be far from controversy on matters
concerning his GCS car, and the trend continued in early 1990 when
he intended to travel to the Savoy Hotel in London for a lunch to celebrate
his fortieth anniversary as an MP.
Vince Dennis, the former PM’s driver for the previous three years,
was suddenly transferred to other duties that morning, leaving Heath
to complain: ‘Why does this always have to happen to me?’ Eventually,
another GCS driver was sent to rescue Heath and take him to the Savoy.
For his part, Vince Dennis stressed that he had been upset not to take
Mr Heath to his big do, but he had decided to finish being his driver
because he (Dennis) wanted to spend more time with his own family:
‘Because Mr Heath is single he spends a lot of time on the road.’
As we saw in the case of Edward Heath’s early experiences with his
ex-Prime Minister’s GCS car, this was by no means the first time that
concern had been expressed about his extensive use of the vehicle!
SOME COST CONTROL OBSTACLES
As GCS moved towards Agency status as part of TSSD, so there was
clearly concern within the organisation that every effort should be
made to control costs and improve efficiency. One individual user
clearly targeted for these economies was Lord Tonypandy, who as
George Thomas had been Speaker of the House of Commons from
1976 to 1983. Consequently, a GCS memo of April 1993 to the DoE
explained that in March 1989, Environment Minister Christopher
Chope had agreed that GCS should, exceptionally, provide Lord
Tonypandy with the occasional use of a pool car. The memo left no
doubt, however, that this arrangement had by now exploited the
goodwill of the Service:
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The expectation was that this would be a short term arrangement,
but Lord Tonypandy continues to use GCS and the current cost is
£6,000 per annum. In the past, we have unsuccessfully tried to get
the House of Lords Fees Office and the Speaker’s Office to meet the
cost. We have also approached the Lord President’s Office for advice
but have got nowhere. GCS cannot afford to continue to subsidise
Lord Tonypandy. He is the only person who gets free service from
GCS.
In the event, these pleas appeared to fall on deaf ears. At other times,
GCS found that questions of cost took second place to matters of
security. This was evident in the case of Lord Howe, who as Sir
Geoffrey Howe had served as both Chancellor of the Exchequer and
Foreign Secretary in the 1980s governments of Margaret Thatcher.
By the early 1990s he was no longer a Minister, but continued to be
given a GCS vehicle on security grounds. Lord Howe himself had
made it clear that he wanted to pay when the vehicle was used for
private purposes, but a memo to GCS from the Home Office Central
Unit (which had the responsibility for security matters) made it clear
that this was not a course of action that would be officially
encouraged:
The Home Office Central Unit and his police protection officers
would encourage him to use the GCS car as much as possible while
the terrorist threat against him warrants it. He is obviously more
secure inside the official car with its trained driver and radio com-
munications than he would be in his own car or on public
transport.
Therefore to charge Lord Howe for private use of an official car
might be counter-productive in that at times he could be dissuaded
from using it. Moreover, the Cabinet Office, the GCS and the Home
Office Central Unit cannot recall a non-ministerial protected
principal paying for the use of an official car, so we would be setting
a precedent if we asked Lord Howe to pay.
The examples of Lords Howe and Tonypandy illustrate that, at times,
GCS can be powerless to control costs when wider security and
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political considerations receive precedence. In fact, Lord Howe relin-
quished his GCS car only in 2006, amidst some public controversy
about his continued use of an official vehicle.
Nevertheless, in the early 1990s GCS was making a concerted
attempt to improve its efficiency. This was illustrated in a GCS memo
of May 1993 that explained how a report in March 1992 by
consultants Coopers and Lybrand had identified potential operational
savings of £616,000 per annum. Of these, savings of £324,000 per
annum had already been realised, and the remainder would be
delivered in accordance with the Coopers and Lybrand programme by
April 1994.
In addition, as GCS and IDS were now both within TSSD, and
occupied the Ponton Road site together, the memo explained that
integration of the businesses included the appointment of a business
manager to run both operations; a combined accounts section and
information systems; and that the GCS workshop facility on site now
supplied and maintained all IDS vehicles.
PRIVATISATION HINTS
AND THE CREATION OF SAFE
Even as GCS was moving towards Agency status as part of TSSD, and
despite the clear rejection of privatisation for the Service in the
1980s, there continued to be hints that a sale of GCS, or at least of
parts of it, had still not been entirely excluded from the policy agenda
as an alternative to Agency status. In particular, press reports in
March and April 1993 suggested that the Trade and Industry
Department, headed by President of the Board of Trade, Michael
Heseltine, had put forward a plan whereby private contractors would
provide Ministers’ cars. Allocated cars for Ministers would be abo-
lished, apart from those using protected vehicles, and would be
replaced by a fleet of pool cars. It was reported, however, that the plan
had been rejected after Cabinet Ministers realised that they would
lose their Rover Sterlings, and also that a car could not be guaranteed
when they needed it. In addition, Cabinet Secretary Sir Robin Butler
was said to be worried about losing the team of tried and trusted GCS
drivers.8
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Concern was also expressed a few months later, in September 1993,
at proposals (eventually rejected) to privatise the financial manage-
ment of GCS/IDS. This was as a result of the Market Testing program-
me. Trade unions were worried that handing these responsibilities to
the private sector could breach the vital and long-cherished security by
revealing personal details of drivers and vehicles.9
Despite these distractions, the Security Facilities Executive (SAFE)
was officially launched at a ceremony held at the Queen Elizabeth II
Conference Centre on 15 October 1993. The four organisations put
together in TSSD (GCS, IDS, LCS and SSG) were now joined by
Security Furniture Services, a supplier of approved security furniture
to the public sector. At the launch ceremony, Environment Minister
Baroness Denton handed over the Agency’s Framework Document to
John King, now the Chief Executive of the new Agency. The Minister
wished the agency a most successful future, and stressed its emphasis
when she explained: ‘Its new name signifies the important role that
it plays in providing security for government.’10
Princess Diana and the Bottomley Effect
GCS drivers are well known for their self-effacement and general reluctance
to court publicity, and this modesty caught even Princess Diana unawares
when she visited the Department of Health in 1992.
The Health Secretary, Virginia Bottomley, was keen for the Princess
to meet the drivers who looked after the various Health Ministers, but
the then Princess of Wales was somewhat confused when the drivers all
introduced themselves according to the names of the Ministers they drove.
The introductions thus went as: ‘Hello, I’m Virginia Bottomley’, and
‘I’m Brian Mawhinney’, and ‘I’m Baroness Cumberlege’.11
Virginia Bottomley and her husband Peter are one of the very few
examples of a husband and wife team serving simultaneously as government
Ministers. This came to an end in 1990 when Peter Bottomley left the
government. In a nice touch, he wrote a letter to all GCS drivers thanking
them for their help during his time as a Minister. The note concluded with
a personal plea: ‘Do continue to care for the Minister of Health – she
matters to me.’
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SAFE LIMITATIONS FOR GCS
SAFE was launched as an Agency in October 1993, undoubtedly with
high hopes and good intentions. For example, in preparing for
Agency status a number of service improvements had taken place,
particularly in response to the objectives of the Citizens’ Charter.
These measures included (as we have seen already in the case of GCS)
major cost savings intended to result in nil or minimal 1993–94 price
increases for most services; Supply and Service Agreements estab-
lished with most key customers; an extended programme of customer
visits; and regular customer satisfaction surveys conducted and
feedback provided.12
The objective with all the various organisations making up SAFE
was clearly to maintain and strengthen the customer base while
keeping a tight control on costs. From an early stage, however, it
became clear that, for both GCS and IDS, whose fates were by now
closely interlinked on the Ponton Road site, long-standing and quite
deep-rooted organisational and financial problems would not be
overcome easily.
A major warning of what lay ahead came with the Market Testing
of IDS services in 1993–94. The comparisons with the private sector
were highly unfavourable for IDS, and placed the whole future of the
organisation in doubt. Consequently, Jerry Doyle, who had taken over
as Fleet manager of GCS in 1993, suddenly found himself thrust
headlong into a first-degree crisis:
IDS had done extremely badly in Market Testing, and was on the
verge of going under. I was then given just six months to save it, and
fortunately was able to bring things round. However, by the mid-
1990s in many respects the problems at GCS were just as serious, and
so I was involved in performing a similar task for the Car Service as
I had for IDS.
In particular, Doyle found that communications within the organi-
sations at Ponton Road left much to be desired:
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There was very poor communications between accounts and opera-
tions, and this obviously had extremely serious implications for the
efficiency of the whole organisation. The chief problem was that
accounts used one information technology system, and operations
another. I consulted all sides, and then produced an integrated
bespoke system we called, quite appropriately, Phoenix. Fortunately,
this has worked well ever since, and in fact the system has been
adopted by the Scottish Office.
As part of an Executive Agency, GCS was now more publicly identi-
fiable as an organisation in its own right than previously, but this in
itself did not offer any magic solutions to its problems. In fact, as IDS
discovered with Market Testing, and GCS itself in the 1980s in the
case of scrutiny by ‘Rayner’s Raiders’, the modern trends towards
generally more detailed comparative examination of government
activities, associated with the setting of strict operational and
financial targets, could suddenly leave apparently stable organisations
in an exposed and vulnerable state. There was of course no doubting,
as ever, the high quality personal service provided by GCS to its
customers, but as the 1990s progressed it became clear that the
organisation could not progress, or even survive, unless a major
transformation took place in its vision for future growth, combined
with a more methodically organised approach. For all its good
intentions it appeared that SAFE, with its peculiar mixture of organi-
sations and focus on security, was not the ideal vehicle to turn things
around for GCS. This view is confirmed by David Turner, who was a
member of the Advisory Board of SAFE (and would later become a
non-executive director of the Government Car and Despatch
Agency). Turner found that ‘SAFE was a peculiar organisation with
no real focus, and its reputation within Whitehall was not
particularly good.’
As GCS attempted to control costs, it was perhaps inevitable that
this would cause tensions with drivers, and matters came to a head in
February 1995. The drivers were looking for a 2.5 per cent increase
on their £13,000 salaries, but GCS was offering 1.96 per cent. The
drivers were also unhappy about what they believed were attempts by
GCS to restrict overtime. As we have seen, the drivers had
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traditionally worked long hours of overtime to supplement their basic
salaries, but this inevitably made it difficult to predict costs. On 2
February, 150 drivers stopped work at 6 pm and held an emergency
meeting to discuss grievances, although drivers serving the Prime
Minister and other members of the Cabinet with police protection
supported the action, but continued to work for security reasons. For
other Ministers, private chauffeurs had to step into the breach. One
GCS driver summarised their disquiet:
In forty years, GCS had only one half-day of action before now (in
1978), so we are very loyal and discreet. But we feel very strongly
about this. On average, a driver will do eighteen to twenty hours
overtime a week because the basic wage of £13,000 is so low, and
some of the Ministers have actually said we should stand up for our
rights.’13
The industrial action by the drivers reflected a poor trading position
for GCS in the mid-1990s, and by 1996 the situation was quite
serious. The depressing news was spelled out in February 1996 by the
new GCS Operations Manager, Norman Kemp, in an Operations and
Business Briefing issued to staff. The Briefing revealed that difficult
trading conditions were badly affecting GCS. This was blamed on a
combination of financial cutbacks in government departments and a
light programme of parliamentary business that had caused pool use,
and therefore revenue, to fall during the previous few months. It was
also pointed out that the recent death of former Prime Minister Lord
(Harold) Wilson had also removed an allocated vehicle.
The Briefing stressed that GCS was going all out to find new work,
but the overall financial position was very weak, as costs remained the
same but income was down. Consequently, a loss approaching
£100,000 for the financial year 1995–96 now seemed likely, growing
to £500,000 in 1996–97 unless action was taken immediately.
One problem highlighted was that although daytime pool work
had been particularly badly hit, business in the evening, when there
was often resistance by GCS drivers to working overtime, still
required some hiring-in of vehicles and drivers. In an attempt to
reduce these evening hirings, volunteers were now being sought
The History of the Government Car Service
188
amongst pool drivers to move to late attendance. It was perhaps a
reflection of changing attitudes in society that GCS drivers, who had
traditionally worked long hours overtime, should now be more
resistant to working unsocial hours.
The Briefing also pointed out the continuing necessity for GCS to
replace over forty vehicles every year of its 170-car fleet, and that this
investment needed to be maintained in order to uphold the quality of
the Service. For example, in the medium saloon car range, the new
Vauxhall Vectra was particularly popular.
By the time of the March 1996 Briefing, the situation had if
anything deteriorated still further, due to more industrial relations
problems. In the Autumn of 1995 a working party comprising trade
union and management representatives was set up to examine the by
now outdated 1990 pay agreement and to recommend changes.
However, when formal negotiations were due to begin in February
1996, the trade union side had refused to meet management and no
new dates for meetings had been fixed. It was clear, therefore, that
considerable ill will continued to exist after the walkout of 1995.
The result of all these difficulties was that it had been decided to
write to all GCS drivers with details of a voluntary retirement/
severance scheme. One early outcome of this offer was that the May
Briefing announced that two Briefing Officers (who perform the
crucial function of taking orders for vehicles and scheduling them)
had left under the Voluntary Redundancy Scheme, with more
expected shortly. It was emphasised that the financial targets set by
SAFE and the Cabinet Office (which by now had taken over
responsibility for SAFE from the DoE) were tough, but it was hoped
that the measures being taken would prove sufficient.
BEGINNING AGAIN
Beyond the struggles within GCS and SAFE, a new broom was by
now sweeping through the Cabinet Office in the form of Deputy
Prime Minister Michael Heseltine. Complete with his trademark zeal
for reforming the machinery of government, in its difficult
circumstances it was unlikely that GCS would be left untouched, and
this certainly proved to be the case. Heseltine describes his Cabinet
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Office base as being home to a glorious confusion of responsibilities.
In a description of what he found at the Cabinet Office that seems
particularly apt for GCS and SAFE, he concluded: ‘It was a “bran tub”
– an accumulation of central government activities that did not fit
easily into any of the other departments and all incorporated into the
Office of Public Service (OPS) under the day-to-day supervision of a
Minister with the splendid title of Chancellor of the Duchy of
Lancaster.’14
Not surprisingly, Heseltine once again introduced his Manage-
ment Information System for Ministers (MINIS) that he had
developed at DoE in the early 1980s. He believed that MINIS was
particularly appropriate here so that, as he put it, he could establish
what was going on in the Cabinet Office’s rabbit warren of offices and
myriad Agencies. Significantly for GCS and SAFE, he was not
satisfied with what he found: ‘There was no evidence that Ministers
had ever subjected this miscellany of activities to critical scrutiny.
What were we doing these things for? Why did the public sector
need to provide services of this sort? Within a very short period of
time, we had a list of candidates for privatisation.’15
Heseltine makes it clear that he looked highly favourably on a
possible privatisation of GCS,16 but as we have seen there were many
political and security obstacles barring the way to this objective.
Nevertheless, one SAFE organisation that was privatised was London
Security Services, and in turn this brought into still sharper focus the
future structure and identity of SAFE. David Smith worked in the
Cabinet Office at this time, and was the person responsible for
overseeing SAFE, and basically acting as an intermediary between the
Department and the Agency (after his retirement from the Civil
Service in 2001, he was to become a non-executive director of the
Government Car and Despatch Agency). He confirms that Heseltine
was keen to privatise whatever was possible of his Cabinet Office
responsibilities, and successes here included Her Majesty’s Stationery
Office, the Chessington Computer Centre, the Occupational Health
Agency and the Recruitment and Assessment Services Agency. He
stopped short with GCS, however, and David Smith explains that
what could be described as a high motive and a low motive were at
work here:
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The high motive was that there were not really any private com-
panies suitable to take over GCS. This was in contrast to activities
such as HMSO, where there were certainly private companies dealing
in printing and publishing well able to operate it. The low motive
could be said to be that Ministers greatly valued their drivers, and
were loathe to see anything happen that might disrupt this. A third
factor was of course the security aspect.
As Heseltine described, the Minister in day-to-day charge of the OPS
was the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, at this time Roger
Freeman. Heseltine describes Freeman as highly competent in
administration and the very exemplar of a safe pair of hands, who
could be relied upon to throw himself into any challenge he faced.17
By October 1996 the new challenge for Freeman was to decide
exactly what to do with GCS and IDS. Consequently, on 7 October
he paid a visit to Ponton Road, and on 14 October sent a letter to
SAFE Chief Executive John King with some heartening news,
particularly given the severe problems GCS faced at that time: ‘I was
very impressed by the quality and importance to government of what
I saw on my visit to Ponton Road. I can assure you that, apart from
any essential changes associated with restructuring, it will be
business as usual for the foreseeable future.’
The Freeman letter cleared the air in terms of confirming the
continued existence of GCS and its retention in the public sector, but
its destination as an organisation remained undecided. This uncer-
tainty was reflected in a SAFE memo from John King on 31 October
in which he emphasised that the Treasury and the Home Office still
had to be consulted. Nevertheless, King revealed that the options
included a restructuring of SAFE or, more likely, two separate
Agencies.
The uncertainty was finally resolved in a memo from Roger
Freeman that announced, in the light of discussions at Ponton Road,
and of what he had seen there, that it had confirmed his view that two
organisations should succeed SAFE, with GCS/IDS splitting away to
form their own Agency. Freeman argued that he had decided GCS
and IDS should be established as a stand-alone Agency because he
believed this would enable both the Services to focus on service
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delivery in order to meet their customers’ needs in the most effective
manner. Although the wording is somewhat cryptic, it suggests that
Freeman had understood how uneasily GCS and IDS fitted into
SAFE.
Nevertheless, the degree to which the security preoccupation
continued to dominate thinking is indicated by the fact that, until
quite late in the day, the planned name for the new Agency was the
Security Transport Agency. Only in the final draft of the Framework
Document, shortly before the new agency began life on 1 April 1997,
was the more general and appropriate name adopted of the
Government Car and Despatch Agency (GCDA).
There was perhaps some irony in the fact that, just a month after
the birth of GCDA, the Conservatives were heavily defeated in the
May general election after eighteen years in office, and so it was left
to the New Labour government under Prime Minister Tony Blair to
oversee the new Agency’s progress. However, as part of the Cabinet
office ‘bran tub’, at least GCS, effectively for the first time in its
history, now had the opportunity to win prizes in its own right.
Blair Versus Howard – Part One
In 2005, Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair won a third successive
election victory, this time at the expense of Conservative Party Leader
Michael Howard. By a quirk of political fate, fourteen years earlier
the pair had an encounter involving a GCS car that somehow seemed
to foreshadow their later battle of wits, although on this earlier occasion
it could be said that the outcome was a score draw.
In July 1991 Michael Howard was Employment Secretary, and
Tony Blair his Labour shadow. On this occasion, the pair were invited
on the BBC Radio Four Today programme to debate Labour’s proposals
for a statutory minimum wage. Howard was left stranded at the studios
when his ministerial car broke down, and so Blair stepped into the breach
and gave his opposite number a lift to Conservative Central Office.
Unfortunately, on leaving the car Howard absent-mindedly walked off
with all Blair’s briefing papers, leaving the Employment Secretary with
more information on Labour’s proposals for a minimum wage than the
future Prime Minister!18
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DRIVEN BY THE ENVIRONMENT
The 1990s was the decade when the relevance of environmental
factors to transport issues really took off on the political agenda. In
particular, from the late 1980s, the politically potent concept of
sustainable development (defined at that time as development that
meets the needs of the present, without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs) began to have a real
impact. This new environmental awareness was particularly evident
in the area of the harmful effects of vehicle emissions, where
knowledge was increasing quickly about potentially deadly health
impacts. This concern could be heightened still more by particular
incidents. A particularly vivid example occurred in London in
December 1991, when for four days abnormally high concentrations
of nitrogen dioxide were recorded. There was strong evidence to
suggest that vehicle emissions were the dominant source of the
pollution, and the Department of Health reported that the death rate
in London rose by 10 per cent during those four days.
The quest for sustainable development therefore had particular
relevance in the policy area of vehicle emissions. We saw in the
previous chapter how the question of lead in petrol and the link to
learning problems in children became a live issue in the 1980s, but
in the 1990s these concerns with vehicle emissions became much
wider, with the substances involved linked to the increasing
incidence of respiratory diseases such as asthma, and a potentially
catastrophic warming of the earth’s atmosphere through the
production of so-called greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide.
These health and environment warnings had a major impact at the
level of the European Union. Consequently, from 1993 there was a
requirement that all new cars be fitted with three-way catalytic
converters which, once the exhaust reaches a high enough operating
temperature, eliminate 90 per cent of harmful nitrogen oxides,
carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons, as well as measures on ambient
(i.e. ‘in the atmosphere’) air quality management and assessment. In
addition, the EU nations signed, at the landmark Rio Earth Summit
in 1992, the Framework Convention on Climate Change, which
included a commitment to take measures aimed at returning
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emissions of carbon dioxide to 1990 levels by the year 2000. Later, at
the Kyoto climate change conference in 1997, the UK made a
binding target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 12.5 per cent
below 1990 levels by the period 2008 to 2012. The British govern-
ment had first set out its strategy for sustainable development in the
1990 White Paper, This Common Inheritance, but in 1994 the govern-
ment produced simultaneously four White Papers on the imple-
mentation of sustainable development itself; climate change;
biodiversity; and sustainable forestry.19
In this new climate of environmental awareness, it was clearly
important for a government flagship in the shape of GCS to set the
best example with its fleet of around 200 vehicles. This it did, being
particularly active in looking at alternatively fuelled vehicles. In
particular, from 1993 it trialled a number of vehicles able to run on
natural gas, including a specially converted Rover Sterling and a
Rover 827 on long term evaluation in an agreement with British Gas.
The engine of the Rover Sterling had been adapted to run on either
gas or petrol, with the gas going into a tank in the boot. It was found
that the gas car was quieter, could go longer without petrol changes
(because total fuel capacity is greater with the two tanks than with a
petrol only vehicle), and (at that time) had a much cleaner exhaust
than a petrol vehicle, with the only drawback being a 5 per cent drop
in performance. A wider concern, however, was that the tax on gas
was higher than that for petrol, making the two about even in
running costs, but hardly justifying the £1,200 engine conversion.
GCS therefore hoped that a tax reduction could make the gas car
more financially attractive.20
GCS was also active in a feasibility study of electric powered
vehicles, including an evaluation of Ford’s Ecostar all-electric
vehicle. In addition, it also trialled a refrigerant for air conditioning
units which did not contain CFC gases (that deplete the ozone layer),
while the Service also offered free exhaust emission tests to staff
working in the DoE and the Department of Transport.21 As the
1990s progressed, therefore, it became increasingly clear that
environmental concerns would in future play a much greater role in
GCS’ vehicle purchasing and operational policies. This occurred
particularly at the expense of earlier priorities to ‘Buy British’, a
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phenomenon accelerated by the long term decline of the Rover
Group. In any case, Rover passed out of British hands when it was
purchased by the German BMW Group in 1994.
A Drop of Dewar’s
In December 1995, government whip Michael Bates was waiting for
his GCS car to collect him at his Kennington home and take him to
Westminster. He found, however, that he had a long wait. This was
because, at the same time, Labour Chief Whip Donald Dewar, who lived
near to Bates, was also waiting for a BBC courtesy car to take him for an
interview at Television Centre in Shepherd’s Bush. When the car arrived,
Dewar got in and asked the driver to head for the Television Centre.
It was only on the way there that the GCS driver realised that he had
got the Kennington addresses confused, and had picked up the wrong
passenger. In the circumstances, the driver was content to take Dewar to his
BBC appointment, while Bates had to wait for a driver able to find his
address.22
GCS ALLOCATION AND USE DILEMMAS
Over the years, the so-called Prime Minister’s Rules that govern the
allocation and use of GCS cars for Ministers and officials have tended
to change in an incremental way. As we noted earlier, changes tend to
develop either from an official recognition of what is widely
happening in practice, or from the consideration of special cases. As
we saw in Chapter Three, the rules for allocating vehicles to Junior
Ministers were relaxed in the early 1970s, yet it was to be another
twenty years before the privilege was extended to all Ministers of this
type, although in reality this had already become the common
practice. Consequently, a 1992 review of the rules officially gave
Junior Ministers use of a first call car. The new arrangements were set
out in a Cabinet Office letter of 3 June 1993, and noted that the chief
features of the review were that Cabinet Ministers, Ministers of State,
Parliamentary Undersecretaries and ex-Prime Ministers would be
provided with first call cars from the GCS pool. In addition, First
Permanent Secretaries and certain designated Chief Executives would
also be provided with a first call car.
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The letter also set out the range of models that would be available
for each category of users, and this indicated that vehicles from the
Rover Group continued to dominate the list, together with UK
manufactured Fords and Vauxhalls. Consequently, Cabinet Ministers
and ex-Prime Ministers would be given the choice of a Rover Sterling,
Rover 827, or any other vehicle from the Rover 800 series. The less
exalted Ministers of State and Parliamentary Undersecretaries would
be given a choice of a Rover 416, a 2 litre Austin Montego, a 2 litre
Ford Mondeo, a 2 litre Vauxhall Cavalier, or the diesel equivalents.
First Permanent Secretaries and the Chief Executives would also be
given this latter choice. The only exceptions would be where Ministers
(such as Michael Heseltine) provided cars at their own personal
expense. The letter also announced that a review of the Prime
Minister’s Rules would take place every three years.
In fact, there was one contribution to the 1992 review that did
make a plea for a more fundamental reappraisal of the rules govern-
ing use of GCS cars. Perhaps not surprisingly, this came from the
office of Environment Secretary Michael Heseltine (the Department
responsible for GCS), who perhaps because he did not use a GCS car
felt more able to comment freely on these rules. As we have seen,
Heseltine was never one to shy away from challenging Whitehall
accepted wisdom, and a memo from his Private Secretary of 26
March 1992 in essence argued that the government was too sensitive
about public reaction to when and how a Minister used a GCS car.
Instead, it believed that a more open acceptance of reality would
remove several long-standing dilemmas. The memo therefore
questioned the basic thinking underlying the guidance governing
GCS car use:
The structural problems with the guidance are that it tries to avoid
the reality that Ministers regard ‘their car’ and ‘their driver’ as one of
the perks of the job. The public see it in that way too. I suppose the
arrangements are described in this artificial (i.e. impersonal) way to
avoid creating a tax liability. But the structure gives rise to the
unreality that the use of the car from home to office is supposed to
be dependent on working on official papers. And there is no pro-
vision for use in London in the evening where the Minister has been
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out on a purely social occasion. Yet the reality is cars are uniformly
used in these cases. It would be better for the rules to recognise this.
The memo went on argue that the rules would be improved if they
also were more sensitive to the interconnections between party and
official business:
The only area of practical difficulty concerns car use for party
political events. The rules provide for use of a car if the event occurs
between two official engagements. But they make no provision for
use of a car – typically first thing in the morning – to take the
Minister to the station or airport en route for a political engagement
where the air or rail ticket is being paid by the Party. It would be
reasonable to allow for this. At present, the practice differs between
Departments – and indeed offices. It is a source of friction.
The memo was perhaps intended to provoke thought rather than lead
directly to action, but it did set out clearly some of the dilemmas in
framing rules for GCS use, and offered an alternative perspective in
looking at the problem. Meanwhile, however, by the late 1990s, GCS
was more concerned with preserving its very existence, rather than
with reforming some of the anomalies of the Prime Minister’s Rules.
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CHAPTER 7
A Phoenix Rising
1997–2006
BEATING THE ODDS
In 2005, a large scale End-to-End Strategic Review of theperformance of the Government Car and Despatch Agency, since
its foundation in 1997, provided a graphic summary of the highly
precarious state in which the new Agency had commenced its life:
As part of SAFE, GCS and IDS had not received effective senior
management and direction. There were no overarching and cohesive
strategies in place to deliver effective services, and the management
information systems were very weak. Morale was very low, and trust
had broken down between the industrial workforce and Agency
management, leading to hostile and uncooperative trades union
relationships. The perception by key stakeholders was one of a run
down operation that would probably not survive in the long term.
It could be said that after fifty years of suffering from a lack of
identity, for GCS the chickens had come home to roost. It was clear
that to have any kind of viable future things had to change both
quickly and drastically, and in this context the creation of GCDA
arrived in the nick of time. The result was that, in its sixth decade,
GCS could at last shape its own destiny, working alongside IDS as a
free-standing Agency.
The 2005 Review makes it clear that this major organisational
change of the switch to GCDA in itself acted as a catalyst for
beneficial progress, and that the clear focus and accountability of
Agency status provided a sound basis on which to develop and
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manage the recovery plan. Consequently, the freedoms accorded to
the Chief Executive Nick Matheson and the management team meant
that new strategies could be put in place quickly, and managed
effectively, due to short spans of control and un-bureaucratic decision
making processes.
We saw in the previous chapter how the creation of the Phoenix
information system dramatically improved the link between admini-
stration and operations, but perhaps the culture shift that took place
within GCDA is best indicated through the development of the Short
Term Hire (STH) business, where GCS is in strong competition with
the private sector. The development of STH, basically a type of
chauffeur-driven saloon service for Whitehall, confirms the funda-
mental character of GCS as a transport organisation, and not just the
security body defined by SAFE. Consequently, STH revenues
increased from £750,000 in 2000, to around £2 million in 2005.
This meant that, although allocated cars remain the core business for
GCS, STH grew from under 6 per cent of total GCS income in 2000,
to around 11 per cent of total income by 2005. A further example of
the greater entrepreneurial attitude within GCS has been its success
in winning the contract to transport Crown Court judges in England
and Wales.
We saw in the previous chapter how, by the mid-1990s, GCS was
in severe financial trouble. It was found that one of the chief reasons
for these problems was that GCS prices were perceived as being too
high by many of its customers. This led to the innovative policy of
actually reducing prices in real terms. In the event, it was found that
the boost in demand as a result of these price cuts actually increased
revenue overall. Alongside these pricing policies, considerable
progress has also been made in rationalising pay systems for both
industrial and non-industrial staff. A key to these successful pay
negotiations was that the Chief Executive made it a high priority to
construct a more open and conciliatory relationship with the workf-
orce. As Nick Matheson puts it: ‘The vital thing is to unlock the
human potential that you have in the organisation. You have to ask,
“What can each individual bring to the table?” Then you can set
about making things operate as they should. This approach was
totally lacking under SAFE.’
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Since the turn of the century, therefore, GCS finances have been
placed on a stable basis, with the Service reporting surpluses each year
until the present time. Another major area of change over the past
decade is that the environmental agenda has now supplanted the ‘Buy
British’ lobby as the chief external and internal pressure on GCS
vehicle purchasing and operation policy. One major factor in this
process is that the long-standing relationship between GCS and
Rover came to an end with the demise of the latter company in 2005.
In reality, however, EU competition policy has for several years
precluded GCS from operating a ‘Buy British’ policy, with cars
purchased on the basis of fitness for purpose and cost.
On the other hand, the environmental debate has moved on rapidly
in recent years, although in some respects this has created problems
for GCS, as shifting priorities have caused targets to change in
character quite rapidly. For example, the chief environmental target
at the creation of GCDA was to improve average miles per gallon for
the GCS fleet, but in 1999 this was changed to emphasise use of
alternatively fuelled vehicles. In 2002 this was changed yet again, to
encompass government policy on climate change to reduce emissions
of carbon dioxide (the chief greenhouse gas). As part of its response,
GCS has again taken an entrepreneurial initiative in operating a
Green Car Service for short trips by civil servants. In addition,
Cabinet Ministers are now offered the option of using the
electric–petrol hybrid Toyota Prius. It could be said that the fact the
Prius is manufactured in Japan is less important for the credibility of
GCS policy than its strong environmental credentials.
In 2005, Roy Burke succeeded Nick Matheson as Chief Executive
of GCDA, and was instrumental in producing the first five-year
Corporate Plan for the Agency. A particular feature of this Plan, and
a reflection of the greater emphasis on the commercial approach as a
transport organisation, is a considerably strengthened marketing
capability. The new Chief Executive also separated for operational
purposes the component parts of GCS and IDS.
One outcome of GCDA forming a component part of the Cabinet
Office ‘bran tub’ set of responsibilities (as defined here by Michael
Heseltine), has been that over the past decade the Agency has largely
been left alone to find its own destiny. In some respects this true
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arm’s-length relationship has clearly been an advantage for the
Agency. At the same time, as the years progressed, there is perhaps
some irony in the fact that GCDA itself became concerned that its
affairs were being given insufficient attention amongst the Cabinet
Office’s unfocused responsibilities. Consequently, in 2005 the
Cabinet Office acknowledged the unsatisfactory state of affairs, and
the departmental home of GCS was shifted once more, when oper-
ational responsibility for GCDA passed to the Department for Trans-
port (DfT). This change remains controversial, although it could be
said that, by this time, it was GCDA itself that truly defined the
modern GCS.
Security Dilemmas Revive Echoes of the Past
Although the creation of the Government Car and Despatch Agency moved
GCS away from the central focus on security found in SAFE, events in the
twenty-first century have of course ensured that questions of safety remain a
major consideration. In particular, the 9/11 2001 terrorists attacks,
including those that destroyed the World Trade Centre in New York, and
the series of public transport suicide bomb attacks in London on 7 July
2005, that killed fifty-two people, have intensified the need for watchful
protection. Ironically, two measures taken in the light of the 9/11 attacks,
involving former Prime Minister Tony Blair and his wife Cherie, provide
strong echoes of GCS events in earlier decades.
Firstly, in 2003, responsibility for driving the Prime Minister was
passed to the Metropolitan Police on security grounds. GCS has driven every
Prime Minister since the war, and GCDA Chief Executive Roy Burke is
anxious for the Agency to regain this responsibility. He acknowledges,
however, that GCS needs to win the respect of Downing Street, and that
this may have gradually eroded over the years:
‘Although GCS has a fantastic history, it was, and to some extent still
is, quite reactive, and can even at times be a bit arrogant. Downing Street
has told us that we are not quite as efficient as we think we are, and that
the service we provide can leave something to be desired at times. We have to
address these problems, and improve customer service. There also needs to be
a better career structure for GCS drivers, with a clear pattern that
culminates in driving the Prime Minister. This should mean particularly
that advanced driving courses for security purposes are accredited and
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overseen by professionals outside the Agency, instead of being approved in-
house as at present. Overall, we need to put in place new processes so that
Downing Street will say: “Yes, they are the best, we can use them now.” ’
These concerns about GCS driver training, of course, have powerful
echoes of the Douglas Hurd–Kenneth Baker exchange in 1986, and in this
context Roy Burke emphasises that GCS has some catching up to do,
compared with police training and qualifications.
Nevertheless, GCS does continue to have a number of Downing Street
allocations, including a relatively recent one for former Prime Minister’s
wife Cherie Blair. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, Cherie Blair became
the first Prime Minister’s spouse to be given a car and driver for her
personal use. Although this car was awarded for security reasons, and
caused some public controversy on the grounds of its expense, it could be
argued that historically it represented a belated acknowledgment of the
essential official role played by the spouse of a Prime Minister.
In this context, it could be seen as something of a natural progression
from the events that originated in 1974, when it took the desperate pleas of
the Lord Chancellor’s wife to obtain the breakthrough of a Minister’s spouse
being allowed to use a car alone for official purposes. Given the reality of
events altering circumstances, particularly where security matters are
concerned, there are also echoes of Edward Heath’s experiences as a former
Prime Minister in 1975. On this earlier occasion, it required an IRA
bomb outside his home for him to be given an allocated car, and official
permission to travel beyond the confines of ‘in and around London’.
A NEW DAWN
The SAFE legacy was clearly evident in the official aim of GCDA, set
out in the Framework Document that was required to outline the
responsibilities of the new Agency. As we noted earlier, it was
originally intended that it should be called the Security Transport
Agency, and although this title was changed, the aim of GCDA was
given as: ‘to be the first choice supplier of secure transport, distri-
bution and mail related services to central government, the wider
public sector and other approved customers’. The fact that the
emphasis remained on the security aspects of the business, indicated
that a relatively narrow vision of its focus continued to hold sway in
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official circles, and that not a great deal of thought had been given as
to how GCDA might break out from this restricted view.
Nick Matheson, who as Chief Executive led the new GCDA from
its inception until his retirement in 2005, had a very different and
much wider view of what he believed was the real purpose of SAFE:
Security was apparently the purpose of SAFE, but in reality each of
its component parts was about providing a personal service. Unfort-
unately, SAFE management did not understand this, and a bullying
culture of staff had developed that was totally counter-productive in
terms of good labour relations and providing an efficient and good
quality service. I saw it as my main priority to rectify this terribly
negative force in both GCS and IDS, that was threatening to disable
the whole viability of the new Agency.
The main GCDA objectives as listed in the Framework Document
also reflected the old emphasis, in that the Agency was required ‘to
meet customers’ needs for the secure provision of services’. Perhaps
the most significant objective, emphasised that the new Agency
should ‘meet financial targets, particularly to recover all costs
through charges to customers’. As we saw in the previous chapter,
by the mid-1990s GCS was losing money heavily, and it was clearly
now imperative that this haemorrhaging of cash had to end, if the
Service was to survive. On the other hand, the public service
element of the Agency was evident in the fact that the aim was to
recover all costs, rather than to make a profit. The implication here
was that any profits made would be returned to the Treasury.
As with all the Executive Agencies, the Chief Executive was
directly responsible to the Minister (in this case the Chancellor of the
Duchy of Lancaster) for the efficient planning, management and
performance of the Agency against the agreed strategy, objectives and
targets laid down by the Minister. In the case of GCDA, the Chief
Executive each financial year was required to prepare a three-year
Corporate Plan that would outline the Agency’s strategy, its resource
requirements, efficiency improvements and operational plans needed
to meet the Agency’s longer term objectives. Complementing this
longer-term vision, the Chief Executive was also required to prepare
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a business plan for the financial year ahead. This would include
specific objectives and targets, and was intended to be a key docu-
ment against which the Chief Executive’s performance would be
assessed. On a shorter timescale, the Chief Executive also reported to
the Minister on the Agency’s performance against published perform-
ance targets at quarterly intervals, or as otherwise agreed.
These official statutory requirements of the Framework Document
set out, in their dry way, the basic requirements of what the agency
was expected to do, but of course supplied no sort of guidelines as to
how GCDA might be able to reverse the fortunes of GCS and IDS.
The true scale and nature of the problems confronting GCS, and the
lack of official faith in the new Agency, was made brutally evident in
a conversation between Nick Matheson and Chancellor of the Duchy
of Lancaster Roger Freeman, at the time the new Chief Executive
took up his post. As Nick Matheson remembers:
Freeman wished me luck, and told me that I had a very big job on
my hands. He then said that he did not suppose the Agency would
survive for more than a year! However, he concluded that it was
unlikely to be his problem, as the Conservative government was
likely to be defeated in the forthcoming general election. At least the
Minister was correct with his second prediction, if not with his first!
Matheson had come to GCDA with extensive private sector manage-
ment experience working for transport and logistics conglomerate
P&O, while latterly he had worked for Hampshire County Council,
managing the wide variety of services that had been put out to tender
by the local authority. This experience placed him in a good position
to assess not only where efficiencies could be made and the business
developed commercially, but also to manage resources that are
operating at arm’s length from central government. From the
perspective of a personal management style, Matheson also believed
strongly that the situation at GCDA required a strong hands-on
approach:
I know that some people called me a control freak, but it is
important that you get people to justify things, and not just go off
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and do as they want. In fact, in arguing a case people often start to
think more constructively and creatively, and then see better how to
overcome problems. The chief objective is to find out what actually
works.
Matheson was also greatly concerned that no one involved with GCS
or IDS was taking a strategic view, and that this reflected a deep-
seated culture within the organisations to passively accept the status
quo: ‘Things were happening because they had always been that way.
It perhaps needed an outsider such as myself to come in and assess
how things could be changed. You could say that the Agency needed
to be “match fit”.’
BENCHMARKING FOR FITNESS
As a starting point towards achieving this ‘match fitness’, in 1997
Matheson conducted a benchmarking exercise of structure and
resources, in order to provide a baseline assessment of the situation on
the ground. This ascertained that permanent allocations amounted to
119 drivers and 122 cars, with an income of £6.97 million per
annum, or 92.1 per cent of GCS income. In contrast, pool operations
amounted to twenty drivers and thirty-two cars, and income of £0.6
million per annum, or 7.9 per cent of GCS income.
Traditionally, the scope for expansion of the allocated side of the
business is strictly limited, given the fact that at any one time there
are a more or less fixed number of Ministers and senior officials. On
the other hand, there is clearly much greater scope for driving large
numbers of Whitehall officials on an ad hoc basis, and it was in this
area that GCS had been slow to exploit the opportunities.
In this context, the benchmarking analysis went to the heart of
the problems, by identifying the urgent need for improved organ-
isation and more competitive pricing of the pool services. It was
revealed that the previous management had sought to sell the
surplus capacity of the pool fleet, and it was argued that whilst this
approach appeared commendable, in that it sought to generate
income in a marginal resource, it had caused both market and
operational difficulties. Firstly, this was for the reason that pool
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capacity was highly variable and unpredictable, as was customer
demand. This meant that services could not always be delivered
using GCS drivers, and had led to confusion and dissatisfaction. In
turn, this was reflected in the poor customer satisfaction rating for
this element of the service.
Nick Matheson found here that much of the Short Term Hire
business was being run with outdated vehicles, and made it a priority
to rectify this poor service:
A great deal of STH was being operated with cars that had been
discarded by the allocated service, and were just being run into the
ground. It meant that inevitably we got a lot of complaints. I
negotiated with the Treasury the resources to buy a totally new fleet,
dedicated for use by STH. This greatly improved the quality of the
service, and also raised morale within GCS.
The second element of the problem was that pricing for the pool
resources reflected the cost structure of the allocated car services, and
was above what the market could bear for ad hoc personal transport.
Consequently, it was emphasised that the GCS pool services were
correctly perceived by customers as expensive. Crucially, it was con-
cluded that in business terms the case for increasing pool resources
merely to meet peak demand was not proven. On the other hand, the
new Chief Executive believed that GCS was in a strong position to act
as the ‘intelligent’ co-ordinator of personal transport at times of peak
demand by utilising properly controlled sub-contracted resources to
strictly monitored service standards, and these issues were under
active review.
By radically improving its organisation of the pool services,
therefore, including use of reliable subcontractors, and also reducing
charges to customers, at least one solution could be found that might
boost business and save GCS. Nick Matheson was disturbed to find
that the relationships with subcontractors relied excessively on
unofficial and sometimes obscure practices. Matters were therefore
placed on a more official basis, and although this meant that some of
the established contractors were jettisoned, there was an overall gain
in quality.
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The benchmarking exercise also identified the long hours required
to be worked by drivers as another problem area. It was acknow-
ledged that, to accommodate the long working day of many
customers, GCS drivers were contracted for a fixed forty-nine-hour
week, but in practice worked considerably longer hours on an
overtime basis. Although these arrangements appeared effective from
the point of view of the customer, in that their drivers were constantly
available, from the perspective of the business it was not cost-
effective, as much of the working day involved waiting and so was
non-productive. The difficulty for GCS management was that it had
not been possible to change working practices because of union
resistance, while there was also little control over drivers, because for
most of the day they were with the customer.
It was in the area of labour relations, even more than the financial
situation he inherited, where Nick Matheson concluded that the most
deep-seated and serious problems confronted the Agency. He found
that relations between management and workers had broken down
completely, and the two sides were not talking to each other. He
therefore made it his top priority to restore communication and trust,
and to construct a more open and approachable relationship with the
workforce. This included such initiatives as the Chief Executive
joining GCS drivers on a driving course, and adopting a more
conciliatory line on disciplinary procedures that had been the cause of
considerable ill feeling with the particular driver involved. Above all,
Matheson was determined to send out the message that the bullying
culture he believed dominated SAFE had been replaced with a more
consensual culture. He found that it took around two years before the
new approach was accepted as the norm by the workforce, and so
allowed a major renegotiation of pay and conditions. Overall, key
objectives on pay and conditions included a simplification of the pay
structure, in particular the consolidation of overtime rates to match
industry and competitive standards.
In addition to pay and conditions, new technology was also a
potential area for conflict, although it offered the opportunity to
enhance GCS efficiency, in that the means were now available to
monitor vehicle locations. The Chief Executive believed that this new
so-called telematics technology would enable GCS to monitor a
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driver’s use of the vehicle, enabling reallocation of work during the
slack periods of the day, and so allowing costs to the customer to be
reduced. He was also aware, however, that this location tracking
might be seen as ‘big brother’ snooping by the drivers, and so it was
acknowledged that a co-ordinated approach was needed to the new
technology.
The Chief Executive was also concerned that driver costs could be
as much as 65 per cent of the total service charge to customers, and
he considered the pay structure to be both cumbersome and uncom-
petitive. He was particularly concerned that the large amounts of
overtime worked were rewarding anti-social work hours, and he
believed that this whole question required a radical review in order to
rationalise and reduce the cost base.
Overall, in his benchmarking exercise Matheson concluded that
the first requirement was a comprehensive market analysis, which
would seek to identify and quantify all transport related target
markets for GCS services. This would be followed by an objective
business analysis to inform future strategy development. The results
of this two-pronged approach were therefore expected to go a long
way to answering a variety of key questions, including the services
that GCS should seek to provide; whether the pool resources could
ever be effective on a market basis; if GCS could provide a wider
transport co-ordination role; and the particular strengths that GCS
may have in targeted markets.
It could be said that, through GCDA and the innovative approach
of the Chief Executive, long-standing problems for GCS were now for
the first time receiving the undivided attention of Agency
management. From now on, questions of market potential and costs
would be daily considerations at the heart of the business. This fresh
approach was illustrated particularly at a management meeting of 30
September 1997, when it was decided that GCS needed to send clear
signals that it was becoming cost conscious. Consequently, it should
not be automatically putting up prices each year in line with
inflation. Instead, holding prices for a year would send out an import-
ant signal. The concept of lowering charges in the hope of actually
improving revenue was therefore at an early stage targeted as one of
the chief means to bring GCS out of its financial crisis.
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Nick Matheson remembers that there was quite a bit of internal
opposition to the concept of reducing rates:
It took a couple of years before we were able to do this, and it was
certainly a gamble, but it paid off in a big way in that our revenues
actually increased! We were able to justify reducing prices on the
grounds that our customers were gaining the benefits of our
improved efficiencies. The previous method of just increasing prices
by a certain percentage each year was a good example of people
accepting things because they had always been that way.
Another strand of the recovery strategy was also in place, when it was
reported in July 1998 that the first live run of the Phoenix software
up to invoice stage had been successful. As we saw earlier, the
development of the coordinating Phoenix programme enabled much
improved communications between administration and operations.
In 1998–99 GCS was able to make a net contribution of £501,000
to the GCDA surplus that was returned to the Treasury, and in
1999–2000 the GCS contribution was £319,000, despite the strategy
being put in place of holding down prices. In 1999–2000 GCS sales
revenue stood at £8.39 million, of which the allocated cars contri-
buted £7.54 million, and short term hire £768,000. Significantly,
STH attracted twenty-one new accounts, worth around £102,000,
and undertook over 26,700 separate journeys. As we noted earlier, a
major car investment programme was also put in place for STH, with
a fleet of new Vauxhall Omegas costing £100,000 replacing the
existing old fleet. In addition, £796,000 was spent on new allocated
cars.
A MILLENIUM REVIEW
By 2000, GCDA was due for an official triennial review, three years
after its inception. This was clearly an important opportunity to show
what the new Agency had achieved, but it also contained potential
hazards, given the mood of foreboding and crisis that had surrounded
GCS in 1997. It was therefore vital for GCDA to demonstrate to the
Cabinet Office that the Agency had taken a turn in the right
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direction, and that the government could have confidence in a viable
future for GCS and IDS.
The review was undertaken by the specialist Cabinet Office
Agencies Unit, in association with consultants Lorien. In the event,
the Review was able to report the good news that GCDA had
performed very well financially, meeting all its financial targets in
1997–98 and 1998–99, and generating comfortable surpluses that
had been returned to the Treasury (although it was noted that GCS
had performed considerably better than IDS). The Review was
particularly pleased to see these results, given the Agency’s bold
strategy to freeze GCS’ 1999–2000 prices at 1998–99 levels. Given
the low-key expectations that had attended its birth, the Agency had
been set modest growth targets, involving small or no annual growth
in cash terms, but actually a reduction in real terms. This had been
justified on the grounds that both GCS and IDS operated in small
markets, in which the scope for growth was limited. There had also
been some uncertainty about allocations in the wake of the 1997
general election, together with GCS’ own strategy of pursuing price
reductions.
However, GCDA had achieved significantly better growth in cash
terms than anticipated, with 2.5 per cent against a target of 0.5 per
cent in 1997–98; and 3.8 per cent against a 0 per cent target in
1998–99. In fact, with the benefit of hindsight, the Review
concluded that the success in meeting the growth targets might not
have fully stretched the Agency. On the other hand, the Review
observed that the value of growth targets might be limited, given
that GCS had a virtual monopoly, and in any case always had to be in
a position to respond to changes in the allocation after a government
reshuffle, or a need for greater security. The Review therefore con-
cluded that serious consideration should be given to setting targets
on an alternative basis.
Significantly, the Review conceded that verification of GCDA’s
performance in the areas of efficiency and productivity had proved
difficult because of the poor accounting and management inform-
ation systems that GCDA had inherited from SAFE (it was these
weaknesses that the Phoenix programme was designed to address). It
was also acknowledged that weaknesses in customer satisfaction
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surveys had been inherited from SAFE, but that GCDA had intro-
duced improvements, including the commissioning of two customer
perception surveys for GCS and IDS from consultants, and the
establishment of customer groups.
The Review also addressed the situation with regard to GCDA
having to operate within the restricted scope of the Cabinet Office’s
annual financial regime, that included the stipulation of surpluses
being returned to the Treasury. This meant that GCDA was not able
to set aside surpluses or borrow money to fund capital improvements,
and must seek parliamentary approval for any increase in business
that affected its forecast revenue or costs. The Review therefore
recommended that further consideration should be given to the
delivery of services within a less restricted trading fund regime,
which would allow the Chief Executive much greater freedom to
pursue commercial objectives. It could be said that the fact a more
commercial trading fund status was even being considered for GCDA
reflected the improvements in its fortunes since 1997 (although in
the event the trading fund option was eventually rejected on the
grounds basically that GCDA was an organisation with a public
service ethos, and that the surpluses earned did not justify the Agency
having this more independent status).
The outcome of the Triennial Review was confirmed in March
2000 in a letter from Ian McCartney, the Cabinet Office Minister
responsible for GCDA, to Treasury Chief Secretary Andrew Smith. As
well as reporting on the evaluation of the Agency, the letter also gave
details of the review of options carried out by consultants Lorien. This
review endorsed the evaluation study, and recommended Agency
status for GCDA for a further five years offered the best value for
money, taking into account the security requirements of customers.
Intriguingly, with powerful echoes of the turbulent privatisation
debate that had continued for several years in the 1980s, the report
concluded that the unique nature of the personal service provided to
Ministers by GCS, customers’ high security requirements, and lack of
credible private sector providers or partners, meant that the Service
should remain wholly in the public sector. The main focus of recom-
mendations was therefore internal, and to a large extent these
reflected those set out by Nick Matheson in his benchmarking
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exercise of 1997, including a package of reforms aimed at modern-
ising drivers’ terms and conditions, and reducing costs while
developing the existing pool service. The report also – perhaps hope-
fully given past experiences – identified scope for improving the
efficiency and productivity of various parts of GCS through
rationalisation and cooperation with other public sector providers of
cars and drivers, such as the Ministry of Defence and the
Metropolitan Police.
One other significant issue raised by the report sought to address
the concerns over the perceived high costs of GCS. It was
recommended that a pilot scheme be undertaken to determine the
demand for, and the improvements in efficiency to be gained from,
pooling allocated services to Ministers on a departmental or wider
basis. It was clearly hoped here that improvements in efficiency could
be achieved by GCS being in a position to rationalise its services, and
it was reported that Nick Matheson intended to approach customer
departments to seek volunteers to take part in the pilot. In his letter,
Ian McCartney also noted that he would wish to see closer
relationships developed between GCS drivers and Private Office
teams, and that he would be consulting colleagues separately on this.
Overall, the 2000 Review presented a positive picture of GCDA
and GCS that could hardly have been anticipated in 1997 (certainly
not by Roger Freeman!), and ensured that the Agency would be given
the opportunity to build on this success over the next five years.
GCS Passes an Official Inspection
It is often overlooked that, in addition to Ministers and senior Whitehall
officials, GCS also provides transport for a number of Chief Executives of
official bodies. These include the government’s Chief Scientific Adviser, the
Chief Medical Officer, and the Comptroller and Auditor General. Another
office in this category is the Chief Inspector of Schools at the Office for
Standards in Education. In 2003, the holder of this office, David Bell,
wrote to GCS to express his appreciation at the quality of service they
provided for him on his travels. Bell’s letter illustrates well not only the
ability once again of GCS to aid an official in performing his job
efficiently, but also that it is not only Ministers who can build close
relationships with drivers:
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‘On every single occasion I have needed it, the car has been exactly where
I wanted it at the right time. Given the rather busy schedule that I have,
this quality of service has been absolutely crucial in helping me to do my job
more effectively.
‘I should also like to pay tribute to GCS drivers. They have been
unfailingly helpful; highly professional; supportive; and discreet. I have
also found them to be, without exception, extremely pleasant. I am pleased to
say that I have been able to strike up a good relationship with whoever has
been allocated to drive for me. Contractors also clearly know what is
expected of them when carrying out GCS work. There is obviously a very
effective system for identifying who is suitable to carry out this work.’
In 2006 David Bell himself joined the ranks of senior Whitehall
departmental officials, when he became Permanent Secretary at the
Department for Education and Skills.
ESTABLISHING A NEW IDENTITY, 2000–05
If the 2000 Review set a marker that confirmed the presence of
GCDA as a valid and viable Executive Agency, then the first years
of the twenty-first century provided the opportunity to establish an
identity that finally allowed GCS to break away from the
constrictions that had contained it for five decades. Nothing
illustrated the shift in culture towards a more entrepreneurial and
proactive perspective than the growth of Short Term Hire, and the
associated market initiatives. Although the allocated sector remains
predominant for GCS, by deliberately seeking out business in the
more variable and competitive STH market, where the customer
has a potentially huge choice of private hire, taxi and minicab
operators, the Service has found a means of projecting a more
positive image.
By 2005, STH had become a stand-alone operation within GCS,
and demand had grown substantially from around £750,000 in 2000
to £2 million in 2005. A large contributory factor here was the bold
decision to hold, or even reduce, prices that had previously been
considered excessive by many customers. This was illustrated
particularly well in the GCDA 2000–01 Annual Report and
Accounts, where it was stressed that STH prices had been frozen at
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1999–2000 levels. This was on top of the previous year’s price
reduction of 14 per cent. In other words, the cost of using STH had
fallen by over 18 per cent in real terms over the previous two years.
In fact, STH evening rates rose only in 2003, and day rates were
held until 2004. Yet as we have seen, STH revenues continued to rise,
and by 2005 stood at 11 per cent of GCS income, up from 6 per cent
in 2000. GCS estimates here that its rates are generally 20–30 per
cent cheaper than those of its competitors, and makes the significant
point that GCS is required to make full cost recovery only, without
the profit margin impact on charging. In this context, it could be said
that there is considerable irony in the public sector ethos that
underpins GCS, in practice actually providing it with a significant
commercial advantage! It is also the case that the long experience of
GCS in the area of reliability and developing close relationships with
its customers is an asset that money cannot buy. At the same time,
the expansion of STH places an even higher premium on GCS dealing
with reliable sub-contracted operators.
Perhaps of equal significance was that in the annual customer satis-
faction survey, those scoring the STH service as ‘excellent’ or ‘very
good’ rose from 54 per cent in 2000 to 75 per cent in 2004. Never-
theless, the comprehensive GCDA 2005 End-to-End Strategic
Review (that was carried out mainly internally, and was set up by the
Cabinet Office as the successor to the 2000 Triennial Review),
emphasised that failure to anticipate developments and manage the
future could leave the Agency with reduced business volume, leading
to expense overhang and financial viability issues. The determination
not to rest on its laurels was therefore evident in the intention to lead
the debate and thinking. It was concluded that this required a
marketing-led approach to explore customer needs and the different
ways these could be met, and entailed undertaking deeper research
into customer attitudes. The intention was that this would enable the
Agency to be more proactive in advising customers on service options
available, and on the most suitable alternatives for individual
circumstances. This need for a more sophisticated marketing strategy
was also recognised by Roy Burke, who succeeded Nick Matheson as
Chief Executive in 2005, and as we will see later in the chapter, he
has made this area a priority.
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Another example of the greater entrepreneurial spirit within GCS
is also illustrated by the Service’s success in winning the contract to
provide vehicles for Crown Court Judges in England and Wales. The
previous system entailed using local companies, and it was believed
that GCS almost halved the customer’s previous costs. In fact, GCS
had to overcome scepticism from some judiciary staff as to whether
the Service could operate at lower costs without sacrificing quality.
Another notable occasion where GCS won customer approval during
this time was in the highly delicate area of the Northern Ireland peace
talks, where the very specific demands of the event resulted in the
Agency receiving several plaudits. At the same time, the need to be
ready for unanticipated events was exemplified by the advent of the
London Congestion Charge in 2003. Given the nature of its business,
by 2004–05 GCS was paying the quite large amount of £158,000 in
Congestion Charge fees, and this sum would have been still higher if
the Service had not been using several hybrid electric–petrol Toyota
Priuses, that are exempt.
Complementing the drive to increase income was the quest to
rationalise the pay structure. As we have seen, for GCS drivers there
has traditionally been a reliance on large amounts of overtime.
Particularly for those driving allocated vehicles, with Ministers
working long hours, and sometimes being required to be in
Parliament until the early hours of the morning, irregular hours go
with the job. However, a relatively low basic salary can have some
serious implications, given that this is used for calculating
pensions. In addition, the unpredictability of overtime can make it
difficult for GCS to predict costs. The 2000–01 pay talks therefore
aimed to simplify the complicated pay structure, and at the same
time to find a way to increase basic pay significantly. Nick
Matheson argues also that raising basic pay raised the self-respect
and public credibility of the drivers: ‘It meant that a driver could
go to a bank or building society and obtain a loan on the basis of
guaranteed pay. The new package took a lot of negotiating, but it
was eventually accepted.’
Because the new package required a large increase in the Agency’s
payroll costs, special permission had to be obtained from the Treasury.
The package resulted in major increases in staff costs of 10–12 per
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cent in 2002–03 and 2003–04, although by 2004–05 the figure was
much lower, at 3 per cent.
On the other hand, a continuing problem for GCS is driver recruit-
ment. Although the Service has many outstanding examples of
drivers with decades of experience, it is generally an ageing work-
force, with insufficient suitable younger people coming forward. GCS
here has to contend with changing times, where people are perhaps
less prepared to make the necessary sacrifices in terms of the working
pattern required of allocated drivers.
Despite its commercial growth, GCDA has not found it easy to
measure efficiency. A major problem here is that placing the emphasis
on one area can result in offsetting detrimental effects elsewhere. It
could also be said that calculating efficiency reveals some of the
dilemmas in pushing for commercial growth, in an organisation with
an essential public service ethos. These difficulties were set out well in
the 2002–03 Annual Report, when it was revealed that no less than
three different efficiency targets had been tried. Initially, the pressure
to lower running costs had been a driving factor, but this precluded
growth because growth inevitably brings increased running costs.
Secondly, the ability to generate sales revenue was chosen, but by
1999–2000 this began to conflict with the primary aim of breaking
even. As a non-profit organisation, pursuing greater profits could have
caused the Agency to make decisions not always in the customers’ best
interests, and so this target was dropped from 2000–01.
Thirdly, the target of increasing income per £1 expenditure on
direct labour costs was developed, as a basic measure to ensure the
Agency had a robust income-to-expenditure ratio. This target was
introduced in 1998–99, and worked well for two years, but as the
target increased, the point was reached in 2000–01 where to meet it
would have meant raising prices more than necessary to meet business
needs. This target was therefore dropped for 2002–03.
Subsequently, the focus moved towards a wider and more consen-
sual criterion involving the efficient management of overall financial
performance, taking into account all cost impacts and the needs of
customers through price constraint.
The Agency also found it difficult to fulfil some of the goals set
in the 2000 Review. For example, as we saw, it had been
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recommended to investigate and consider the options for merger or
rationalisation of the protected fleet with the Foreign and Common-
wealth Office, the Metropolitan Police and the Ministry of Defence.
Perhaps inevitably, however, given the history of rivalry between the
parties concerned, any progress was blocked by a general lack of
cooperation.
Similarly, the 2000 recommendation for identifying Depart-
ments that might be suitable for carrying out a trial of pooling
allocated cars was also dropped after several attempts, because
conflicting requirements made it impractical for Ministers to share
resources.
Nevertheless, Nick Matheson and GCS staff were able to make
some significant breakthroughs in the relationships with individual
Departments that had previously been based on the close relation-
ships between Ministers and drivers. As Matheson explains:
What you had was drivers lobbying ‘their’ Ministers about pay and
conditions. In turn, the Minister would lobby the Cabinet Office on
the drivers’ behalf. This would cause a great deal of aggravation to
the Cabinet Secretary. However, I contacted the Departments, and
said that rather than this indirect and inefficient system, they should
contact me to discuss any problems. A few Departments did do this,
and from there I think it quickly went round Whitehall that I meant
business, and things improved.
The 2005 End-to-End Strategic Review was therefore able to
conclude that the clear focus and accountability of Agency status had
provided a sound basis on which to develop and manage the recovery
plan. The financial management information system also met specific
business needs, and the Agency was able to extend delegation of
responsibility and accountability to each business. The Review there-
fore argued strongly that the government’s best interests were served
by GCDA continuing to provide its existing range of services in its
current overall configuration.
The publication of the 2005 End-to-End Review coincided with
the retirement of Chief Executive Nick Matheson, and its generally
positive findings and conclusions demonstrated that, in its eight-year
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life, GCDA had confounded the expectations of many by not only
surviving, but also firmly establishing its distinctive identity in the
Whitehall world.
THE ECLIPSE OF ‘BUY BRITISH’
For decades, the close relationship between GCS and the Rover
Group, in its various manifestations, provided the mainstay of the
car fleet. Over the years, Jaguars became more evident as a choice for
senior Ministers (as we saw in Chapter Five, some Ministers, such as
Lord Whitelaw, demanded nothing less!), while UK-manufactured
(if US-owned) Fords and Vauxhalls were also popular, at least for
Junior Ministers. From the 1970s, there was an influx of Japanese
investment in the UK, with Nissan, Toyota and Honda all opening
plants, although relatively few of these models joined the GCS fleet.
Given its official position, it was inevitable that GCS would be
lobbied and pressured to ‘Buy British’, particularly from MPs with
a constituency interest in car manufacture. From the 1980s,
however, the definition of what exactly constituted a ‘British’ vehicle
became more and more problematic. For example, the close
association on vehicle development in this period between Rover and
Honda led many to assert that new Rover models were little more
than Hondas in disguise. In any case, in 1994 Rover was taken over
by the German group BMW.
As globalisation has pervaded car manufacture, it has become even
more difficult to give a national identity to a model, with
component parts often manufactured in several countries, and then
shipped to another location to be assembled. There is also UK
membership of the EU to consider, with all the political and legal
implications of dealing with a market of twenty-seven nations. For
GCS, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, it was also
becoming increasingly evident that it could no longer assume a
reliance on Rover. The BMW ownership did not prove to be a
lasting success, and in 2000 Rover was sold for a knockdown price
to UK investors. From this time, it was evident that the company
was in a highly precarious state, with no guarantees for its long term
future.
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It was in this climate that in August 2000 GCDA Chief Executive
Nick Matheson wrote a memo to the Cabinet Office Press Office.
This was in response to the recent announcement that the Depart-
ment of Social Security and the Inland Revenue had each signed
large-scale three-year vehicle contracts that did not include Rover.
Matheson took the opportunity to spell out the new reality of ‘Buy
British’. Firstly, he emphasised that although GCS continued to use
Rover cars, the vehicles for Ministers were purchased according to
their fitness for purpose and cost, not country of origin. He added
here that European procurement rules were designed to ensure that
all EU manufacturers had an equal opportunity to bid to supply cars,
and it would be wholly improper to discriminate.
More generally, Matheson pointed out that it was worth bearing in
mind that the country of manufacture could be misleading. He gave
here the example of the Nissan Primera, at that time a GCS choice for
Junior Ministers:
The Primera probably contains a higher proportion of British manu-
factured parts than any traditional British badged car, including
Rover. Cars that are thought of as traditionally British (such as the
Vauxhall Vectra and Ford Mondeo) are actually manufactured in
Europe. The Jaguar company is now owned by Ford, and some
Jaguars have a high proportion of imported component parts. Until
Rover was purchased by BMW, many Rover components, including
engines, were of Japanese origin. Nevertheless, currently British
manufactured cars make up 34 per cent of the ministerial fleet.
The negative tone of Matheson at this time on the subject of ‘Buy
British’ might have been partly influenced by the difficulties that GCS
was encountering with Rover. Cabinet Ministers had been using the
Rover 800, but this was now out of production, and had been replaced
by the Rover 75. GCS was due to test this newmodel, but in his memo
to the Cabinet Office he expressed concern that the Rover 75 shared
the same 2.5 litre engine as the old Rover 800, and GCS had suffered
some bad experiences with this. Matheson was also concerned that the
Rover 75 was a smaller car than the Rover 800, and so might not be
suitable for rear seat passengers such as Ministers.
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In fact, Matheson had already had some bad experiences in actually
obtaining the new Rover 75. In June 1999 he had written to the
Director of Corporate Sales at Rover Cars expressing his frustration:
‘I am disappointed in the delays in receiving the Rover 75 to test. I
find myself in the embarrassing position that, having persuaded
others to delay a decision, so that the new Rover could be included, I
now have to explain to Ministers why it is that Rover have chosen not
to cooperate.’
In the event, the Rover 75 was eventually adopted into the GCS
fleet, and Nick Matheson describes how he was able to persuade the
company to manufacture a larger version of the vehicle:
I asked Rover if they had ever calculated the advertising value to the
company of their vehicles being regularly seen by millions on TV
pulling up outside 10 Downing Street. They agreed that you could
not calculate this, and emphasised that they wanted to cooperate
with us in any way possible. This led to them manufacturing for us
a larger long wheelbase version of the 75, that was previously
unavailable. In fact, they were so pleased with this model that they
then put it on general sale. We have also been through this same
process with Jaguar. I think it does demonstrate that in many ways
GCS is quite an important and influential organisation.
In 2000–01 the GCDA Annual Report listed 236 vehicles in the
GCS fleet. These included nineteen Rover 800/Sterlings and one
Rover 75, as well as eight smaller Rover 45s. There were also fifteen
Jaguars. The fleet also contained forty-nine Ford Mondeos, manu-
factured in Belgium, and forty-four Vauxhall Omegas, manufactured
in Germany.
The GCS fleet at this time also contained eight Nissan Primeras,
manufactured at the company’s plant at Washington in the north-east
of England, but the Primera was living on borrowed time as a GCS
vehicle. Its final fate was described when Fraser Kemp MP (represent-
ing the Houghton and Washington East constituency) asked a House
of Commons’ question in January 2005, as to why the Primera was
no longer on the official list for GCS vehicles. The reply came from
Cabinet Office Minister David Miliband, who acknowledged that the
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Primera had been on the list of cars available to Ministers when the
Guidance was reviewed in 1997. Unfortunately, it proved not to be a
popular choice, due to its size and comfort. Consequently, only nine
were selected by Ministers and senior officials between 1997 and
2000. An updated model was introduced in the Spring of 2002, but
this did not meet the fitness for purpose criteria. The last Primera to
be selected by a Minister had been in December 2000, and so it had
been deleted from the list in Spring 2004, because of lack of demand
and also to reduce costs of holding unnecessary spare parts and
maintenance equipment.
More significantly for GCS, in 2005 the demise of Rover in the
UK brought to an end the relationship that had been at the heart of
its vehicle investment almost through its history. At least initially,
this tended to place even more emphasis on the Jaguar as a suitable
GCS car manufactured in the UK. This was illustrated in the GCS
vehicle list for 2005–06, which still included sixteen Rover 75s, and
also twelve Jaguars. Out of the total fleet of 186, however, there were
also sixty-five Belgian- manufactured Ford Mondeos and thirty-three
German-manufactured Vauxhall Omegas. Crucially, the fleet now
also contained thirty-five hybrid electric–petrol Toyota Priuses,
manufactured in Japan (up from only six in 2004–05). The ever-
growing presence of the Prius symbolised how the environmental
agenda had now become the predominant consideration in GCS
vehicle purchase, with considerations of ‘Buy British’ forced into the
background. At the same time, GCS environmental objectives had
themselves shifted considerably in just a few years.
COMPLICATIONS ON THE ROAD
TO GOING GREEN
Perhaps no event since 1997 has so symbolised the manner in which
the environmental agenda has invaded the national consciousness,
as the now notorious incident at the 1999 Labour Party Conference
in Bournemouth, involving Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott
and his official Jaguar. In fact, the Bournemouth escapade
represented a culmination of a joust between Prescott and the
media that had begun shortly after Labour came to power. As Colin
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Brown describes in his biography of Prescott, when Prescott became
a Minister, he already owned an old second-hand Jaguar saloon that
he continued to use for private engagements, and on joining the
Cabinet he was allocated a Jaguar, as a senior Minister.1 The
problem for Prescott was that, as well as being Deputy Prime
Minister, he was also Secretary of State for the Environment, Trans-
port and the Regions, and in 1998 his Department had published
a Transport White Paper, A New Deal for Transport: Better for
Everyone. This White Paper set out proposals designed to promote
an integrated transport policy, and in the Foreword, Prescott
stressed that hard choices had to be made on how to combat
congestion and pollution, while persuading people to use their cars
less – and public transport a little more.2
As Brown comments, it was therefore inevitable that as Prescott
called for restraint in the use of the car for short trips, the media
would accuse him of being a hypocrite for using not one, but two,
thirsty Jaguars. Consequently, The Sun began calling him ‘Two Jags’.3
These accusations clearly had an effect on Prescott, and on March 9
1998, in reply to a House of Commons question concerning the cost
of leasing his GCS Jaguar, Prescott himself added a note that for
technical reasons his official car could not be converted to run on less
polluting alternative fuels. However, the Deputy Prime Minister was
pleased to announce that Jaguar had offered GCS the opportunity to
replace his current car with an ex-test vehicle that could be converted
easily to run on less polluting liquefied petroleum gas.
Nick Matheson describes how he visited the Deputy Prime
Minister to suggest the converted car: ‘Prescott was happy to agree.
The only condition he made was that there should be sufficient room
in the boot, where the gas is stored, to accommodate all his wife’s
luggage!’ Prescott was clearly keen to emphasise his environmental
credentials by arguing that the Jaguar offer represented an excellent
opportunity for the government to work with a major British engin-
eering company, to achieve a showcase environmentally-friendly
vehicle development. In fact, Nick Matheson points out that Prescott
was the first person in the world to have an LPG converted Jaguar,
and that he was even issued with his model before the Queen, who
had also ordered one!
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There was to be little public respite for Prescott, however, and on
that fateful day in 1999 Prescott and his wife Pauline were staying at
a hotel 250 yards from the conference centre. A strong wind was
blowing, and the couple made the journey in their official car. On
arriving at the conference centre, Prescott was asked by a journalist
why he had taken the car, and replied: ‘Because of the security reasons
for one thing and, second, my wife doesn’t like to have her hair blown
about. Have you got another silly question?’4 Brown claims that
Prescott had intended the mention of his wife’s hair to be a joke, and
that the chief reason for them taking the car was that they were late,
with the Deputy Prime Minister due to make a speech five minutes
after leaving the hotel.5
Regardless of the true reasons, the story of Prescott making a 250-
yard journey in a Jaguar in order to protect his wife’s hairdo has
achieved almost legendary status, and ensured that the ‘Two Jags’
nickname would be impossible to shake off. Perhaps the most remark-
able thing about the whole affair is exactly why such an essentially
trivial incident is remembered at all. If it had happened only a few
years earlier, it is almost inconceivable that even an Environment
Secretary taking a 250-yard car journey would have attracted the
slightest bit of attention. In fact, the politician concerned might well
have been keen to use the car, in order to publicly demonstrate his
government’s ‘Buy British’ credentials. Ultimately, therefore, what
makes the story really memorable is that it represented a symbolic
political landmark, in demonstrating that the environmental agenda
had become an integral part of mainstream politics, and that in future
no government could take these issues for granted.
David Cameron and the Politics of Green Travel
Perhaps no politician has exploited more his official travel facilities, in
order to demonstrate his environmental credentials, than Conservative Party
Leader David Cameron. As we have seen, the provision of a GCS vehicle
for Opposition Leaders dates back to Edward Heath granting this
privilege to Harold Wilson in 1970. Ironically, Cameron’s environmental
campaigning has involved him in quite frequently not actually using
his GCS vehicle, although he has discovered that this can be a
two-edged sword.
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From the first day of his appointment as Conservative Party Leader,
in December 2005, Cameron was anxious to make a political point
about reducing emissions, and this included at times being seen to cycle to
work. Unfortunately, the impact of this green campaigning was diluted
significantly, when a newspaper photographed Cameron’s official car
following him, in order to carry the Tory Leader’s shoes and briefcase.
An embarrassed Cameron explained that he could not find a pannier large
enough to carry all his things, although he did subsequently attach a cycle
basket, and reassured the media that he would no longer use his car on the
days he cycled to work.
Cameron has nevertheless also aroused controversy over his decision to
switch his GCS vehicle. After originally using a Vauxhall Omega as his
official car (with CO2 emissions of around 276 grams per kilometre), in
common with government Ministers, Cameron was offered a hybrid Toyota
Prius (with its CO2 emissions at the much lower level of 104 g/km).
However, Cameron turned this offer down, in favour of a commercially-
leased, but significantly larger and more expensive, hybrid Lexus GS 450h
(like the Prius, manufactured in Japan), emitting 186 g/km. In reply to
critics who accused the Tory Leader of environmental hypocrisy in turning
down the Prius, Cameron claimed that he would have needed two of these
cars to hold his entourage that travelled with him.6
NEW ENVIRONMENTAL GOALS
The potential threat of global warming, perceived particularly
through emissions of so-called greenhouse gases such as carbon
dioxide (CO2), is something that no government can afford the risk
of ignoring, regardless of the heated arguments that continue on
both sides of the debate about the exact nature of the threat.
Similarly, over the past decade it has become increasingly important
for GCS to demonstrate its credentials in this area.
In 1997 the Kyoto Protocol (part of the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change) set a UK target of a 12.5 per
cent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels by
2008–12. The British government itself decided to set a more
ambitious domestic goal of reducing CO2 emissions by 20 per cent by
2010. In the event, although the Kyoto target is on course to be met,
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the government itself has conceded that the 2010 target is unlikely
to be fulfilled. Nevertheless, this has not deterred Ministers from
setting longer term targets, and in his Foreword to the 2003 Energy
White Paper, Prime Minister Tony Blair confirmed that the
government had set a UK target of a 60 per cent reduction in carbon
dioxide emissions by 2050.7
In recent years, the momentum gained by the politics and econo-
mics of climate change has been particularly demonstrated by the
2006 Stern Review, on the economics of climate change. Chancellor
of the Exchequer Gordon Brown commissioned economist Sir
Nicholas Stern to consider the economic costs of the impacts of
climate change, and the costs and benefits of action to reduce the
emissions of greenhouse gases. The Review came to the plain
conclusion that ignoring climate change would eventually damage
economic growth, and that the benefits of strong, early action
considerably outweigh the costs.8
The government has followed up these findings in 2007 with a
Climate Change Bill. This proposes legally binding limits for the UK
to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 60 per cent by 2050 (in line
with the earlier commitment), but also an interim target of a cut of
at least 26 per cent by 2020. Governments will therefore be required
to set five-year ‘carbon budgets’ stipulating maximum emissions
with tax changes, regulations and ‘cap and trade’ mechanisms to
achieve the desired cuts. The government anticipated that the Bill
would become law in 2008, and so make Britain the first country to
commit to legally binding targets for medium and long term cuts in
carbon emissions. Significantly for GCS, in launching the Bill
Environment Secretary David Miliband explained that the carbon
savings would be achieved across all sectors of the economy, through
improvements in energy and fuel efficiency, and new technology such
as electric cars.9
The economics and politics of climate change is of course a massive
subject in its own right, but as the government’s flagship transport
organisation GCS clearly has to set an example that others can follow.
The transport sector, including aviation, produces about one quarter
of the UK’s total carbon emissions. Road transport contributes 85 per
cent of this, with passenger cars accounting for around half of all
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carbon emitted by the transport sector.10 The government here has a
Powering Future Vehicles strategy, designed to provide a framework
aimed at promoting the development, introduction and take-up of
low carbon vehicles and fuels.11 It is in these areas that GCS has
worked hard to successfully make major changes, although progress
has certainly not been straightforward.
SHIFTING GEARS
The degree to which the environmental debate and goals has moved
on over the past decade is illustrated by the fact that, at its inception
in 1997, GCDA had a straightforward target of averaging 25.5 miles
per gallon for its entire fleet. At this time, the GCS fleet consisted of
179 cars, all petrol driven. We saw in the previous chapter how in the
early 1990s GCS had trialled gas-fuelled cars, and from the late
1990s it appeared that these types of vehicles would form the basis of
the Agency’s strategy to reduce its carbon emissions. As we saw with
John Prescott and his Jaguar, the trend was to convert cars to LPG,
and in 1998 GCS was able to announce that for official duties, 10
Downing Street operated an LPG converted Ford Galaxy and
compressed natural gas (CNG) converted Rover Sterling.
Around this time, GCS announced that it would gradually replace
its fleet with cars capable of running on alternative fuels over the next
five to six years, and fifteen to twenty cars were expected to be
converted each year. The Agency believed that there was a strong
business case to be made for gas powered vehicles, as well as the
benefits in reducing harmful emissions.
At this time, GCS targets revolved around conversion of the fleet
to alternatively fuelled vehicles, with a particular emphasis on LPG.
For example, twelve cars were converted to LPG in 1998–99,
nineteen in 1999–2000, and ten in 2000–01. On 29 August 2003
Cabinet Office Minister Douglas Alexander wrote a letter to
Transport Minister David Jamieson, in which he stated that he was
pleased to see that, in the context of the Powering Future Vehicles
Strategy, GCDA had 29 per cent of its fleet running on alternative
fuels. Of these, 20 per cent were running on LPG. However, he
sounded a significant warning note in the fact that a number of new
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models were not capable of conversion to LPG. On the other hand,
GCS now had four of the hybrid electric–petrol Toyota Priuses on
long term evaluation.
In fact, Alexander’s letter indicated a shift in objectives by GCS.
As the 2005 End-to-End Review explained, from 1999 the emphasis
at the Agency had been on a switch to alternatively fuelled vehicles,
with a target of converting 50 per cent of all cars purchased that were
capable of being converted (this was later raised to 75 per cent). By
2002, however, the problems in obtaining vehicles capable of LPG
conversion, and the often poor after-sales service, had led to second
thoughts. Consequently, in 2003 the Agency target was switched to
reflect government targets to lower CO2 emissions. The intention was
to establish a benchmark of average amounts of CO2 emissions
expressed in grams per kilometre (g/km), and thereafter reduce the
average by 2 per cent each year. This target switch allowed the
Agency to introduce a number of new engine technologies.
In particular, it is the hybrid Toyota Prius that has emerged as the
chief trailblazer in the quest to achieve the new targets. The rapid
switch to the Prius has resulted from a change in the vehicles
available to Cabinet Ministers under the Prime Minister’s Rules. The
choice is now between the Prius and the Jaguar XJ 2.7 litre diesel
that takes a blend of 5 per cent biodiesel, and ultra low sulphur diesel
(sulphur is the pollutant avoided). Significantly, the Agency failed to
hit its CO2 reduction targets of 2 per cent per year in 2003–04 and
2004–05, but comfortably achieved the target in 2005–06 (204 g/km
achieved against a target of 227.39 g/km). A major factor in this
success was the increase in the use of the Prius, with its average CO2
emissions of 104 g/km.
The success of GCS here has led to a tougher target for 2006–07 of
194.67 g/km. This reflects new Department for Transport targets for
the Agency to reduce average tailpipe emissions by 5 per cent in
2006–07, compared with 2005–06. GCDA also now has a target to
increase the use of alternative engine and fuel technology by 10 per
cent in 2006–07, compared with the previous year.
The Prius is also now the mainstay of the innovative Green Car
Service that GCS runs to supplement its STH service, and this has
also proved to be very successful, with charges below those for an
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equivalent black taxi cab. GCDA Chief Executive Roy Burke
emphasises the achievements, but also the necessary choices involved
in hitting the environmental targets:
This year alone (2006–07), our fleet average CO2 emissions have
reduced by nearly 16 per cent. This is a massive decrease, and I would
be astonished if any other fleet in the country could match that.
When I came here in 2005, the garage was full of Omegas and
Peugeot 607s, but the fleet has changed massively, and the garage is
getting full of Priuses. The only way realistically at the moment that
we can hit our targets is through the use of hybrids such as the Prius
and Honda Civic. The only alternative would be to go for smaller
cars. However, we have to take the realistic view. We are driving
some of the most important people in the country, and should we
really be driving them around in small cars? Can you see John
Prescott getting into a Mini? It’s not going to happen!
A Different Perspective
David Turner became a non-executive director of GCDA in 1998, after
previously serving on the Advisory Board of SAFE. He brought to this a
background as a chartered surveyor, who joined Barclays Bank to manage
their property interests, but also became responsible for a car service
operated by the Bank. He believes that, as a non-executive director, he can
provide perspectives and advice from the private sector, and also act as a
sounding board.
He found that morale was low when he joined GCDA, and that there
were a lot of lax practices in ways of operating that had previously not been
questioned. He believed that it was this culture that needed to change,
and was a bigger obstacle to progress than any single financial policy.
Nevertheless, with his Barclays car service experience, he was able to provide
advice on Nick Matheson’s strategy of reducing charges. He argues that this
type of expertise is definitely transferable: ‘For example, a restaurant and a
steel mill may apparently do completely different things, but in many ways
the service they provide is the same, and the business solutions may be very
similar.’
He emphasises that he has seen a radical improvement in working
practices within GCS over the past decade, and also in the financial
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performance. Nevertheless, he believes that there are still significant battles
to be won in managing demand:
‘Cabinet Ministers probably need to be provided with official cars seven
days a week, but for nearly everyone else these could be purchased on the
basis of just a relatively short period of time each day, and given a price,
with a guarantee that a car can be provided at this time. I think we have
to lead a shift in the Whitehall culture in these matters.’
One important feature of the Agency that Turner believes is particularly
important is that it continues to have its own in-house workshop: ‘This is
an unusual feature nowadays, with the work more likely to be handed over
to the manufacturers. The Agency workshop is a profit centre in its own
right, and so this brings in outside work. It again demonstrates the highly
distinctive culture of GCS.’
It is this culture that, coming in as an outsider, Turner found to be the
most remarkable feature of GCS:
‘I saw a great deal of loyalty in the car service I managed for Barclays,
but this has been taken to another level at GCS, with its remarkable
culture of loyalty and discretion. I think that nearly all the staff pride
themselves on this. I remember once coming out of the Institute of Directors
and being hailed by a taxi driver. I wondered what he was doing, then I
realised that he was an ex-GCS driver, who wanted to stop his taxi and
make a point of speaking to me. I think this is typical of GCS, and to a
large extent the values and culture become self-selecting. One or two people
have joined GCS from good quality car hire companies, but then found that
they just couldn’t adapt to the new way of life, and so left.’
DESTINATION TRANSPORT
As so often throughout its history, GCS (as part of GCDA) found its
sponsoring Department, this time the Cabinet Office, at least in some
respects a less than ideal home. Amidst the ‘bran tub’ of the Cabinet
Office’s assorted responsibilities, and with the latter’s central strategic
co-ordinating function for the government as a whole, it was perhaps
inevitable that GCDA was not a high priority interest, and so was
pushed to the fringes. Against this, it could also be said that there
were some advantages here for GCDA, in that the Agency was
basically left alone to get on with the job!
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Until 2002, the Cabinet Office had at least operated a specialist
Agencies Unit that could liase with GCDA, and provide objective
comment and analysis to the Permanent Secretary on the Agency’s
performance. When this Unit was abolished, however, responsibility
for overseeing GCDA passed to the Managing Director of the Cabinet
Office, and consequently the relationship between Agency and
Department became more distant. The ambivalent attitude of GCDA
was made clear in the 2005 End-to-End Strategic Review, where it
was pointed out that the Agency’s relationship with Ministers had
been a very passive one, with very little engagement for a number of
years. For example, quarterly reports were sent out, but the Chief
Executive had never been required to present these in person. This
was at least interpreted in a positive way in the Review, as signifying
that the Agency was seen as being well managed and capable of
resolving issues before they became politically sensitive. Conse-
quently, ministerial intervention was seldom required.
Nevertheless, the Review stressed that an ability to engage at the
level below Managing Director would be very helpful. The re-
establishment of the Agencies Unit was not being suggested, but it
was believed that a focal point was required within the Cabinet Office
that GCDA could work with on a regular basis.
Before the end of 2005, however, the Cabinet Office itself recog-
nised the need for GCDA to find a new home. The new situation was
set out in a letter of 7 November from Cabinet Secretary Sir Gus
O’Donnell to David Rowlands, the Permanent Secretary of the
Department for Transport. The letter revealed that the PrimeMinister
had said he wanted to have a smaller and better focused Cabinet Office.
As GCDA was principally a fleet management organisation, it was
considered the Agency had stronger synergies with the DfT than with
the Cabinet Office. Equally important, the Cabinet Secretary believed
that the DfT had a large and well-run delivery function that his own
Office lacked. Nevertheless, O’Donnell was clearly anxious to retain
some of the more politically sensitive aspects of GCS functions set out
in the Prime Minister’s Rules, and so the letter stressed that the
Cabinet Office would continue to have responsibility for guidance
about decisions on choice of cars available for individual Ministers,
together with any related propriety issues.
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It could be argued that an official recognition of the essential
character of GCS as a transport organisation was overdue, although
GCDA Chief Executive Roy Burke points out that in some ways the
Agency remains one that it is difficult for government to categorise:
We are not a core business for the DfT, but we are an Agency that is
trying to implement some of the direct results of their policies. In
this respect you could say that we are consumers of their policies.
Nevertheless, they are very interested in what we do. This can be a
bit of a two-edged sword. The Cabinet Office was too remote, but
under the DfT it means that people here spend a lot of time feeding
information to the Department. This entails a great deal of work. On
the other hand, the DfT has been very supportive on issues such as
carbon dioxide emission targets, and we can liase with a wide range
of DfT Agencies, such as Driving Standards, MoT Testing and
Vehicle Certification. In addition, I chair the UK Vehicle Security
Advisory Group, and DfT people are providing valuable data here on
important technical matters. We could never have worked on that
basis with the Cabinet Office.
The Intermediary Role
David Smith served as a GCDA non-executive director from 2001 to
2006, after a long career in the Civil Service, first in the Department of
the Environment, and latterly at the Cabinet Office. As we saw in the
previous chapter, he oversaw SAFE for the Cabinet Office, and in this
role acted as an intermediary between the Department and the Agency.
He continued this role for GCDA, although he points out that, over time,
GCDA became the only Agency left within the Cabinet Office, which
made it quite isolated.
In overseeing the Agency, David Smith had a significant role in
developing its targets, in consultation with Chief Executive Nick Matheson,
and a particular feature here was the greater emphasis on environmental
goals. As a non-executive director, he was Chair of the Audit Committee,
and had a significant role in the official reviews of the Agency in 2000 and
2005. As he observes: ‘I think that taking up a position as a non-executive
director reassured the Cabinet Office that someone familiar with both the
Agency and the sponsoring Department was involved in its operation.’
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David Smith’s role in both camps places him in a particularly
authoritative position to judge the merits of the Agency’s switch from the
Cabinet Office to the Department for Transport, and on the whole he sees
this as a move with more drawbacks than advantages:
‘GCDA’s isolation was the chief reason for leaving the Cabinet Office,
but it was probably more appropriately placed there. It does not have a lot
in common with much that happens at the DfT. One area where the DfT
has helped is with the environmental agenda, such as on technical questions
concerning the cars. On the other hand, when we joined the DfT, I found
myself involved in a lot more meetings, mainly liaising with other DfT
Agencies and functions. This was all very interesting, but not really central
to the work of GCS. The Agency will carry on OK, as it has its own
identity, but time will be taken up in becoming involved in matters that are
somewhat removed from its main functions. In fact, having to attend so
many more of these meetings was one of the chief factors in persuading me to
leave the Board in 2006’.
DEVELOPMENT AND TRADITIONS
Roy Burke, GCDA Chief Executive since May 2005, emphasises that,
unlike Nick Matheson in 1997, he was not taking over a failing
organisation, and so came in from a different direction. As a career
civil servant, Burke had extensive Home Office experience, parti-
cularly in the areas of immigration and probation legal processes, and
prior to joining GCDA was Head of the Criminal Injuries Compen-
sation Appeals Panel. Nevertheless, he realised that GCDA would
present very different challenge to his previous experience:
I knew the job would be interesting, but I was really rather nervous,
as GCDA is predominantly an industrial unit and very different from
the mainstream Civil Service. However, I had built up some useful
knowledge of management practice, and had not had the opportunity
previously to implement my ideas. Dare I say it, I was also consider-
ably younger than many of the people working at the Agency, and so
came in as, you might say, a new broom sweeping clean.
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On becoming Chief Executive, Burke was immediately struck by
what he perceived to be the too-narrow structure of the Agency:
For example, Jerry Doyle was Director of Operations for GCS and
IDS. Everything went through that channel, but the Board of
Directors, although obviously involved in the running of the busi-
ness, was not part of that narrow funnel. Consequently, I decided
on my first day to split up the Agency from an operational
perspective into its two very distinct arms of mail and cars. I gave
Jerry responsibility for GCS, which is far and away the largest part
of what we do, and gave Nigel Bennett the opportunity to manage
IDS. We had a consultation process, but it was implemented in
August 2005.
Perhaps even more fundamentally, Burke was unhappy with what he
saw as the serious lack of knowledge about what the customers actually
wanted:
It struck me forcibly in the face, and I realised that we had to take
action quickly, that we provided the allocated cars on the basis of
how we wanted to sell it. What we were experiencing here was a
complete lack of customer service. One of the first things I did was
to ask Andrew Gardner, working on business development, to go out
and speak to all our customers and to ask them if we were meeting
their expectations. From this, a clear picture emerged that we were
providing the service that we wanted rather than what the customer
wanted. We were demonstrating all the worst possible habits of a
monopoly. However, it is important to recognise that the customers
do not have to use us, although they may think that they do.
Roy Burke acknowledges that, from any marketing perspective, it
can be dangerous to interfere with the mindset of its main customers,
but given that these customers did stay with GCS, he believes that
this gave him the clear mandate to offer an alternative service. One of
the first opportunities he had to put this fresh approach into practical
action was with the then Transport Secretary Alistair Darling, shortly
after GCDA was transferred there from the Cabinet Office:
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I was talking to Darling about efficiencies, and pointed out to him
that, as he was also Secretary of State for Scotland, he went to
Scotland every Friday. However, the Department for Transport paid
for a five day a week service, even though the Transport Secretary did
not use this car on a Friday. This came as a bit of a surprise to him,
and so I suggested that we should provide him and his colleagues
with a four day a week service.
Burke found that the reply he eventually received was what he
regarded as typical for the Civil Service:
The DfT said to us, ‘Make sure that the driver does not lose out.’ This
is a manifestation of the power of the relationship between the
passenger and driver for GCS. A private company would have just
implemented the cost savings, but we went ahead with the four-day
week, while also reassuring the drivers that they would not lose out
financially. This means that the Agency picks up the cost, but we
went ahead with it, and now forty of our 114 allocations have taken
the four-day week.
A further potential saving identified by Burke was in the category of
senior civil servants, who use their cars only at certain times of the
day:
The Permanent Secretaries tend to come in to the Department in the
morning, and go home at night, but spend the day in the office. This
means that they are paying GCS for a twelve-hour day, where we pick
them up at 7 am, and take them back at 7 pm, but what about all the
unused hours in the middle? Instead, why not pay for a car in the
morning and evening, and then just at the times they want it during
the day? I am looking here for savings for government as a whole, and
a few Departments have taken up this suggestion.
Roy Burke acknowledges that, in seeking to build up the GCS
marketing capability, he is building on the work done by Nick
Matheson, who identified this as a weakness in the Agency. A
Business Development Unit has now been set up, with a specific aim
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that the Agency should provide its services to more people.
Consequently, a marketing professional, Harvey Leonard, has been
recruited. A key element here is clearly the continued expansion of
STH, but Roy Burke is particularly keen to link this with the
environmental targets of the Agency, and sees the Green Car service
as one with great scope for expansion. Green Cars was originally a
joint venture with a private company, but now GCS mainly runs the
operation in house, with the hybrid Prius once again at the forefront
of the service.
Burke points out that Green Cars is almost a subset of STH:
People will migrate from STH to Green Cars. The Prius is
particularly suitable for the relatively short journeys as it operates
best in town, and the engine cuts out when the car is slowing down
or stopping. It means that when customers contact us saying they
want to order a STH vehicle, we have a responsibility to say that we
can provide a Green Car that will cost them less. From the customer
perspective, it is better for us to influence their choice.
It is a measure of how far GCDA has come over the past decade that
GCS is now considering wider questions of the degree to which
they can encourage Ministers and officials to become more environ-
mentally aware, rather than being compelled to design a strategy
for survival, as was the case in 1997. Indeed, if Ministers should
gradually place less emphasis on the value of personal mobility,
then this could cost GCS revenue. This is a new type of twenty-first
century dilemma, where past experience carries few guidelines, but
nevertheless requires new ways of thinking and innovative
solutions.
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CHAPTER 8
Service and Business
PENALTIES OF SUCCESS
At the heart of GCS for much of its sixty-year history is theparadox of how it could, on one level, be so highly valued by
Ministers and officials for the service it provides, yet at the same time
have been so neglected and basically taken for granted as an
organisation by successive governments.
Perhaps one of the explanations for this peculiar split character of
GCS lies in the very success of the service it provides. For many senior
Ministers and officials, their experience of GCS exists largely on a
one-to-one basis. As former GCDA Chief Executive Nick Matheson
explains, some Ministers can take this to extremes:
Basically, Ministers think in terms of ‘their’ car and ‘their’ driver,
although really they are hired from GCS by the Department con-
cerned. Nevertheless, Ministers can be very possessive, and not really
keen to share resources. I have even known Ministers to pass by other
Ministers standing by the road, and simply refuse to give any of them
a lift!
In one sense, therefore, the Minister–driver relationship is undoubt-
edly the GCS golden asset, and at times, such as in the case of
Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s, it has probably been the single
factor that has ensured the survival of the Service. On the other
hand, Ministers can come to see GCS in terms of one single driver,
and overlook the organisation that has to underpin the whole
operation.
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This blind spot can in turn have serious consequences for GCS. As
we saw in Chapters Two and Three, Prime Ministers in the 1950s and
1960s, such as Harold Macmillan and Harold Wilson, tended to deal
with GCS in terms of the use and misuse of vehicles by Ministers, with
the development of the Service itself very much a background concern.
Over the years, this order of priorities can become something of a self-
fulfilling vicious circle, with the organisation treated as a closed ‘black
box’, that can somehow take care of itself. For many years, of course,
successive generations of GCS people proved themselves to be masters
of adaptation and the art of survival. In fact, the origins of the Service
lay in the ad hoc, and quite unorthodox, development of the Motor
Transport Corps during the Second World War, and this very British
talent to improvise and make things work, often at its best in
conditions of adversity, has served GCS particularly well.
In this sense, GCS turned the organisational difficulties to its
advantage, but over the years the lack of strategic direction left the
Service in an increasingly vulnerable position. This trend was
aggravated as the Whitehall culture itself shifted radically in the
1980s and 1990s, towards one based more on market and business
values. GCS came relatively late to this modern environment, but
since the creation of the Government Car and Despatch Agency in
1997 it has been making up for lost time, with much greater
emphasis on strategic planning, business expansion and the achieve-
ment of stated goals. GCS is therefore one organisation of which it
can be safely said, that the arm’s-length Executive Agency model has
proved an undoubted success. Nevertheless, some tensions do remain
between the established traditions of the Service, that have made it
such a distinctive success, and the need to adapt to the modern world.
STRENGTHS AND VULNERABILITIES
The traditions and values of GCS, and the nature of the service it
provides, inevitably make it vulnerable to critics seeking ways of
undermining the government of the time. The fact alone of a
Minister being transported around in the back seat of an upmarket
vehicle will, perhaps inevitably, conjure up images of an over-
privileged elite, that is indulged at the taxpayers’ expense. Seen in
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this light, GCS cannot win. If the government or individual
Minister has, for whatever reason, become controversial and unpop-
ular, then the GCS target will be seen as even easier to hit. In recent
years, former Deputy Prime Minister ‘Two Jags’ John Prescott is the
prime example of a Minister suffering in this way.
As we have seen, from the 1940s, Ministers themselves have been
highly sensitive to criticisms of extravagance, and at least periodically
demonstrated their desire to economise. At times, such as during the
energy crisis of the early 1970s, GCS has been at the forefront of the
government’s need to set a good example, with Ministers riding
around in Minis. In recent years, the demands of the environmental
and climate change agendas have exerted new pressures to
demonstrate green credentials. In other areas, the long resistance to
Junior Ministers being granted allocated vehicles also indicated the
sensitivity of governments on issues of economy.
In modern times, GCS is perhaps even more vulnerable to these
attacks than in former years. Firstly, it could be said that GCS was
founded in a more openly hierarchical and class-conscious age, when
personal service was more widely accepted as a way of life. In this
context, the GCS golden asset, the Minister–driver relationship, can
be interpreted by critics as a reflection of the values of a bygone age.
Secondly, the increasing importance of the environmental agenda
places even greater emphasis on the need for economy and efficiency.
Espousing environmental priorities, however, can also lead to some
strange conclusions. For example, in February 2007 the Liberal
Democrats obtained figures from GCDA, showing that the Agency
drove 2,394,200 miles in 2004–05, and 2,834,000 miles in
2005–06. The Liberal Democrats interpreted these figures in terms
of their relevance to climate change, and their transport spokesman,
Alistair Carmichael, declared: ‘Climate change is the biggest threat
our planet faces. It is vital that everyone does as much as possible to
cut down on carbon emissions. Transport currently accounts for over
a quarter of the UK’s CO2. Government Ministers need to start
leading by example.’1
In reality, most of this increase in GCDA mileage was accounted for
by the success of GCS in winning a greater share of the short term hire
market and the expansion in the environmentally-friendly Green Cars
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Service. On the Liberal Democrat reasoning, this apparently presents
GCS with the difficult dilemma referred to at the conclusion of the
previous chapter – that it should be less efficient as a business, in order
to promote its environmental credentials! The great strengths of GCS
in recent years, in terms of quality of service and business expansion,
can therefore ironically themselves make the Service vulnerable to
critics with a point to prove.
GCS AS A PRACTICAL NECESSITY
In fact, the true essence of the value attached to GCS lies in the
necessity of the service that it provides on a day-to-day basis. Funda-
mentally, as was first recognised during the Second World War, it is
attempting to help Ministers and officials do a better job. Apart from
the relationships with drivers that may produce intangible benefits,
such as less stressful decision making, the basic logistics of the job
require at least a type of GCS service. As Conservative Party Leader
David Cameron discovered, even if you like to ride a bike to work, a
car has to follow to carry the briefcases, papers, etc. In the case of
Ministers, the ever present red boxes have to be dealt with, and the
GCS trips to and from the office do at least extend the working day,
and allow extra time to fit everything in.
We saw in Chapter Six the detailed case made out for GCS by
former Transport Minister Steven Norris, and in the basic terms that
he sets out, the Service provides an essential tool in performing the
job more efficiently, and is anything but a luxurious optional extra.
In this context, it is also important to bear in mind that Ministers
and officials themselves are not immune from the ever-quickening
pace of the modern world. In Chapter Three, long-serving GCS pool
driver Irene Maykels described how, as relatively recently as the
1960s, a driver could have little to do from the time when Parliament
rose for the Summer recess at the beginning of August, until things
got going again in October. Such a relaxed way of doing things would
now seem inconceivable, in an era where the news media have a 24/7
agenda, and there is little respite for Ministers in the need to meet
public expectations, that themselves have tended to become higher
with the passage of time.
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Ministers are therefore frequently on the move, with official visits
and receptions, groups and delegations to meet, debates and votes in
Parliament, media interviews, and so on. As the pace quickens, so the
need for an official vehicle becomes even more of a necessity, while in
these circumstances it could also be said that the intangible benefits
of a GCS driver also become of increased value.
Consequently, governments do not exist in a vacuum, and them-
selves reflect changing social patterns, economic circumstances, and
public expectations. There is no doubt that the scope of GCS,
including the allocated vehicles, has grown over the years. It would of
course be naive to overlook the element of ministerial self-interest
here, such as in Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s decision to grant a
GCS car to former Prime Ministers, just a year before he became one
himself. Even here, however, we saw how the need for security was
eventually the deciding factor in the decision to grant former Prime
Minister Edward Heath an allocated car, when officials were
despairing of his refusal to restrict his trips to ‘in and around London’.
Similarly, as we emphasised in Chapter Four, Heath himself repre-
sented an early example of a modern trend towards younger Prime
Ministers, and therefore ex- Prime Ministers, who are not inclined to
play the role of the retired and immobile elder statesperson. Modern
trends can also be detected in the decision to grant an official car to
former Prime Minister’s wife Cherie Blair, a facility which,
fascinatingly, was first considered for Clementine Churchill during
the Second World War. Although made officially on security
grounds, it could also be said to reflect the higher public profile and
role of a Prime Minister’s spouse in an age of heightened media
attention, and a preoccupation with celebrity.
For many years, successive governments resisted special pleading
from a variety of Departments for ‘their’ Junior Ministers to be given
allocated vehicles. Again, there is no doubt that considerations of
status and self esteem play a significant part here. At the same time,
the increased demands and public expectations placed on govern-
ments in modern times have intensified pressures for Ministers to be
seen to be ‘doing something’ about topical issues. A visit from a
Junior Minister, if the Cabinet Minister is unavailable, can perform
an important political function. In addition, as events and the art of
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government become more complicated, with the need for European
and international bargaining and agreements, all kinds of groups and
interests to be consulted and kept informed of developments, and
issues that cut across a number of Departments, so a team of Ministers
is required to take on these tasks, with mobility an essential
ingredient of doing the job.
In this context, to a significant extent the development of GCS
services reflects much wider political and social changes. Never-
theless, GCS as an organisation has itself had to adapt to changing
times. For example, as former GCS driver and union representative
Denis Oliver puts it:
In my early days with GCS, it was a case of being given an annual
grant from the Treasury, and just getting on with the job. Nowadays,
it has to be run as a business in its own right, with everything costed
in detail and accounted for. The basic job may still be the same, in
terms of the car and the driver, but everything that lies behind it
seems to be a great deal more complicated.
Former GCDA Chief Executive Nick Matheson makes a similar point
in a different way: ‘I have said that there is something magic about
the relationship between a Minister and a driver. However, like all the
best magic, there has to be a lot going on that remains unseen to the
outside observer. This has to work efficiently, otherwise the whole
thing falls flat.’
In the past decade, GCS has had to reinvent itself in order to
literally keep the show on the road. There is no doubt that the Service
is a great Whitehall survivor, but hard experience has taught it that
the future cannot be guaranteed. The service GCS provides may be
essential in order to keep the wheels of government moving, but
events in earlier decades, particularly the 1980s, made it clear that
others were ready and willing to step in and do the job, if given the
opportunity. In recent years, as part of GCDA, GCS itself has been
proactive, and taken a significantly greater share of the short term
hire market from the private sector. On the other hand, the Metro-
politan Police, that tried so hard to take over GCS responsibilities in
the 1980s, has finally won the responsibility for driving the Prime
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Minister. A development of this type emphasises the challenges for
GCS that continue to present themselves.
TRADITION DRIVING THE FUTURE
Some of the biggest challenges facing GCS are concerned with
routines and practices that are rooted deep in the culture of the
organisation. In particular, although the basic salary has risen
significantly in recent years, there is a continued reliance on overtime
by many drivers. GCDA Chief Executive Roy Burke is keen to
change this culture, but recognises that, in turn, new working
practices may threaten the Minister–driver relationship:
Our staff do too much, and I find it totally unacceptable that we
expect them to work such long hours. They cannot possibly have a
life outside this Agency. The standard for an allocated driver is
twelve hours per day, or sixty hours per week, when the standard for
the Civil Service is around thirty-six hours per week. These long
hours are not acceptable. We could make things more efficient for
Ministers with two drivers – one doing the morning shift and the
other the afternoons. However, I put this to Alistair Darling when he
was Transport Secretary, and he said immediately, ‘I only want one
driver.’ This means that you come up against our golden asset of the
relationships between Ministers and drivers, but you cannot
introduce savings with one hand tied behind your back. There is no
reason why a Minister cannot have a relationship with two drivers,
but they insist they only want one.
Roy Burke emphasises that there are big issues of health and safety
here, and that such measures as EU working time Directives cannot
be overlooked indefinitely, so that Ministers may be compelled to bite
the bullet and accept change:
We opted out of the forty-eight-hour week, but we have to comply
with the EU Directive in terms of adequate breaks each day. This
means that drivers cannot work more than thirteen hours per day.
One problem here is that you are capping earning potential, and this
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could have an adverse impact on future recruitment, to the extent
that it could threaten the existence of GCS. Nevertheless, I cannot
condone anything that breaks the law. This is a live issue, and we are
working very hard on it. It may be that in future drivers will have to
work shifts, and Ministers must accept having more than one driver.
After all, they voted for the EU legislation, and it is not going to go
away!
As Roy Burke points out, the delicate question of drivers’ hours can
have important implications for driver recruitment. In general terms,
GCS has an ageing workforce, and it is not always easy to find the
right type of younger recruit for this specialised job. However, former
GCDA Chief Executive Nick Matheson argues that there can be
serious pitfalls in hiring young drivers:
You can find with some young drivers that they may not be discreet,
and can be rather edgy and pushy in their manner. Being a GCS
driver is perhaps a job for a more mature person. I think that people
who have had extensive experience as chauffeurs, or perhaps have
driven top brass in the services, are those best equipped to do the job.
You have to look at the roots of GCS here. Significantly, the last of
the old Motor Transport Corps drivers only retired shortly before I
arrived at the Agency in 1997, and in the earlier days many drivers
were recruited from the services. I think that we need to re-establish
these links if the numbers and quality of drivers is to be maintained.
Another live issue for GCS brought about by rapid technological
development is in so-called telematics, whereby data on a wide range
of subjects can now be obtained from cars, including distances
travelled and the position of the vehicle. The introduction of many of
these devices has been resisted by the unions, on the grounds that
they constitute an invasion of privacy, so that the driver can feel that
he or she is being spied on. On the other hand, Roy Burke argues that
the wider introduction of telematics can have significant benefits:
A lot of things would be so much easier if we had telematics devices.
For example, when the Liberal Democrats asked us the Parliamentary
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Question on the total mileage by the Agency in 2004–05 and
2005–06 [quoted earlier in this chapter], we gave them the factual
answer that mileage had increased. Unfortunately, this answer was
spun by the Liberal Democrats to make it sound environmentally bad.
We argued that the real reason for the increase was because of the
expansion of short term hire and Green Cars, and that the figure for
allocated mileage was about the same for the two years. With
telematics, we would have known the exact figure for allocated cars. In
addition, we have to do the calculations for CO2 emissions manually.
For the last two years, it required four people working on the figures,
but the telematics devices would allow us to do the calculations
instantly. Nevertheless, there is a lot of union resistance here.
One significant organisational change for GCDA in recent years has
been the switch from responsibility for the Agency being held by the
Cabinet Office, to that of the Department for Transport. After sixty
years of searching for an appropriate home, it could be said that the
DfT represents belated recognition that GCS is basically a transport
organisation. However, Nick Matheson, strongly disagrees with this
move, and argues that it places the agency in a less politically secure
position:
I think that there were considerable advantages for GCDA in staying
with the Cabinet Office. Apart from suffering very little interference,
it was placed right at the centre of government, and did not belong
to any departmental interest. The big problem in being linked to the
DfT is that you can become identified with the interests of that
Department, and so become alienated from other Departments. In
turn, the Transport Secretary may or may not be sympathetic to the
Agency. On the whole, it leaves GCDA more vulnerable.
Nevertheless, it could also be argued that the DfT represents a sign-
ificantly more natural home for GCS than any of its many previous
Whitehall affiliations, and that in any case it is the development of
GCDA itself that will decide the fate of the Service.
Perhaps more crucially, Matheson also argues that the unique
culture and traditions of GCS have to be preserved, and that these can
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guarantee the survival of the Service if things should again turn
against it financially. Amidst the need to adapt to a changing world,
it is easy to overlook the degree of continuity and recurring
challenges that run like a thread through the history of GCS. This can
even be evident in GCS entrepreneurial plans for business expansion.
For example, GCS Director Jerry Doyle emphasises that the Service is
keen to provide transport for special events, and in 2005–06 drove
Ministers from around the world at the G8 summits held in the UK.
This initiative produced over £500,000 in business for the Agency.
Doyle is now looking to provide transport for officials in the build-
up to the 2012 London Olympics. In this respect, there are clear
echoes of the vans provided by the Official Car Service, bought to
transport competitors at the 1948 London Olympics!
Similarly, in stressing the need for GCS to retain the quality and
integrity of its service, it is impossible to avoid conjuring up images,
amongst many, of Kay Summersby driving Eisenhower round
wartime Britain; Tom Hughes catering for Churchill and his cigars;
the long-suffering Bill Housden patiently dealing with the assorted
needs of Harold Wilson’s ‘Kitchen Cabinet’; Ron Vaughan’s sym-
pathetic understanding of Tony Benn; Denis Oliver ensuring that
Margaret Thatcher safely left the bombed Grand Hotel in Brighton;
Beryl Osborne looking after Norman Tebbit and his family in the
aftermath of the Brighton bombing; Kenneth Baker stoutly
defending GCS against its challengers; John Major’s driver inspiring
him for Prime Minister’s Questions with patriotic marches; and Nick
Matheson and his team leading GCDA from the edge of oblivion to
prosperity.
It is in the nature of the service provided by GCS that much of its
work is unobtrusive. Yet telling its story makes clear the degree to
which it forms an integral part of political history, and reveals the
many remarkable individuals involved. If these traditions are
maintained, then the ‘Outer Cabinet’ can surely retain its status as a
national asset.
NOTE
1. Daily Telegraph, 27 February 2007.
The History of the Government Car Service
248
